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BACKGROUND ~ro THE STIJDY. 
Art as a school subject embraces a broad epistemological dornain. It 
is quite acceptable for an art teacher to include in a single art 
curriculum - in other words, to count as 'Art' - such diverse fields as 
art history and ceramics, drawing and metal casting, paper-making and 
basic design, furniture design and the making of videos, conceptual 
art and weaving, book-binding and body art, canputer graphics and 
-wood-carving, clay modelling and photography, painting and 
p9rfonnance. 
In the light of such a diverse range can it be reasonably asswned that 
an art teacher teaches a single discipline? For one may deduce from 
the forms listed that Art in schools may comprise not one fom of 
knowledge, involving essentially one way of knowing, but that in fact 
there may exist instead several forms of knowledge involved in the 
subject called 'Art'. Is the art teacher therefore, not a teacher of 
one subject but a teacher of many? And what are the possible 
implications of the concept (and expectation) of diversity in school 
Art curriculum for what a student may actually learn in, and through 
the subject, including what he or she may learn about the nature and 
purpose of art in society? 
Tb tackle these questions exclusively from the standpoint of art would 
be to deny significant educational considerations, for the questions 
are concerned not only with art but also with education. And 
conversely, failing to explore struc~ural characteristics of art, 
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conceding (for instance) that normative conditions in schools should 
principally determine the content of art curriculum, would also be 
pa.tently inadequate, however prevalent such practice may sometimes be 
in schools themselves. 
The intent of this dissertation is to inquire into that apparent 
morass of diverse knowledge in art - into the educational potential of 
the various philosophies, ideologies, processes and techniques all of 
which can, it seems, legitimately constitute the content of school art 
curriculum. Behind this inquiry is a desire on the part of the writer 
to simply resolve, if only for himself, a long-held problem: the 
problem as to what should count as Art in schools. 
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Tl~U NOiffiY 
Insofar as te.rm-Lnology is concerned, the word 'art' can pose problems. 
One such problem is whether and/or when the word should contain a 
capital 'A'. In this dissertation the word is used with a small 'a' in 
all contexts except those in which reference is made to art as a 
viitual world; that is, as a normative order containing elements which 
may possess no intrinsic relationship to art as such at all. Such 
instances may be seen to occur when reference is made to the school 
subject Art and to the 'world of Art'; both examples connote and 
indeed involve whole sets of relationships -material, social, 
organisational, political and so on - which combine to place artistic 
activity itself within a contextual milieu. 
Whether or not it contains a capital letter, however, 'art' in the 
singular is used to refer exclusively to the so-callE:.u visual arts. 
Since the entire concern of the dissertation is to inquire into what 
should co_unt as art, it rray seem somewhat dismissive to simply assert 
this particular definition of art at the outset. However, the writer 
takes the view that in common usage it is accepted that the singular 
'art' does, in fact, refer to the visual arts. It may have been ITDre 
accurate, perhaps, to use the term 'visual arts' in prefexence to 'art' 
in the text, but 'art' has been preferred for reasons of economy and 
flow. 
The plural 'arts' is also employed in the terms of common usage: that 
is, to denote that whole range of 'artistic' pursuits which are 
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collectively so labelled in everyday language. These are the arts of 
music, drwna, dance, poetry and so on, as well as art itself. 
A complication arises with the adjective 'artistic', for it can be used 
to specifically refer to a condition in respect of art alone, but it 
can, as well, generally describe something as broad as the disposition 
of a person who engages in a number of the arts or who simply behaves 
in a particular way. It is hoped that the specific contexts in the 
text in which the word 'artistic' is used will communicate the 
appropriate :rreaning in each instance. 
A more arbitrary determination however, pertains to the terms 'art 
forms' or 'art activities' as canpared with 'arts forms' or 'arts 
activities'. In this discourse, the two former terms refer to 
different types of art (that is, 'visual arts') as defined, while the 
latter two terms refer to different disciplines in the broad field of 
the arts as defined. 
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INCRODUC'I'ION: VARIE:TY AND SCOPE IN THE ART CUHRIOJLUM. 
r·t is an expectation of Art in mny Tasmanian schools that the subject 
should provide a wide range of art experiences: indeed, accordj~g to 
this belief, the wider the range the better the program:ne. 
Upon what could such a belief be based? Is it a belief derived from 
considerations as to the true nature of art? Is it a belief which 
reflects educational values? Is it a belief which expresses an 
ideology, serving as one of a myriad of connect.ing threads which 
sa:nehow link a society's institutional mnifestations with its deep-
seated system of values and beliefs? 
Is it a combination of all these and other factors? Are the first two 
- art and education - themselves derived from, and built upon the 
third-ideology? Why should a wide scope of activities, of itself, be 
considered important in art curriculum? 
In a (hypothetical) year of high school Art, a child m:q experience 
such diverse activities as screen printing, pottery, filrnrrnaking, 
drawing, photography, jewellery, weaving, painting, art history, 
product design, metal junk sculpture, etching, graphic design, 
puppetry, mask-making and numerous other forms. Now a so-called 'year' 
in high school Art my in actuality comprise a total of only some 
ninety to one hundred-and-sixty hours of actual class time, depending 
upon the child's grade. Given this relative brevity of overall time, 
such a wide scope of subject offerings w:mld offer little in the way 
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of learning in any depth as distinct from superficially 'experiencing'. 
As Dewey (1938) stated, 
Each experience may be lively, vivid and 
'interesting' and yet their disconnectedness 
r~y artifically generate dispersive, disintegrated, 
centrifugal habits. The cons~~ence of formation 
of such habits is inability to control future 
experiences ... some experiences may develop 
callousness, lack of sensitivity and automatic 
skills in a particular direction which land 
(a person) in a groove or rut. 
(p.26). 
Yet for many art educators, offering more and more scope in Art seems 
to be an almost irresistible drive. Variety seems to be an end in 
itself. Could this partly be because the very notion of variety taps 
the nerve-end of a particular deep-seated cultural value? 
Variety is, after all, linked with the value of freedom of choice. 
Without abtmdant variety, the logic goes, freed em of choice cannot in 
turn be abundantly exercised, and freedomof choice is a right. Its 
existence, in fact, stands as testimony to the existence also of that 
wider principle: namely, freedom itself, the great tenet of Democracy. 
As removed from metaphysics as the principle of merely offering a wide 
range of art experiences in a school may be, a quasi-spiritual 
rationale such as this may yet account for the educational 
irrationality of many conceptions and applications of the principle of 
curriculum variety. For in terms of this rationale, a denial of 
variety 'WOuld constitute a denial of freedom, and this 'WOuld be 
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considered 1.mdemocratic. Thus if .:m art curric'Ulum progressively 
cffered less rather than more scope it would be unacceptable even on 
noral gro1.mds. On the other hand, it would seem, the greater the 
variety a curriculum provided, the more the ideal of freedan would be 
manifest and thus, in turn, could be realised by the curriculum. 
others would take a more cynical view of the promotion of variety as a 
value in itself. They vvould regard the internalisation of the value 
as a triumph in conditioning by the capitalist system. Within the 
ethos of consumerism, they would point out, variety is a pre-eminent 
value. If, as Illich (1971, p.5l) asserts, the real purpose of 
schools is to 'educate for disciplined consumption,' then an important 
objective would surely be the edification of this principle of variety 
as a goal in itself. 
Consumerism is the child of capitalism. Thus to educate for 
disciplined consumption would also be to support the survival of 
capitalism. According to Dale (1976), schools contribute to precisely 
this end. From his Marxist perspective he states, 
Schooling is not just one among many of the 
social institutions which contribute to the 
perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production, 
it is arguably the rrost important. 
(p.l). -
Thus variety in art curriculum may constitute more than simply a means 
for the realisation of certain educational ends. Variety in 
curriculum may - albeit tacitly, and below the level of consciousness 
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- be pursued and incorporated in curriculum as an end 1.n itself. 
A highly - varied c:urriculurn may detrirrentally affect learning in 
another way. By constantly shifting from activity to activity, from 
process to process, fran material to material, from a requirement for 
this way of thinking and behaving to that way of thinking and 
behaving, such a curriculum would never perrrd.t a child to reach beyond 
the most superficial contact in anything. This constant shifting and 
superficial contact would in itself also tend to produce behaviours 
and an approach to knowledge tailor-made for disciplined consumption, 
in relation to which constant change, titillating fleeting experience 
and surface image are essential conditions. 
Obviously a curriculum which provides a plethora of one-off 
experiences in a variety of art techniques is simultaneously denying 
opportunities for learning in depth. In respect of learning 
techniques, a widely varied curriculum may never, as a consequence of 
its variety alone, allow a child to effect those critical 
transformations, described by Dewey (1934) and Eisner (1977), when 
inert raw substances such as clay or paint become the media for the 
representation of personal meanings. As Eisner states, 
Without the skills necessary for making 
such a transformation, material never 
achieves the status of a medium and the 
ideas, images, and feelings of the child 
remain locked within the psyche, unable to 
take a public form. 
(p.2). 
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The virtual conspiracy theory which has been propounded - t_he idea 
that curriculum in Art is sanehow intendE:-"C'l. to condition for 
consumerism and the prese1:vation of the capitalist order - may be too 
far-fetched. After all, variety of experience is a basic human need. 
Indeed, as the old cliche reminds us, it is the spice of life. The 
great foe - boredom - is surely kept at bay by variety in human 
experience. And teachers hardly need reminding that variety is 
crucial in curriculum as a benefit to learning. 
The issue raised should not be seen as a question of choosing between 
opposites, between unfettered variety in art experiences at one pole 
and absolutely no variety - for instance, a curriculum which consisted 
entirely of drawing bottles with a 2B pencil - at the other. As Dewey 
(1938) reminds us, to assume polarised positions on educational issues 
is as ludicrous and irrational as it is, unfortunately, prevalent. 
It is a question of degree: of the degree of variety, of balance 
between breadth and depth in art curricula. At present, the principle 
of breadth has, ir. a large number or 'I'asrmnian school art departments, 
assumed an inordinately and, it is felt, a dysfunctionally high 
emphasis in relation to the facilitation of depth. 
Clearly in order to correct such imbalances something in the way of 
curriculum content in Art would have to go. Choices would have to be 
mde between what should be included in, and what should be excluded 
from the Art curriculum. How might these choices be mde? 
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one pc>rticular way of dealin9 with t.his proble..rn derives from the fact 
that, broadly s.p:oaking, the multitude of activities which legitimately 
count as Art in schools may be seen to fall into tJ1ree general 
categories. These are the categories of so-called fine art, so-
called design and so-called craft. 
In the extreme 'breadth' approach, an art teacher will incorporate all 
three categories into his or her curriculum. In many schools, 
however, Art consists largely, or even entirely of a single category. 
Thus what might count as Art in one school may be fine art, in another 
it may be design, in a third, craft. 
So pervasive has the trend towards design become in Britain that the 
name of the subject has been expanded fran 'Art' to 'Art and Design'. 
This new ti·tle itself implicitly makes the point that art and design 
are seen to differ one from the other. The fact that both are yet 
also seen to be properly locatable within the same curriculum slot 
has produced a problematic situation. The situation in schools is 
mirrored at other levels, particularly in tertiary art education, in 
which area, after all , those who wi 1.1 transmit the respective 
epistemologies in schools - art teachers - are trained. · 
Developments in the wider society, particularly in tertiary 
institutions, inevitably have a powerful influence upon what hap~1s 
in schools. In art education, such developments have been strongly 
marked by the struggle - often reaching bitter proportions - between 
fine art and design, with the protagonists of each claiming sole 
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legitimacy as the rightful incumbent of the school's Art curriculum 
and, by extension, to be considered alone to be accepted as Art in the 
wider society. 
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FINE ART VERSUS DESIGN: THE CURRE'Nr CONFLICT' 
Delivering the 1982 Power Lecture in Contemporary Art, the British art 
critic Peter Fuller pointed to perceived problems in art c~ucation 
generated by the wide range and the diverse nature of productive areas 
yet claimed as the legitimate property of art. According to Fuller, 
this catholic conception of art has had serious negative consequences 
for the nature and quality of art education and for the place of art 
and the role of the artist in society. 
With regard to the question as to what should count as art, Fuller 
conceives of a selection of knowledge which is radically narrow. To 
him, painting and sculpture alone (though, one assumes, he would also 
include drawing in his selection), rightly constitute the discipline. 
He states (1982), 
There are historical reasons why I stress 
painting and sculpture. Indeed, I believe 
that in an 'aesthetically healthy' society, 
the aesthetic dimension permeates throughout 
all work, and extends to every part of the 
social organism, regardless of class and 
condition. But we do not live in such a 
society: and painting and sculpture, alone, 
offer this promise of a new reality, realised 
with the existing one. 
(p.l2) . 
A major target for Fuller's attacks on contemporary art education has 
been the Royal College of Art in London. It is not difficult, given 
his strong support for painting and sculpture, to see why. In 1977-
78, the RCA curriculum consisted of the following departments: 
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Ceramics and Glass, ~sign JVlanagE:'ffie_nt, ~sign Research, Environmental 
~sign, Enviroi1ID2ntal Media, Fashion ~sign, Film and Television, 
Furniture Design, General Studies, Graphic Arts, Industrial Design, 
Photography, Silversrnithing and Jewellery, Textile ~sign, Painting 
and Sculpture. (Commonwealth Universities Yearbook 1979, p.692). 
The above list itself suggests that painting and sculpture hardly 
enjoy a position of pre-eminence in the RCA. It is salient to note 
that the word -~sign' , however, is incorporated in no less that seven 
subject labels in the list, suggesting that design prevails in the RCA 
as the dominant orientation. The import of this is considerably 
:rragnified when it is realised that the RCA, as an institution, 
functions as an important legitimating body in determining what counts 
as art, influencing not only other stages of education but also 
society at large with its determinations. 
An analysis of the 1977-78 staffing situation at the RCA provides 
further evidence of the relatively lowly position of painting and 
sculpture in corn.[Brison with the design -oriented fields. Out of a 
total staff canplement (full and part-time) of 119, painting and 
sculpture were served by a total of only twenty staff members between 
them, and most of these were part-timers. In fact, only one person 
out of five in the sculpture department was employed full-time. At 
the same time, the subject ubiquitously dubbed General Studies could 
boast thirteen staff members (eleven part-tirne), while Textile Design 
had seven (four part-tirre) , Furniture Design six (four part-tirne) , and 
Film and Television nine (including only one part-time). (C.U. 
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Yearbook, 1979, p.692). 
If indeed, as Fuller claims, painting and sculpture alone offer the 
promise of an aesthetically heal thy society, then the Royal College of 
Art - with its apparent low emphasis on painting and sculpture - would 
be contributing very little to society's good aesthetic health. 
To the RCA itself, however, such an accusation would be preposterous. 
For its part, the RCA would claim that t..he good aesthetic health of 
society is indeed its major concern. Moreover, it would not :rrerely 
make such a case on the basis of the cultural rub-off deriving from 
the College's traditional esteem and its presence in a large city. 
Rather, the RCA would claim that an aesthetically healt.hy society is a 
deliberate objective: that such an objective, in fact, constitutes the 
College's very raison d 'etre and is he.nce the daminant guiding 
principle in its curriculum determinations. 
The college could point to the utility and relevance of the very 
labels of its subject offerings - Environmental Design, Fashion 
Design, Film and Television, Furniture Design and Industrial Design, 
for instance - as evidence of its concern for the aesthetic health of 
the society. Such labels of themselves denote the existence of an 
educational philosophy which would apparently seek to plant the visual 
arts squarely within the wider social dorrain. 
To a significant extent the word 'design' itself achieves social 
acceptability. Indeed the respectability attached to the word has not 
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gone unexploited. The word 'design' connotes order. Its 'inege' (its 
rhetorical value) is the antithesis of one of unbridled, undisciplined 
anotional expressiveness by which terms detractors love to portray the 
character of fine art. Design stands for order, fine art for chaosi 
design means stability, fine art rneans revolution; design conjures up 
images of individuals harnessed to the common weal, fine art only 
images of anarchists. There are significant political dimensions of 
the design-versus-fine art issue. 
In an article entitled 'Art's Last StBnd?', (Times Educational 
Supplement, 29.7.83), Bernard Denvir describes how the British 
National Advisory Bcdy on Art and Design Education's prescribed 
across-the-board ten percent cut in funding to colleges of art was 
effected in some institutions. He cites the case of the Ravensbourne 
College of Art and Design - a college controlled by the London borough 
of Bromley - which decided, in the face of the necessary ten percent 
cut, to close dCMm its television technicians' training course, 'the 
functions of which could be carried out by the industry itself, and 
which had never had any integral relationships with the main college~ 
(p.28) 
Denvir (1983) reports, however, 
But Bromley Educational Committee decided 
otherwise. Fine Art '!Nauld go oompletely, 
and the College '!Nauld become a 'college of 
Design for Industry' • This rocmstrous 
decision now seems as though it is going to be 
implemented. 
V\hat is happening at Ravensbourne looks like 
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being repeated all over the country. 'l'he 
reasons are many and complex. Dominant is 
the attitude of the present Government, which 
in the field of art and design, as well as Ln 
the wider academic area, seems obsessively 
concerned with technology, in the narrower 
sense of the word, and instinctively opposed 
to any discipline which does not have an 
immediately obvious practical application. 
Nor is this attitude peculiar to a handful 
of backwoods ideologists. Especially in 
local government circles of the more traditional 
kind, there is a deep feeling that art and 
anarchy are virtually synonymous, an attitude 
reinforced by memories of 1968 when Homsey College 
of Art played a prominent part in the wave of 
student unrest. 
(p.28) 
According to this view, the emphasis on design and the demise of fine 
art in British art education is due not only to the British 
Government's obsession with technology. It also relates to the notion 
of control. 
Denvir implies that the British Government lS able to determirte what 
counts as Art in education simply because, as his examples clearly 
show, it holds the purse-strings. 
One may speculate that the extent of such poWE!r would be considerably 
less if the overall economic climate in Britain was in a healthier 
state. If it were, then perhaps curriculum content in art 'WOuld not 
be subjected to the same scrutiny, the same pressures, the same 
demands to account for diminishing funds and resources. 
If there was more money made available to go round, it could be 
expected that the same insistence on cuts, and the pressure on 
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educational institutions of such cuts simply being in the air would be 
largely dissipated. Ravensoourne College of Art, for instance, would 
probably never have been forced to face the possibility, let alone 
experience the reality of losing its fine art deparbnent were it not 
for a 'necessary' ten percent cut in its funding. 
Thus the current emergence of design and the accompanying demise of 
fine art in curriculum could perhaps be substantially explained as an 
outcome of the scramble for diminishing funds - a scramble which 
places obvious requirements on accountability, in which stakes design 
has a considerable advantage. 
Historically in Britain, so-called design and so-called fine art have 
co-existed in school and college art curricula since the introduction 
in the 1830 s of Art in general education. This relationship has 
traditionally ebbed and flowed, but in general terms a consensus has 
existed between them, a situation not difficult to maintain during 
relatively prosperous times. 
Consensus, or co-existence, is not difficult to achieve when resources 
for all are perceived to be in relative abundance, for buoyant 
economic circumstances offer the hope of something for everybody. 
~pressed circumstances, on the other hand, produce a scramble for 
ever-dimishing resources. 
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As Partridge (1971) explains, consensus lS the outcorre of 
... ;accarunodations' between conflicting 
interests and demands, which the groups 
concerned are willing to accept for the 
tirre being as a base from which further 
demands can .be projected. 
(p.94). 
He goes on, however, to state: 
It would scarcely be plausible to assert 
that agreement about the "rules of the 
garre ' can co-exist with any sort and 
volume of economic and social conflict. 
(p.95). 
Here Partridge provides not only a rationale for consensus but also a 
rationale for conflict. Applying his view to the issue of fine art 
versus design, it would mean that so long as the two camps could each 
perceive for itself a possible place in the sun, a limited degree of 
dissensus between them could easily be tolerated, even encouraged, for 
such encouragement could itself testify to the 'lively debate' in the 
field. However, with the erosion of faith in the systEm to provide 
such a place in the sun for both, any heal thy dissent would soon be 
replaced by bitter conflict. 
This notion may principally explain why fine art and design are today 
at loggerheads over the issue as to which should count as Art in 
education. They are at loggerheads because each perceives the effects 
of the wider socio-econanic situation such that there is no longer 
roan for both. It is a fight to the death. 
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Designers have gone onto the attack by asserting that design is 
socially useful, responsible and constructive. Fine art is portrayed 
by them in an opposite light - as being socially useless, 
irresponsible and destructive. Nor would such criticism necessarily 
offend fine artists, rrany of whom have long basked in seductive 
notoriety as society's 'enfants terrible', operating within a legacy of 
a traditional recalcitrance to collaborate with society at large. 
Even Matthew Arnold ( 1880) described the function of poetry - close 
kin to painting and sculpture - in such terms. He saw poetry as being 
rightly concerned with criticism of, rather than subservience to 
society's prevailing panaceas: 
OUr religion parading evidences such as those 
on which the popular mind relies now; our 
philosophy, pluming itself on its reasonings 
about the causation and finite and infinite 
being: what are they but the shadows and 
dreams and false show of knowledge? The 
day will come when we shall wonder at 
ourselves for having trusted to them, for 
having taken them seriously; and the more 
we perceive their hollowness, the more we shall 
prize the breadth and finer spirit of knowledge 
offe:>:"ed to us by poetry ...• More and more Plank inC\ 
will discover that we have to turn to poetry 
to interpret life for us, to console us, to 
sustain us . 
•.• The consolation and the story will be of 
power in proportion to the power of the 
criticism of life. 
(in Murray, 1917, p.78) 
Herbert Marcuse is committed to a similar view as to the significance 
of what he terms the 'critical, negating function of art'. He states 
(1977), 
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The inner logic of the 'MJrk of art 
terminates in the emergence of another 
reason, anotl1er sensibility, which defy 
the rationa 1i ty and sensibi 1i ty incoq::orated 
in the dominant social institutions. 
(p. 7). 
Art, according to Marcuse, constitutes 
... an invalidation of dominant norms, 
needs and values. With all its affirmative-
ideological features, art remains a dissenting 
force.· 
(1977, p.8). 
It is claimed by Shahn (1957) that the pre-eminent concern of fine art 
is with expressing essentially what is human about human beings. If 
this is so, however, the popular conception that the 'critical, 
negating function of art' represents total negation and abuse of 
humanity 'MJuld be unfounded. It could in fact be claimed by mny fine 
artists that their art portrays aspects of life which those who are 
likely to hold the misconception that artists are socially 
irresponsible have themselves dehumanised. 
The beauty with which the artist is expected to ingratiate the 
philistine is of the saccharine kind. There is, however, another 
notion of beauty of art, and this is the notion which adrni ts the 
intelligent, perceptive, autonomous artist who can rightly exist as a 
social critic. It is the notion expressed by Keats' famous lines: 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty - that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know • 
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It is also the notion of beauty 1n art alluded to by Rodin: 
As it is the power of character which makes 
for beauty in art, it often happens that 
something which is ugly in nature is beautiful 
in art. 
Such blatantly non-utilitarian sentiments, however noble-sounding, 
serve no useful purpose for today's Prosaic Man, to use George 
Morgan's (1970) term. 'Prosaic Man' reg11ires that all facets of life 
be fashioned into forms which are not only apprehendable by, but also 
serviceable to him. 
It is clear where Prosaic Man would stand in relation to the fine art-
versus-design conflict. To him, designers solve problems; artists 
create them. Designers make useful things; artists celebrate the 
uselessness of fine art. The products of design are easily 
comprehended; those of fine art are purposely incomprehensible. 
Design exists in order to please; the function of fine art is to 
shock. Wher•::as design is ·truly denocratic because it takes unto 
itself concern for the welfare of the common person, fine art is 
anarchistic, even nihilistic, at the same time as it is fundamentally 
elitist. 
Pitted against Prosaic Man - the ally of the designer - the battle for 
fine art has been a tough affair. It has becorre alrrost totally 
unwinnable for fine art when it has been fought in the public rredia -
the haneground of Prosaic Man so championed by the designer but so 
ostracised by the fine artist. Fuller ( 1982) reports how 'The 
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Guardian' once took up t.he cause, the paper imploring that 
... scarce resources forrrerly offered 
to scruffy painters and sculptors should be 
switched to designers who might make some 
concrete contribution to Britain's export 
drive. 
(p.5). 
In Australia, Melbourne's 'Sunday Observer' (28.12.75) launched its own 
virulent attack on the 'scruffy' fine artists, trumpeting, 
Crack down on the Artful Dcdgers. That 
should be one of the first tasks of the 
Fraser Government. 
Under Labour we saw an immense waste of 
taxpayer's money in hand-outs to alleged 
artists, writers, musicians and the like. 
Most of them misused the m::mey. 
Recipients could be found day and night 
in pubs around the town, grogging away the 
rroney earned by productive workers. 
~he rather rrore prestig1ous 'Times Educational Review', (12.12.75)- in 
an article written by the then-Head of General Studies at the Royal 
College of Art, Professor Christopher Cornford - may well have 
provided the arrrnunition for the Sunday Observer's onslaught. (Note 
the respective publication dates.) In somewhat more sophisticated 
terms, Cornford yet deployed the same basic strategy as that of the 
Observer in his own broadside on fine art, rhetorically titled 'Art 
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for Society's Sake'. Cornford asserted, 
I think they (art schools) are often 
grievously deficient in critical muscle, 
theoretical backbone, and awareness of their 
own social and cultural context. 
As a result, particularly on the fine art 
side, .irnrne..nse arrDunts of time and materials 
are wasted on half-convinced regurgitations 
of current international styles culled from 
the art magazines. And on the part of all 
too many staff there is an unexamined consensus 
to the effect that somet~ing called 'self-
expression' must be the sole and supreme value 
and objective in the process of art education. 
(p.l7). 
The isolation of the fine artist is the stuff of romantic saga. Art 
history abounds with examples of the struggling recluse which stir the 
imagination: Michelangelo, El Greco, Rembrandt, Goya, I.autrec, Van 
Gogh, Gauguin, Cezanne, Munch, Modigliani, Pollock among many others. 
How could such often self-styled social misfits possibly be equipped 
to fulfil Cornford's ideal of producing 'art for society's sake? 
The designer, on the other hand, identifies his or her role as one 
which can only be justified and validated if it is functioning within 
and for society. But the design mentality tends to press for more 
than a merely servile social role for itself. Clues to this may be 
found in the vocabulary of the designer: in such words as 'integrate', 
'rationalise', 'systematic', 'co-ordinate', 'structure', 'inter-
disciplinary' and 'solution'. The design mentality - or ideology -
embraces the notion of control even to the point where, according to 
Denvir,for example, control itself appears to have priority over 
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people. 
t>envir (1983, p.29) describes how the Eoyal College of Art, responding 
to a 1981 government ultimatum that its grant would be cut 'unless it 
paid more attention to the needs of industry', appointed as its new 
rector Lionel March, a man with a background in mathematics before his 
becoming a Professor at the Open University. According to Denvir, 
March - 'a committed believer in the notion that canputers take 
precedence over people in the creation of good design' promptly 
appointed a new dean, also from the Open University, 'who shared his 
belief in mechanistic perfectionism.' 
Far fran retreating fran society in the manner of the archetypal fine 
artist, and as distinct from merely serving society's whims for new 
products, design as ideology involves the very orchestration of 
society. Consider how potentially far-reaching in this respect is 
Cornford's (1975) appeal for education in design, 'as distinct from 
either art or craft': 
'Design' in this context doesn't mean 
scaled down imitations of, or excerpts from, 
current professional practice. It refers to 
every imaginable kind of planning and decision-
making process that results in the man-made 
environment being what it is - not to mention 
the consideration of what it might become. 
Inquiry might start with: 'Hovv might we 
rearrange the seating in this classroom?' and 
end with: "What are the pros and cons of the 
new housing estate at X or the proposed motorway 
through Y?' 
It is not far-fetched to imagine that if 
such a curriculum became pervasive (and, rightly 
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seen, it is a core subject in the curriculum, 
having implications in art, craft, engineering, 
horre economics, science, social studies, civics, 
geography, local history) there would come into 
being not only a substantial core of excellent 
recruits to all design, environmental and planning 
professions, but also a massive public both able 
and determined to assume an active role in 
grass-roots democracy. 
(p.l7). 
Cornford's Utopian scenario, if instituted in schools as the content 
for art curriculum, would, it is plain to see, constitute not merely 
alternative content for a curriculum in which selections of knowledge 
inevitably have to be made in any case. Rather it would appear to 
describe an entirely new subject, involving a vastly different 
discipline from that of Art as it has been conventionally identified 
in schools. 
Certainly, 'Art for society's sake' in the terms outlined by Cornford, 
is a concept which Marcuse (1977) diametrically opposes. From 
Marcuse 's Marxist perspective, 
The concept of art as an essentially 
autonomous and negating productive force 
contradicts the notion which sees art as 
performing an essentially dependent, 
affirmative ideological function, that is 
to say, glorifying and absolving the existing 
society. 
(p.ll). 
Fuller, h..iJTlself appearing to owe sorre debt to Marcuse, describes this 
general distinction between opposition to, and affirmation of society 
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in terms of what he sees as struggles 
between those who are basically 
'collaborationist' in outlook towards the 
existing culture, and those who perceive 
that the pursuit of the "aesthetic 
dime.nsion" involves a rupture with, and 
refusal of, the means of production and 
reproduction peculiar to that culture. 
(1982, p.S). 
Fuller relates how the fundamental ideological cleavage between fine 
art and design became open conflict at the Royal College of Art during 
the mid-seventies. The respective chief protagonists during this 
drawn-out battle were the then - Rector, Richard Guyatt,who, according 
to Fuller (1982, p.S), 'had a background in advertising and the graphic 
arts', and Peter de Francia, Professor of Painting. 
But if fine artists and their advocates believe that design is a quite 
different thing fran fine art, theirs is a view not shared with 
designers when it comes to the question of control . For designers 
(when it suits them) claim that art -indeed all the arts - fall within 
the aegis of design. The previously - cited key words from the 
designer's vocabulary- words (concepts) which include 'control', 
'integrate' and 'rationalise' - suggest that the notion of design as the 
umbrella discipline for all the arts is absolutely consistent with the 
whole design ethos of control. 
Another RCA Professor - Bruce Archer, in 1980 Head of Design Research 
- has attempted to justify this all-encompassing rationale for design. 
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In a paper entitled 'The Arts in Education' - for which, presuma.bly, 
his own professional background as a chartered mechanical engineer 
provided no hindrance to his knowledge on the subject - he vaguely 
refers to 
... the field of Design, compnslng the 
creative arts .•. and I could provide 
ar1 etymological justification for the 
word /design' if I had time. 
(Writer's emphasis, Archer, 1980, p.9.) 
If, however, design were to prevail over fine art as the content of 
school curricula in Art, such a victory would not have come about 
simply as the result of an analysis of the original meanings of words, 
even if time were available to Archer to provide them. It would have 
largely, however, come about as the result of the systematic sustained 
bombardment with such rhetoric by designers such as Cornford, Archer 
and Petelin. The nature of their advocacy has been blatantly 
political. 
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DESIGN VERSUS FI!\'E AE'I': RESPONDING TO THE CALL F'OR ACCOONrABILITY. 
Vklatever has needed to J:x:~ done in society at large has been 
transmitted to education and transmuted into responsibilities for our 
schools - and thus diffused as the rightful concerns and 
responsibilities of other social institutions and of politicians. 
Education is hailed as the great Universal Cure-All. Whatever has 
needed to be done in western society - from waging wars on poverty to 
landing a man on the rnJOn, from instilling respect for traditional 
values to imparting knowledge of the facts of life, fran being 
prepared for work to being prepared for leisure - for all this and 
much more, not the least of which is somehow reconciling all these 
demands with getting Back to Basics, G~e school constitutes The Great 
White Hope. As former Michigan Governor Milliken (1972) put it, 
We live in a time of multiple crises, and 
no approach to the solution of these crises 1s 
as promising as education. 
(p.68). 
The sense of urgency typically expressed in such statements is often 
intended to provide the platform for radical action of the rrost urgent 
import. In this way, rnassi ve intrusions into education by vested 
interests may be legitimated and accepted by a consenting but 
manipulated community which mistakenly believes that the intiUsions 
represent, in fact, democratic actions taken on its behalf. 
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Recent attempts a·t introducing rrandatory literacy--nurneracy tests and 
external examinations at t~e end of compulsory schooling (grade 10) by 
a conservative government in 'rasm:.1.nia provide examples of this 
approach. In this instance, 'great concern' about 'lower standard...s' 
(despite educational surveys which have shown that standards have, in 
fact, been steadily improving) have preceded the merely inevitable 
imposition of the government's will. These attempts could be 
construed as straightforward expressions of the functionalist ideology 
of a government :rrerely purporting to be responsibly :rreeting an 'urgent' 
need. 
Clearly, educational changes of this magnitude and character produce a 
rrassive impact on the nature of schooling. At least one Hobart 
secondary school, in response to the possible imposition of the 
literacy-numeracy tests intended by the State Government to be 
conducted at the end of grade 10, has already (in 1984) approached its 
feeder primary schools with the notion that they (the feeder schools) 
operate a comm::m core curricuh:un in rrathematics which might prepare 
children for the particular high school's awn first year mathematics 
curriculum. 
To accede to this pressure V\Duld, according to one of the affected 
primary school Principals, be to deny important philosophical bases 
of, as well as stifle successful teaching methods in primary 
education. It is seen by him to constitute a virtual return to the 
long-abandoned Ability Tests (Eleven-Plus examinations) which once 
effectively served to stratify and classify children at the end of 
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·their primary schooling for their subsequent educational experiences 
and allocate them for their various roles in life. 
Perhaps the condition of consumerism is itself so all-consuming that 
the ethos of the warket-place has become totally internalised within 
the collective psyche of the populace. If so it would mean that this 
ethos may have also become manifest as the set values and beliefs by 
which the entire spectrum of human affairs are judged, including 
education. 
That this seems to be so is rrore than implicit in the words of 
Wildavsky (1970) who, it should be noted, is in this instance 
discussing education (not toothpaste on the supermarket shelf): 
Consumers of govern~ent services are 
entitled to know what they are getting. 
Truth in packaging applies just as much to 
government as to private industry. 
(p.212). 
The conception of education as a giant packaging industry, in which 
products must meet the prescribed needs of consumers is, of course, 
total anathema to that traditional bastion of the ethos of the 
autonomous individual and free thinking: the fine arts. It is little 
wonder that within the current hysteria of accountability, the 
position of fine art in art curriculum is under extreme pressure. 
The position of design in relation to the values of accountability is, 
hCJ'i.Vever, one of canpatibility. For in a design curriculum consumers 
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of education are indeE-xl able to know and detennine what they are 
getting. Truth 1n packaging does not relate to design in purely 
rretaphorical terms: it consi tutes an inherent design principle. Above 
all, design is attractive to the consumer mentality because design is 
an integral part of the very production of rraterial goods on which 
consumerism feeds. 
The orientation tCJ.Nard design in art education may be seen as a 
response to the call for accountability in education generally. It 
is considerably easier for a school to justify a design curriculum 
than it is a fine art curriculum to a lay camnunity which ultimately 
foots the bill for education. It is relatively easy for vested 
interest groups - including conservative politicians - to promote 
design by imploring the lay corrmunity that it should insist on getting 
value for money in art education. Precisely because the community of 
taxpayers is essentially a lay corrmunity, its notion of value for 
money tends to be based on the extent to which art education, like 
education in general, is able to deliver easily-perceived, short-term, 
utilitarian and 1raterial benefits - to itse.lf. In their respect1ve 
capacities to so deliver there is simply no contest between design and 
fine art. Design wins hands down. 
In his paper, 'A Rationale for Design Education in Australian 
Schools', George Petelin (1981) implies that whereas fine art is 
virtually irrelevant (as well as it is irreverent) to society at 
large, design - in complete contrast - offers nothing but improvements 
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for the lot of the cornrron p2rson. He states, 
Unlike Fine Art which is not governed by 
any restrictions, Design cannot be stored 
away in museums to be looked at for 
occasional stimulus. We all have to 
constantly live with it. It is not an end 
in itself and it is a large part of our 
inescapable environment. Therefore, its 
ultimate rationale and criterion lies in its 
improvement of p20ple's day-to-day existence. 
( p. 3) • 
To schools increasingly required within the prevailing climate to 
respond to the call for accountability, the app2al of design as the 
basis of art curriculum is obviously strong. One of the major 
dysfunctions of the present-day accountability sctrrry in education is 
that it is the capacity of a bcx::J.y of knowledge to be easily explained 
and justified to non-students - and done so not in terms which are 
intrinsic to the discipline but in terms of extrinsic needs - which 
largely determine its viability as curriculum content. 
Yet to Wildavsky, one of the champions of the accountability movement, 
giving the taxpayers what they want in terms which they can readily 
canprehend is an essential requirement of education. To him, 
The ability of ordinary citizens to 
appraise whether they are getting what 
they want is of critical importance in 
a system of democratic government. 
(1970, p.212). 
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Key phrases here such as 'ordinary citizens ... getting what ·they want' 
and 'a system of de .. rrocratic government' typify the rhetoric of the 
crusaders of accot1ntability. These crusaders rely upon the reflexive 
appeal to Prosaic Man of such phrases and of simplistic but appealing 
rationales designed to prorrote, above all, the cause of accountability 
itself, which is to say t~e ideology which underpins it. Thus one may 
deduce that Wildavsky,for one, seeks to ensure the perpetuation of 
conservative values in education and functionalist ideology in society 
at large in his calls for educational accountability. 
Design is inherently supportive of such values. It gives ordinary 
people what they want, in tenns they can understand, and it raises no 
potentially subversive social questions. 
In education and society today, in which scientism reigns supreme, the 
dominant evaluative process involves empiricism and the quantification 
of results. Implicit in scientific method is objectivity; and 
objectivity, in turn, seeks to realise the truth in phenomena which 
are external to the perceiving subject. Thus contempxary evaluation 
systems are based on the notion that empirical method, producing 
quantifiable results, is therefore objective -which is to say truth-
revealing. 
Gilbert Murray's (1917) description of the nature of revelation in 
literature would appal the scientific evaluators in the 
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accountability rrow;rnent. According to Murray, 
... words of inspiration or revelation 
... never are concerned with direct scientific 
fact or even with that part of experience which 
is capable of being expressed in exact statement . 
. . . They are al 1 in the nature of the guess that 
goes before scientific knowledge; the impassioned 
counsel of one who feels strongly but cannot in 
the nature of things, prove his case.· 
(pp.lOl-102). 
Statements of this kind are ripe for attack in an age which worships 
science. One could e:xr:x:=ct them to be regarded as decadent, 
subjective, romantic and, since their claims cannot be verified 
objectively (that is, scientifically, quantitatively), such statements 
could not be proven to be true. Because it is inherently antipathetic 
to scientific measurement - the teeth of accountability - fine art as 
a body of knowledge has become subjected to considerable pressure in 
contemporary education. Design, on the other hand, is eminently 
reconcilable with the prevailing ethos: hence the increasing momentum 
in schools to ccunt d2 sign a:3 Art . 
Design tasks fit scientific evaluation because they involve pre-
determined objective criteria (design briefs) against which results 
{design products) can be assessed. In fine art, however, the artist 
often begins with no concrete idea at all, but simply with a response 
or an impulse . Pollock alludes to this in his statement, 
When I am 1 in' my painting I'm not aware 
of what I'm doing. It's only after a sort 
of 'get-acquainted" period that I realise 
what I'm about. 
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At such a statement the scientific evaluator would be aghast. To him, 
Pollock's art would represent the epitome of mindless self-indulgence. 
How would it be possible to empirically evaluate this artistic impulse 
and produce a quantified (that is, a truth-revealing) result? It 
=uld not be done. Would it, therefore, be true to =nclude that 
there is no such thing as the artistic :in1pulse? If this is so, 
however, it may also be true to say that other non-material 
manifestations of the human spirit such as love, religious experience 
and aesthetic experience - along with the human spirit itself -
similarly do not exist in the lives of human beings. 
There is surely a m::>re than reasonable J::ody of evidence fran human 
history- if one needed to refer to anything outside one's own 
sensibilities - which suggests that such manifestations have not 
simply existed, but may have even been the crucial determinants in the 
course of human affairs. Empiricism in the form of historical 
evidence at least shows us (if we required the affirmation) that 
sanething like the human spirit, and many distinctive facets of it, 
indeed exist. 
In mocking the ineptitude of quantitative measurement to evaluate such 
essentially non-quantifiable dimensions of the human psyche, David 
Best (1980) relates a fictional tale of two lovers anxious to express 
their love for one another. 'I'm dying to tell you how much I love 
you', said one to the other, 'but I forgot my pocket-calculator! v 
(p. 5). 
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Yet the somewhat infa'!lous Michigan Education Assessment Program (MEAP) 
set out with the precise mission of quantifying the unguantifiable. 
In a 1976 address, Sir Alec Clegg cited some so-called performance 
criteria which he had encountered 'a short time before' in Michigan. 
Among Clegg's cited examples from MEAP documents were the following: 
By the end of the pre-kindergarten experience 
90% of all children will demonstrate their 
recognition of at least three of the five 
basic emotions - fear, anger, sadness, joy, 
and love in self and others, as measured by 
a Michigan Educational Assessmert Program, 
or MEAP. 
By the end of the third grade (in Art) , 
students will voluntarily choose linear media 
to interpret personal feelings as measured by 
a minimum criteria on an Objectives Reference 
Test. 
By the end of the third grade (in M.lsic), 
children will create vocal or instrumental 
accompaniments to songs using combinations 
of melodic, harmonic, or rhythmic patterns 
as measured by an Objectives Reference Test . 
... (For example), while the class sings the 
chorus of Oh Susanna the child plays the 
tambourine any way he chooses. 
(Clegg, 1976, pp.l0-11). 
'lb Clegg, accountability in education is 'the scourge of the decade.' 
(p.ll) 
It is not the child at all upon whom such accountability programmes 
fundamentally focus, but performance itself. Considerations as to any 
intrinsic value of an art =riculum for the individual child are 
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therefore secondary. According to Eisner (1979) 1 
... such approaches, and the methods of 
inquiry that are regarded as legitimate within 
their borders, fail to tell the whole story. 
As a result of the partial view that such 
methods provide, a biased, even distorted 
picture of the reality that we are attempting 
to understand and improve can oc=. In some 
respects this result is paradoxical because 
the stringent canons of social science 
methodology are the product of a desire to 
reduce bias and diminish distortion: the 
claim that they may in fact contribute to 
bias and distortion is a severe critique, 
if true, and a paradox of their intention. 
(p.ll) 
One might question, however, whether in fact the Michigan performance 
criteria do constitute a paradox of their intention, if, as one 
assumes, Eisner is referring to an inherent educational intention in 
the statement above. Indeed the Michigan tests may have produced a 
highly successful realisation of their intention: that is, to 
condition rather than to educate in the fullest sense. 
In his book, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, (cited in Bowers, 
1972), Raymond Callahan alludes to such conditioning in education, 
drawing a close parallel between the accountability movement and the 
principles of so-called Scientific Management - that early twentieth 
century organisational system whose character was reflected in the 
label, Cult of Efficiency. 
In describing how the old Cult of Efficiency ethos transferred from 
big business to education in the 'twenties, Callahan could mistakenly 
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be thought to be describing the situation in many schools and 
education systems today. He writes, 
... educational decisions were subordinated to 
business considerations, ... administrators were 
produced who were not, in any true sense, 
educators, ... a scientific label was put on 
some very unscientific and dubious methods and 
practices; and an anti-intellectual climate 
already prevalent was strengthened. 
(in Bowers, 1972, p.30) 
Nash and Agne (1972) also attack the pervading scientism which so 
distinguishes the posturing of the contemporary warlords of 
accountability, and maintain that there simply exist far too many 
variables in human behaviour to allow for reliable measurement: 
The true scientist is aware of this, but 
not the human engineer. 
(p.365). 
According to Nash and Agne, it is the htlJ!'iF1 Pngineer who has beP.n 
pressed into service in order to instil in the young 'the technocratic 
values of predictability, objectivity and efficiency.' (p.364) 
(1972) reports his perception of 
..• the greater move towards accountability 
and the transformation of education into a 
technology that will rrake the control of 
students more effective. 
(p. 30) 
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Bowers 
The fundamentally dysfunctional character of accountability systems in 
the U.S., such as the Michigan system described by Clegg, largely 
derive from their attempts at pressing the disciplines of liberal 
education, including art, into the service of technocracy. 
The two are irreconcilable. Liberal education, of its nature and 
indeed by literal definition, is the antithesis of a system which 
would seek to control, sterotype and condition individuals. The 
inclination, however, for the content of art =ricula to retain overt 
identification with typical liberal content and principles at the same 
time as being subjected to quantifiable performance criteria of a 
behaviorist ilk ~y represent but an attempt to lay a veneer of 
liberalism over more sinister intentions. R.H.S. Crossman (1937) 
imagines that Plato would have viewed such a scenario thus: 
-For the general education you so highly 
praise does not make the masses free, but 
inculcates only a false self esteem and 
pretentiousness, with the result that they 
are not less but rrore liable to be misled and 
deceived by the rogues and tricksters whose 
profession it is to sEll Enlightenment and 
Culture to them. It is not the humble 
craftsman but the get-rich-quick merchants 
who thrive .•• The rrore educated your people 
become, the rrore easily they are swindled and 
deceived by the self-same trickery decked out 
in the trappings of science and culture and 
even religion. 
(p.l07) 
In these terms, art curricula which comprised purely design content or 
which imposed strict performance criteria on supposedly liberal fine 
art content would serve to deflect students' concerns away from the 
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otherwise potentially subversive and highly volatile inquiries and 
statements which are characteristic of fine art. 
Attempts at conditioning are precisely what fine art diametrically, 
traditionally, perhaps instinctively opposes. Indeed, such opposition 
- in the view of Arnold (1880) and Mrrcuse (1977) - constitutes the 
raison d'etre of fine art. It is an opposition which, according to 
McLuhan ( 1964), arises so vehemently because fine artists perceive the 
contradiction so clearly - 'precisely because fine artists are experts 
in depth-perception'. 
In contrast to the designer, the fine artist typically affronts 
Prosaic Man with his or her work. Far frc:m seeking to woo the 
politician, the business person and the person in the street, the fine 
artist will often seek to insult t.J-,em. How could fine art hope to win 
out over design in any head-to-head contest for which Prosaic Man is 
the judge? For it is the ordinary citizen who is increasingly 
determining the actual content of school =riculurn. According to 
Wildavsky (1970), this is a principle and a function which must be 
rigorously exercised: 
The ability of ordinary citizens to 
appraise whether they are getting what they 
want (in education) is of critical importance 
in a system of democratic government. 
(p.2l2). 
In an age of accountability, then, design measures up, fine art does 
not. 
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However, can one seriously claim that the unlque propensity of human 
beings to make meaningful images of themselves and their world - a 
propensity which has been abundantly demonstrated for virtually as 
many millennia as man has been treading the earth - has been a 
misguided, irrelevant, useless and socially-undesirable preoccupation 
after all? And is it also true that only nON are we, with the gift of 
scientific evaluation, able to make such a judgement? 
Of course such a claim is nonsense. Yet the ultimate logic of both 
the design ideology and the accountability rrovement would seem to lead 
to the conclusion that fine art, at least as it has existed this 
century, is a social misfit. 
The picture so far has portrayed fine art - despite its promotion by 
some as the sole means of realising an aesthetically healt."ly society 
- as being under serious attack from both the world of design and 
forces of accountability. '1\o.D general paths have been taken by those 
who would seek to make art education more accountable to the 
'cor,sumers' of educational 'products.' 
The mainly British direction has been to address the content of art 
=riculum, substituting a mainly design orientation for a largely 
fine art one. American accountability systems, on the other hand, 
have focussed more upon methodology, with traditional fine art content 
continuing to be pursued, but now in ways geared to the purportedly-
objective measurement of student performance. 
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The British model reflects a concern to make art education more 
meaningful, more relevant, more accessible, and hence more accountable 
to all social groups. Here the radical revision of curriculum content 
is an apparent manifestation of the educational objective of equality 
of outcomes. This objective largely derives from conception of 
traditional =riculum as a selection of knowledge from high culture 
only and thereby strongly favouring children who already belong to 
that culture. Therefore, the rationale goes, in order to attain the 
objective of educational equality, the actual content of the 
=riculum should be rendered free of cultural specificity. Rather, 
the content of =riculum should be culturally neutral. 
If a =riculum is to be culturally neutral, the knowledge which it 
contains would have to be essentially objective in character. And 
sin~e the discipline of science is considered the epit~e- of cultural 
neutrality and objectivity, then the more seemingly scientific the 
content and methodology of a =riculum the better. In this way, the 
more seemingly scientific a curriculum, the more it could realise the 
objective of equality of outcomes and -~us tl1e obJective of 
educational equality in generaL 
It is paradoxical that whilst science is regarded as the supreme 
repository for all that is objective and rational, notions such as 
'equality of outcomes' and 'educational equality' are clear expressions 
of the subjective-the antithesis of science in the popular 
consciousness. Nevertheless, the content and, particularly, the 
methodology of design are far more akin to the scientific mode than is 
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the case with fine art. Thus it is perceived that design, as the 
content of Art curriculum, may contribute to achieving the objective 
of equal educational outcomes. For design itself is perceived as 
being culturally neutral. It is seen to neither alienate nor to 
confer advantage on any particular social group. It is therefore 
easily assumed that design constitutes objective knowledge, and this 
identifies it with science. Of greatest significance, however, is the 
fact that both design and science share a canmon relation: technology. 
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THE RCOTS OF SCHOOL ART EDUCATION IN THE 
NEEDS OF INDUSTRY 
Fran its earliest days, art in British general education has been 
linked with technology - in other words, with the needs of industry. 
Efland (1982) explains that the sole objective of art education in the 
early nineteenth century was 
to socialise youth into a system of 
industrial education. Corrmon school 
art was a response to the Industrial 
Revolution. 
(p.l50). 
The revolutionary new means of production in the last century - the 
division of labour and the creation of the factory - led to the demise 
of craftsman - training in design of the organic kind, which was 
inherent in the old tradition of workshop production. 
Carnon-school art was an attempt to redress this. loss, and to 
ultimately realise an improvement in the design of British 
manufactures. Thus in its statement on the National Art Training 
School, 'The Year's Art' of 1880 notes, 
·The courses of instruction have for their object 
the systematic training of teachers, JIB.le and 
female, in the practice of Art and in the knowledge 
of its scientific principles, ... (JIB.king them) 
competent to develop the application of·Art to the 
corrmon uses of life and to the requirerrents of 
trade and manufactures. 
(p.92). 
And fifty-four years later, the 1934 edition, under the heading of 
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'Industry's Need of Art' , proclaimed, 
'Vieux jeu!' the hardened cynic may exclaim, 
but at last the time has come when the British 
manufacturer has been forced to realise that, 
without the arts and =afts as his allies, he 
cannot compete any longer in the w:::>rld 's markets. 
(The Year's Art, 1934, p.l) 
When, therefore, the call goes up in Britain today for 'Art for 
Society's Sake' it is the revival of an old theme. It is, in fact, a 
call to return Art in general education to the province of that 
industrial purpose which spawned it. Design thus possesses 
traditional cultural legitimacy as the content of =ricula for Art in 
British schools. The same justification does not apply to Australian 
art education, which nevertheless, however, oontinues to be strongly 
influenced by British developments. 
In British art education, design and fine art have historically co-
existed in varying degrees of amicability at different times. The 
'Jery union of the '::wo has often constituted one of tl:1e FOS': 
distinguishing features of art education in Britain. El:J.ward Strange, 
in an article entitled 'Applied Art in 1899' (in The Year's Art 1900) 
provides an insight into such an amicable relationship, referring to 
... the enlarged reoognition given to what may 
be called the finer handicrafts, by that very 
conservative institution, The Royal Academy 
(of Art). The enamels exhibited in 1899 ..• 
were both interesting and important; and 
although Professor Herkorner's large shield 
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was not equal to the achievements of (others), 
... the mere fact that a painter of his position 
has thought it worth while to devote his attention 
to the art is at least of considerable 
significance. 
(p.ll) 
The 30th Armual Report (1883) of the Science and Art Department of the 
Committee of Council on Education,in outlining details of projected 
expenditure for 1884, also linked fine art and design in its 
deliberations and decisions: 
The object of the vote for the Department is 
to prorrote instruction in Drawing, Painting 
and Modelling, and Designing for Architecture, 
Manufactures, and Decorations, especially 
among the industrial classes. 
(The Year's Art, 1884, p.97) 
And further on. the Report states, 
The ramifications into which the Art 
Department has spread in the thirty years 
of its existence are divided into 
l.The aid given towards the promotion of 
instruction in Elementary Drawing as a 
part of National Education, and in Fine 
Art as applied to industry. (etc., etc.) 
(p.99) 
The historical unity between fine art and design in Britain is further 
indicated by a survey of various fields in which students were able to 
submit works in the National Canpetition of Schools of Art, 1883 • 
This competition offered prizes in 
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- Drawing and Painting the Figure from the 
Antique and from Life Studies of Drapery ... 
- Modelling the Figure from the Antique and 
from Life, Details, Designs, &c 
- Architectural Designs and Drawing - Studies 
of Historic Ornament ... 
- Designs for Textiles, Carpets, lace, Silk, 
Printed Muslins, Cottons, Woven Hangings, for 
Pottery, for Tiles, Mosaics, &c - Studies of 
Flowers for Ornamental Arrangement ... 
- Designs for Wall Papers, Furniture, Metal Work, 
&c ... 
- Painting from Still Life, Flowers and Monochrorre 
Studies of 'TOne' and from Casts &c .. , 
- Mechanical Drawings and Drawings for Measurerrent, 
(The Year's Art, 1883, pp, 119-124) 
With ever-developing industrialisation, and with all the s=ial 
implications attendant to it, the traditional union between fine art 
and design in art education has progressively diminished. Continuing 
close ties were, however, earlier perceived, For example, in 1918 the 
British Institute of Industrial Art was founded, a body which had as 
its object, 
••. ra~s~ng and rraintaining the standard of 
design and workrranship of works and of 
industrial art produced by British designers, 
craftsmen, and rranufacturers, and of stimulating 
the derrand for such Y.Drk as reach a high standard 
of excellence. 
The Institute will be incorporated under the 
joint auspices of the Board of Trade as the 
Department dealing with industry, and the Board 
of Education as the authority controlling the 
Victoria and Albert Museum ... 
(The Year's Art, 1919, p.49) 
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This Institute was itself subsequently followed, in 1933, by the 
Council for Art and Industry, which was 
... representative of artists, designers, 
manufacturers, distributors, and interested 
Government departments ... , formed in order 
to discover and develop the best designing 
talent, and induce industry to make use of 
it; and to examine the best methods of 
industrial art education in relation to 
mechanical and mass production. 
{The Year's Art, 1934, p.l) 
The conception in the nineteenth century of the role of art in 
education as one necessarily aligned to the purely utiliarian ends of 
industry was also a =rmon theme across the Atlantic. A U.S. Bureau 
of Education Bulletin of 1874 stated: 
In addition to the increased competition 
arlsmg from the steam-carriage, new and cheaper 
methods .of manufacture, and increased productiveness, 
another element of value has radically pervaded all 
manufacturers, an elEment in which the United States 
has been and is woefully deficient - the art element. 
The element of beauty is found to have pecuniary as 
well as aesthetic value ••• The end sought {of 
the teaching of drawing in the public schools) is 
not to enable the scholar to draw a pretty picture, 
but to so train the hand and eye that he may be 
better fitted to become a bread-winner. 
{in Eisner & Ecker, 1966, p.l2) 
As Eisner and Ecker note, 
••• the justification for art as a subject to be 
taught in the school - especially in the industrial 
states in New England - was that it was necessary 
for the development and prosperity of American 
industry. 
{1966, p.l3). 
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To this end, the Massachusetts authorities established a new 
educational priority - instruction in drawing - and in 1871 appointed 
Walter Smith, who formerly taught Industrial Drawing and Crafts at the 
South Ke.Dsington School (now the Royal College of Art), to a range of 
new posts: Director of Art for the State of Massachusetts, Supervisor 
of Art for the City of Boston and principal of the Art Normal School 
(a school for the training of art teachers). 
Clarke, writing in 1885 (cited in Efland, 1983), described the impact 
of Smith thus: 
In the coming of Professor Smith, the 
hour and the man happily met. The 
successful results of the efforts in Great 
Britain to improve the manufactures of that 
country by the definite training of large 
numbers of youth in drawing, which had been 
going on for some twenty years, was known to 
wany citizens of Boston and its vicinity. 
The inferiority in artistic qualities of the 
products of the manufactories of New England 
at that time, was painfully apparent. 
(Clarke, 1885, p.3 in Efland, 1983, p.l56) 
According to Efland: 
· ... Smith laboured for industrial drawing, and 
not for the dreams of a beautiful and democratic 
art for a free people. 
(1983, p.l56) 
Dewey had yet to rrake his nark on Arrerican education. In his essay, 
'The Nature of Freedom' (1938), Dewey related the system of traditional 
education to that of IIBSS industralism. He described the 'enforced 
quiet and acquiescence' in the class-rooms of the traditional schools, 
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conditions which 'prevent pupils from disclosing their real natures.' 
He went on, 
They (the schools) enforce artificial 
unifonni ty. They put seeming before being. 
They place a premium upon preserving the 
outward appearance of attention, decorum and 
obedience ••• Mechanical unifonnity of studies 
and methods =eates a kind of uniform 
immobility and this reacts to perpetuate 
unifonni ty ••• 
(1938, p,62) 
Within the U, S. traditional school of the nineteenth century, as in 
Britain, the nature of disciplines - or the content of curriculum -
had to be reconciled with the nature, method and principles of 
schooling, the essential mission of which was to condition individuals 
for an industrial system. 
It is a mission which present-day =usaders of accountability have 
revived. 
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FINE ART AND DESIGN: DIFFEREN:r WAYS OF KNOWING? 
The difficulty of publicly (that is, verbally) accounting for fine art 
in large part arises fran the obtuse, oblique (that is non-verbal) 
nature of the meanings made within its various forms. Yet it is 
precisely this obtuseness and obliqueness which. constitute the nature 
of meanings in fine art. Artistic meanings are often described as 
metaphoric meanings because it is considered that they allude to 
rather than specify. Such a view, however, implicitly places verbal 
meanings and linguistic knowledge in the position of pre-eminence; 
that is, as the knowledge against which other forms of knowledge are 
identified and defined. Artistic meanings may be described as 
rnetaphorical, but only in terms of linguistic know ledge. Artistic 
rneanings are not rnetaphors of verbal rneanings. Artistic meanings are 
rneanings which are canplete in themselves, in tenns of art. It is not 
a painting which constitutes the metaphor of verbal meanings which may 
be put forward in order to interpret it, but rather it is the verbal 
interpretation which constitutes the rnetaphor of the artistic meaning. 
Nevertheless, the concept of the metaphor is an extrernel y useful one 
in the probing of meanings in art. 
The great Rembrandt self-portraits are collectively more than a mere 
visual record of an artist's physical appearance at various stages 
during his life-ti.lre. It is sanet.'Ung of a cliche to state that these 
portraits - like Shakespeare 's immortal characters - are statements 
about humanity in general. They are about the universal human 
condition. Their significance lies in the capacity of their content 
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to transcend the imnediate, the specific and the easily-grasped. It 
is perhaps a spectator's comprehension tacit or overt- of their 
symbolic rreanings - rreanings with which he or she may be able to 
identify - which generates an aesthetic response. That is, the 
discovery of rreaning in art could itself provide and constitute 
aesthetic exper1ence. 
Here fine art may be seen to differ from design, for the aesthetic 
elerrent in, say, an ordinary kitchen chair may be said to derive not 
from the discovery of some complex subtle rreaning which is latent in 
the chair itself - its ·rreaning is probably s:imple and straightforward 
- but fran the chair 's physical or formal properties: the colours and 
textures of rraterial, its craftsmanship and finish, its shape and 
practical efficiency, and so on. 
The nature of aesthetic response itself in respect of fine art may 
thus fundamentally differ fran that pertaining to design. Fine art, 
it may be clairred, is concerned with the discovery, expression and 
ccmnunication of rreanings; design with the beauty and functional 
efficiency of objects. The two fields may, therefore, embody 
fundarrentally different criteria and focus on fundarrentally different 
visual factors in determining what constitutes significant visual form 
in each. It may be, therefore, that each employs a particular way of 
thinking which fundarrentally differs frcm that utilized by the other. 
Fine art and design, in other words, may each possess its = 
distinctive cognitive style. 
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,Witkin et al (1977) describe the nature of cognitive style 
as 
... a broad dimension of individual differences 
that extends across both perceptual and 
intellectual activities. Because what is at 
issue is the characteristic approach the person 
brings with him to a wide range of situations, we 
call it his 'style' - and because the approach 
encompasses both his perceptual and intellectual 
activities - we speak of it as his 'cognitive style.' 
(in Zimmerman, 1983, p.l9) 
Whilst much of the work in the area of cognitive style has, 
according to Zirrmerrran (1983), been concerned with so-
called field-independency-dependency perceptual 
dispositions of individuals, other studies have been 
concerned with the question as to whether cognitive style 
is an innate or a learned characteristic. According to 
McFee (1957, 1970), cognitive style is a learned 
disposition-a product of socialization. This view differs 
from that offered. by LCJwp.nfeld (1964), whose theory t.hat 
cognitive style is innate or constitutional has continued 
to provide a basis for art education theory in many 
educational settings today. 
That cognitive style should be accorded sociological 
explanations, as distinct from purely psychological ones, 
is of relevance to the issue of fine art and design as 
fundamentally different ways of knowing. For as previous 
discussion would suggest, the fine art - versus - design 
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conflict is a largely ideological struggle. Sociological 
accounts of cognitive style explain depth of 
internalisation and reification of essentially normative 
perceptual and conceptual operations. Cognitive style acts 
as a conceptual framework, even as a conceptual screen 
detennining how and what phenorrena are perceived and 
interpreted by the individual. 
Witkin et al (1977) explain that cognitive styles are 
... concerned with form rather than the content of 
cognitive activity. They refer to individual 
differences in how we perceive, think, solve 
problems, learn, relate to others etc .. The 
definition of cognitive styles is thus cast in 
process terms ... 
(p.l5, in Zimmerman, 1983, p.20) 
If cognitive style is related to ideology, then it is 
related to an individual's or a culture's set of values. 
Such values largely detennine how the environment is 
actually perceived. 
It may be considered, then, that any differences in the 
respective cognitive styles of the fine artist and the 
designer in contemporary culture are, despite the apparent 
depth of the differences, nevertheless normative products 
of the different normative wxlds within which the fine 
artist and the designer respectively function. 
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Could it not also be claimed, however, that at the heart of the 
matter - where individuals are engaged in the development and the 
production of tangible works - the creative process engaged in by 
both designer and fine artist are virtually identical? 
According to Suzanne Langer (1953) art is, at bottom, concerned 
with the import of visual form. 
Could not this definition embrace both fine art and design? 
Historical examples suggest that the two fields have not only 
man~ged to harmoniously co-exist in other cultures in place and 
time, but have been able to do so to a degree which has blurred any 
distinctions between them. 
The fifth-century B.C. Chinese cross-bow support (fig.l.) is an 
example of this apparent unity between fine art and design. This 
object was obviously intended to perform a practical task, a task 
requiring considerable precision on the part of its user. Its 
purpose was to support the cross-bcw and at the same time provide a 
target-sight for the archer using it. As a 'design brief' such 
exa·cting requirements for an article to be used in an important 
activity demanding the highest precision would seem to be demanding 
also a product conceived in the most severely utilitarian form. 
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FIGURE 1. 
Cross-B<::M Support. Chir1ese. Fifth Century B.C. 
Unearthed in 1954 at Yunchi, Shansi. Fran the 
Chinese Exhibition catalogue. Melbourne: 
Gardner Publishing Co., 1976. 
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Yet the cross-bow support itself has been conceived in much broader 
terms, for in addition to adhering to the article's functional 
requirements, its maker has also fashioned the object as an expressive 
inage. It has been made into the fonn of a striking serpent. 
In fact, the contemporary Western observer may regard the object 
primarily as a fine art (expressive) object, as distinct from a design 
(utilitarian) object. Such a view would not be surprising, for it 
would be encouraged by such factors as the context for viewing the 
object (not in action, as it were, but lying mute in a display case in 
a Western Art gallery); the contemporary Westerner's passivity toward, 
or ignorance of the nature of the activity for which the object was 
intended (its function); and his or her association of the object's 
form with modern Western aesthetic principles in sculpture, which it 
happens to evoke. Thus the contemporary Western viewer may perceive 
the cross-bow support not as a functional object at all, but interpret 
and evaluate it essentially as a non-utilitarian sculptural fonn 
intended to appeal exclusively on a sensual level, in the way that 
contemporary abstract sculpture of the West is addressed. 
Surely this interpretation is, however, valid. It can be seen that 
the object's maker has paid considerable attention to its elegance and 
grace: its 'pure' form. The incorporation within this utilitarian 
article of the stylised body and head of a serpent constitutes a most 
harmonious marriage of expressive content with functional design and 
pure aesthetic form. In addition, the piece has been embellished 
with surface decoration which enhances the curvilinear lines of the 
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form, and the flowing linear carved recesses have ln turn been inlaid 
with silver, which further enhances its aesthetic appeal. 
In the light of these apparent artistic intentions on the part of its 
maker, it does not seem unreasonable to regard the cross-bo.v support 
as a work of art rather than as a thing of utility. Diverse cultures 
the world over, often ignorant of the very existence of others, have 
yet demonstrated an identical inclination and propensity for bestowing 
mundane items of daily use with completely non-utilitarian decorative 
qualities and symbolic meanings, which we would call artistic . 
Does this apparent universal tendency reveal a natural disposition -
even an instinct - in human beings for artistic representation? 
Dissanayake (1982, p.398) maintains that this lS so: 
There are ... behaviours that seem unique to the 
human species. Among these is art. No human 
society has been discovered that does not display 
some e.xarrples of what. we, in 1-.he modem west, o>re 
accllstamed to call 'art' . It is worth investigating 
whether we can identify a universal 'behaviour of 
art' and, if we can, ·attempting to determine what its 
selective value has been in human evolution ... One 
may argue ... that regarding art as a fundamental 
manifestation of human nature with its roots in 
biological processes is not to reduce it to these 
rcXJts, or to denigrate it, but rather to better 
appreciate its essential value 
(p.398) 
Peter Fuller (1983) describes the work in the field of 
psychoanalysis of Donald Winnicott also as support for the 
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claim that the artistic disposition is a universal 
biological trait in humans. 
According to Fuller, Winnicott based his theory of the 
universal disposition for L~e arts (and for other universal 
human dispositions) upon the particular unique nature of 
the mother-child relationship which exists within humans, 
as opposed to other animal species. 
Conceiving of the simultaneous condition of 'absolute 
independence and absolute dependence' (in Fuller, p.237) of 
the human infant in relation to the mother, Winnicott 
described 
... the way in which this primary state changes to 
one in which objective perception is possible 
for the individual . (p.237) 
Here Winnicott saw L~e early development of the growing 
infant not in terms of a 'one-body relationship' becoming a 
'two-body object relationship', but conceived instead that 
... the unit is not the individual, the unit is an 
environment-individual set-up .. (in which) the 
shell becomes gradually taken over and the kernel 
... can begin to be an individual. 
(in Fuller, p.237) 
In this process of development, so-called 'transitional 
objects' and 'transitional phenomena' play a critical role, 
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occupying what Winnicott described as 
... the third part of the life of a human being, 
a part that we cannot ignore: an intennediate 
area of experiencing, to which inner reality 
and external life both contribute . 
(in Fuller, p.238) 
Proceeding from first =ntacts with external reality 
through ·moments of illusion' which the mother provides -
for example, when the mother offers her breast at exactly 
the mol!l2Ilt when the child wants it - the infant,according 
to Winnicott, 
... acquires the illusion that there is an external 
reality that corresponds to his capacity to create 
(in Fuller, p.238) 
'Illusion' he defined as 
... a bit of experience which the infant can take 
as either his hallucination or a thing belonging 
to external reality --
(in Fuller, p.238) 
Thus in the process of separation between infant and 
mother, transitional objects, transitional phenomena and 
the domain of illusion together constitute the rreans of 
acting within a •potential space' which Winnicott saw as 
the 'arena of creative play' (p. 239), itself a transitional 
phenornenom, and 
... always on the theoretical line between 
the subjective and that which is objectively 
perceived . 
(in Fuller, p.239) 
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In this statement, Winnicott could be offering a definition 
of the artistic pr=ess; and indeed, according to Fuller 
(1983 ), 
He (Winnicott) pointed out that the task of 
reality acceptance is never completed: 'no 
human being is free from the strain of relating 
inner and outer reality'. The relief from 
this strain, he maintained, is provided by the 
continuance of an intermediate area, which is 
not challenged 
(p.239) 
Thus Winnicott wrote, 
This intermediate area is in direct continuity 
with the play area of the small child who is 'lost' 
in play ... (and is retained) ... in the intense 
experiencing that belongs to the arts and to 
religion and to imaginative living, and to creative 
scientific work . 
(in Fuller, 1983, p.240) 
Winnicott pointed to the significance of 'transitional 
objects' for young children which, for them, occupy this 
'intermediate area': things such as rags, blankets, cloths 
and teddy bears, to which children become particularly 
attached and which thus assume particular psychological 
importance. 
SUch things have a physical presence and a concrete 
identity which, however, to outsiders may constitute a 
merely bland existence; but their potential meaning for an 
individual child can be quite the antithesis of blandness. 
Indeed these objects can assume a virtual life-of-their-own 
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1n the child's mind which can result in such objects transcending 
their mundane concrete existence and their bland utilitarian 
purposes and becoming instead something 'special'. Nor is this 
inclination lost with the passing of childhood. 
In the same way, even objects of t_l)e most everyday utili tar ian kind 
can have their meanings extended by adults such that these objects 
too can assume an infinitely more complex reality than one 
concerned with mere utility. Thus objects are described as status 
symbols or as possessing sentimental value. As such, they might 
serve as important transitional objects occupying the 'potential 
space' in the human psyche identified by Winnicott. 
Thus the question as to whether the Chinese cross-bow support is a 
design object or a fine art object may itself be considered a 
spurious question. 
Winnicott 's ideas encourage an expanded ooncept as to what might 
constitute function in respect of man-made objects. Surely his 
ideas admit the notion of psychological as well as practical 
function. It is possible that such an expanded concept of function 
may be a basis for removing the distinction between fine art and 
design since both fields could be seen to be fulfilling particular 
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functions. 
In respect of the Chinese cross-bow support, then, it could 
be suggested that the practical need for the object itself 
provided a context and an opportunity not only for its 
maker to exemplify and demonstrate human ingenuity in the 
making of tools - in this case, a serviceable weapon- but 
also it enabled him to indulge in another human behaviour: 
the making of art. In the object· s creation, a completely 
unified, or singular cognitive style, therefore, has been 
brought to bear. The object testifies to the existence of 
unity between the human dispositions for design and for art-
making which have been carried forward as one way of 
thinking and one way of realising, resulting in a concrete 
form which signifies and embodies the union. 
Dissanayake (1982) conceives that what counts as art is 
simply any man-made object which is in some way rendered 
'special': 
If there is such a thing as a 'behaviour of art' 
we must assume that it developed in human evolution 
from an ability or pr=livity that our pre-
palaeolithic ancestors could have shown. I should 
like to suggest that this root proclivity is the 
ability to recognise or confer 'specialness', 
a level or order different from the everyday . 
. . . . In our ethological view, artistic behaviour 
shapes and/or embellishes everyday reality with 
the intention of constructing or manifesting 
(or recognizing) what is considered to be another 
level from quotidian practical life . 
(p. 401) 
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Kubler (1962) alludes to the same conception. To him, 
objects of art are si.'T!ply any rran-mde 'things' which have 
been conferred with this quality of specialness. He 
states, 
·within the history of things we find the 
history of art. More than t=ls, works of 
art resemble a system of symbolic communication 
(p.6l). 
Kubler's idea, then, is that objects assurre the status of 
art when, in addition to any practical utility they may 
possess, they also possess the capacity to comnunicate 
sorrething in symbolic form and as symbolic forms. 
Therefore, it would be their capacity for symbolic 
communication which constituted the'specialness'of objects 
thus designated as art. 
On this basis the Chinese cross-bow support could be more 
than a t=l: it would also be a fonn of symoolic 
ccmnunication. What, however, =uld be the nature of this 
latter meaning? What might the object actually be 
communicating EY: symbolic rreans? 
In responding to these questions, one could adopt an 
ethnographic perspective, within which at least two 
approaches could yield satisfactory answers. First one nay 
take a contextual approach,in which the actual role of 
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archery and of warfare in general would be examined within 
the context of the culture in which the weapon was 
produced. Thus the object my be conceived in terms of 
Tctinis'(l864) pioneering sociological criteria for the 
evaluation of the art of different cultures: that is, in 
terms of 'the race, the surroundings and the epoch (race, 
milieu, moment ... )' (in Beardsley, p.29l) which produced 
it. 
The second approach may be described as an aesthetic 
approach. It would be based on kncwledge and 'feeling'. It 
would derive from knowledge of the nature of archery and 
consequent contemplation of its 'essence'. Using this 
approach one may consider the feelings and sensations of 
shooting arrows, of hitting targets (particularly live 
targets); one my imagine noble warriors engaged in battles 
designated as noble conflicts. One may then consider the 
extent to which such imaginative conceptions are somehow 
embodied within and represented by the physical form of the 
cross-bcw support itself. 
This ethnographic or anthropological perspective has far-
reaching implications for deteruriJ<ing what might count as 
art not only in respect of artefacts of other cultures but 
in respect of our own. As such, it has implications for 
what might count as Art in our schools. 
Kaeppler (1976, in Chalmers, 1983) describes the nature of 
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other cultures. 
In addition, however, the dominant values of consumerism 
which provide the motivation and context for much of this 
everyday bombardment also tend to impose themselves upon 
our very judgements of the meanings and values of images 
and forms. That is, the disciplined consumer regards 
things in tenns of their potential value for himself. (An 
example familiar to art teachers is the judgement of a 
child's art by a parent based solely on its potential as 
interior decor for the family home. ) 
Rapid change in trend and in its obvious corollary - rapid 
obsolescence - are institutionalised as inherent structural 
necessities of a consumer society. Hence the values and 
attitudes attendant to such principles have become 
internalised such that they must be seen as constituting a 
dominant cognitive style, one wh:i,ch allows an easy and 
rapid classification of artefacts into 'mean~ngful' or 
'meaningless' purely in terms of their perceived material 
value to the individual consumer. The criteria errployed 
for making such judgements are entirely the criteria of 
self-gratification. 
Thus an artefact from another culture (such as a Chinese 
cross-bow support) might appeal to a western consumer on 
the basis of its =rent fashionabili ty and status in 
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this anthropological perspective on art: 
·The anthropological study of art is essentially 
an analysis of cultural forms and the social 
processes which produce them according 
to the aesthetic precepts of a specific group 
of people at a specific point in time. Discovering 
the structure and content of such forms, processes 
and philosophies fran the indigenous point of 
view is pre-eminently an ethnographic task . 
(p.2l) 
It 1s therefore an anthropological imperative that cultural 
a_rtefacts be considered on the basis of their meanings for 
the cultures which have produced them. It is in narked 
contrast to those theories of Art which assume the 
universalism of aesthetic values. 
The anthropological or ethnographic approach may not only 
enable art educators to come to terms with what might count 
as Art for, say, adolescents in high schools. Ethnography 
might also constitute a method to be employed by the same 
ad::>lesce':lts i.':l studyir.g 1\rt t.hansel?es - par:icu~m:::.y the 
art of other cultures. Perhaps the constant lx:xnbardment of 
visual images and the plethora of material objects which we 
encounter in our daily lives as a result of revolutionary 
means of reproduction and mass production have numbed our 
minds and our senses to the potential'specialness'of some 
of these images and objects. Perhaps we are thus content 
to remain ignorant of any special meanings which reside not 
only in images and objects fran our own, but also fran 
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relation to the consurrer 's Otiil social group. The appeal 
would not be necessarily due to the consumer's 
appreciation of any deeper indigenous or contextual 
meaning of the artefact. 
Artefacts which possess no gratuitous value for the 
spectator - as - consumer are considered merely useless. 
This poses a dilemna for fine art, for within the fine art 
tradition,criteria for determining the quality of a work 
often reside in valuations of the subtlety, the complexity, 
the mystery, the ambiguity, the obliqueness of possible 
meanings, and with reconciling often literally 'shocking' 
formal means with consideration of the validity of the 
artistic intent. Indeed, the 'uselessness' of fine art has 
been hailed by some as one of its virtues. Oscar Wilde 
(1891), for example, wrote, 
The only beautiful t.'lings, as somebody 
once said, are ':he thir.gs that c'o not 
concern us. As long as a thing is useful 
or necessary to us, or affects us in ai'1Y 
way either for pain or for pleasure, or 
appeals strongly to our sympathies or is a 
vi tal part of the e1wironment in which we live, 
it is outside the proper sphere of art. 
(in Ellman, 1982, p.299) 
'Ib the disciplined consumer of today, however, the intrinsic meanings 
of such artefacts of other cultures as Australian aboriginal cave 
paintings, Japanese rock gardens, Sikh turbans, Hindu dances, Sepik 
River sculptures, and even Chinese cross-ha-l supports YOQUld be missed. 
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'rhus even though the cross-bow sup_[X)rt may appeal to a vvestern 
consuner as a beautiful object in a decorative sense, its ethnographic 
significance nay be C'Ompletely missed. 
Lasher, Carroll and Bever (1983) note that archery occupied an exalted 
_position in fifth century Chinese culture. Indeed, with Zen Buddhism 
as the basis of the Chinese philosophical tradition, archery was 
regarded as an art form in its own right. 
Thus the realm into which the idea of archery was projected in the 
_popular consciousness of its day was one residing beyond ordinary 
experience. And within this Chinese philosopical tradition, art -
including archery - was seen as 
a discipline that can be studied and perfected. 
- (and as) ... a potential path toward a fuller 
understanding of what is true 
(Lasher et al, 1983. p.l97) 
Wichin tlns scenario, the "specialness' of the cross-bow 
support - in other words, its existence as an art object -
nay be more fully appreciated. Whether it should be deemed 
a design object or a fine art object would now seem 
problematic. Sane would suggest that the question of any 
such distinction was irrelevant. It leads one to consider 
whether the categorisations of design and fine art are 
valid after all. 
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other cultures abound with countless similar exwnples of 
the organic unity between what we have learned to 
separately dub design and fine art . Surely,..it would 
seem, there thus exists, on the basis of an anthropological 
conception of art, sufficient evidence to show that the 
contemporary division in Western society and art education 
between fine art and design is a false dichotomy. 
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THE SIGNIFIC'ANC'E F'OR AR'l' OF CHANGING ~!JEANS OF PEODUCTION 
To conclude that a division between fine art and design is a false 
dichotomy, however, fails to account for the revolutionary cultural 
impa.ct - the impa.ct on traditional cultural fonns and struc:tures - of 
changing means of production within a society. 
Such changes which have occurred over the pa.st two hundred years in 
Western society have had far greater impa.ct upon people than simply 
providing them with cheaper, rrore varied products in greater 
abundance. According to the Marxist view, the means of production 
detennine the nature of social relations. If this view is accepted, 
it would have to be conceived also that the massive changes which have 
occurred in respect of production would have brought about similarly 
massive reorientations (and disorientations) in the entire social 
structure, detennining not only how people function at their place of 
work but how they live their whole lives. 
Because of the nature of rrodern production, people have become 
alienated from the products of their own labour. In accord with the 
demands of progressively rrore refined techniques in mass production, 
work has progressively become more highly specialised. Each phase of 
the production process is separated from the others. Each phase 
becomes a virtual world in itself. Indeed (as in the case of rrotor 
vehicle manufacture for example), separate components for a single 
product may be manufactured on opposite sides of the globe. 
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As well as renoving the individual worker from the final fruits of his 
or her labour, this state of affairs has brought about one's 
acceptance of ignorance in respect of rratters which nevertheless shape 
one's own destiny. But industrial man has not looked to Gcx:1 to fill 
this void of ignorance, as his ancestors may have done. Faith is 
instead vested in the specialist, the expert here on earth. 
A complex society's tot.al achievement tends to be measured as the sum 
of the individual achievements of its various experts. A society as a 
whole may well present a rounded picture of itself and its 
achievements, but this rounded, 'civilized' conception would not simply 
constitute a projection of the lives of its individual members. 'Eheir 
social existence would, more likely, be characterised by alienation, 
narrowness in outlook, limited skills and high dependenc-y on experts 
for life-sustenance. 
Hence the ethos of specialisation - specialisation as a value in 
itself- is implanted within the'conscience collectivej becoming, for 
example, an educational principle and a doctrine for determining the 
nature and structure of cultural forms: for example the arts. 
Accompanying the increasing specialisation in a field is a narrowing 
world-view which serves to further radicalise the insularity of the 
specialisation. Nineteenth century Romanticism, pranoting the 
doctrine of Art for Art's Sake, constituted an example of this 
phenomenon • This was a philosophy (as will be seen) which arose out 
of (albeit as a reaction to) the changing means of production in the 
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nineteenth century. 
'rhe example of the fifth century Chinese cross-bow support has reen 
put forward as support for the concept of unity, of fundamental 'one-
ness' between fine art and design. This example should now re examined 
in the light of the concept of changing means of production and their 
radical effect on traditional cultural forms. 
The cross-bow support has been described as both a fine art object and 
a design object. It could be stated, therefore, that the object has 
been fashioned out of the integrated skills of the sculptor and the 
tool-maker (or ~apon-maker), both sets of skills being possessed and 
practised, however, by a single individual and employed concurrently 
in the making of the object. 
This traditional situation is in marked contrast to the relationship 
which exists between the world of sculpture and the world of tool-
making today. To some, sculpture is seen to be fulfilling esoteric 
human needs, while tool-making is considered to be serving decidedly 
utilitarian ends. Out of this obvious contrast in their perceived 
purposes and in keeping with the principle of the division of labour 
in contemporary society, two totally separate, mutually-alien vvorlds 
exist - one for the sculptor and one for the tool-maker. And since 
they are now separate, the differences between the tvvo are possibly 
irreconcilable. For caught up in the dominant ethos of ever-more-
narrow specialisation, the sculptor on the one hand and the tool-maker 
on the other tend to become become progressively more estranged one 
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from the other. Thus whole worlds are built up by each, within which 
- so as ·to fulfil the human needs for social solidarity and group 
identity- internally perceived values and beliefs and internally 
generated attitudes and behaviours are formed and become 
institutionalised. Hence each world develops its own ideology, which 
is to say that each becomes virtually irrernedially separated from the 
other. 
Thus the fact that knowledge of sculpture and knowledge of tool-
making may, in another time and place, have been brought together by a 
single artesan in the production of a single product - the Chinese 
cross-bow is an example - does not mean that a reunification of the 
now quite distinct productive "IM)rlds of sculpture and toolmaking 
would be a simple task, or even possible in the contemporary milieu. 
Consequently, the fact that the designer and the fine artist may have 
once functioned within, as it were, the mind and body of a single 
individual should not be taken to mean that the two could so arnenably 
co-exist within the mind and body of the contemporary worker 
thoroughly conditioned to the campartrnentalised, highly-specialised 
ways of modern means of production. 
On this basis, to bring together design and fine art in a single art 
curriculum is to bring together two different worlds . The resultant 
clash of ideological values may render the overall art curriculum 
incoherent. 
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A rmjor factor emanating from changes u1 tl1e roeans of prcduction lS 
the tendency for such changes to also bring about social class 
stratifications where these may not previously have existed. rrhis 
strongly reinforces the nutually exclusive ideological intensities 
which distinguish the separate groups so formed. For if a production 
process is broken down into its numerous separate operations, it is 
quite likely that all the separate tasks would not require the same 
level of skills. Some tasks would be rrore difficult than others, and 
this is likely to mean that a greater demand would exist for the 
perfornance of the more difficult skills, leading to more extensive 
education for the potential prac~itioners of the more demanding 
skills, higher pay and thus higher social status for the~. 
Where the division of labour also splits the individuals involved in 
production into the two major categories of what may blandly be termed 
the'brains'and the•hands~ the social class implications of the 
division of labour in rrodern manufacturing are clearly discernible. 
Raymond Williams (1981) provides an example of this. Describing 
'redistributions of role and authority witl1in working professional 
companies', he gives the following account of changes he observed in 
one facet of the film and television industry: 
The deepest changes came only with the 
development of the new productive technologies. 
They are most obvious in film and television. 
First, the new technology required a much more 
extensive professional specialization. Writers 
and actors, and then designers, were joined by 
cameramen, sound recordists, editors, and a 
whole range of people with ancillary skills. 
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At the simplest technical level, the role of a 
co-ordinating director became almost inevitable. 
But then, second, there was a further division 
of labour, in the installation, mainteBance and 
some forms of operation of the technology 
itself: electricians, carpenters, logistical 
staff. 'These can be said to represent only a 
development fran earlier kinds of craft support, 
but the general situation was qualitatively 
new, in that work in this area became indispensable, 
in the advanced technologies, even though there 
could still be doubt whether such workers were 
truly part of the cultural production. It is here 
that class lines became drawn, often with 
continuing argument about jobs at or near the 
point of division. (pp 114-115). 
The impact upon art of changes in society~ s dominant means of 
production has been considerable. Every rr.ajor development has forced 
artists and 8Rc::theticians to evaluate the continued purposes of · 
particular artistic activites and to probe anew questions as to the 
essential nature of art and art-making. 
The history of art abounds with instances where technological advances 
have been wholeheartedly embraced by artists, culminating not only in 
the utilisation of new artistic techniques and new art products, but -
at a deeper level - they have led also to the establishment of new 
aesthetic values and whole new theories as to what constitutes art. 
Thus the development of printmaking processes has modified the aura of 
the one-off original as a crucial qualification for a work of art. The 
invention of photography stripped painting of the utilitarian 
necessity of representational ski.lls, whereas four centuries earlier 
the invention of oil paint had led to the institutionalisation of 
these techniques as aesthetic values. The canputer has further 
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removed from artistic production the necessity of many such skills, 
and images produced by the canputer now canprise an accepted and 
(inevitably) a growing niche in the World of Art. And surely film is 
able to realise, in infinitely more complex, canprehensive ways, all 
that the narrative painter of the past sought to portray even in his 
episodic images (such as Giotto's Arena Chapel frescoes depicting 
the life of Christ). 
It is interesting to note that in each instance reported above a 
canrnon principle is apparent. All of the relatively new productive 
forms mentioned contain at their core the principle of . 
reproducibility. They also all lend themselves (some more L~an 
others) to physical detachment of the 'creator' from production itself. 
Two fundamental inter-related tenets of modern means of production are 
thus reflected by these examples in art: the reproduction of products 
and the division of labour. 
As in virtually all spheres of human affairs, however, the World of 
Art comprises not only individuals eager to grasp new techniques and 
challenge existing aesthetic norms. There are also those who would 
staunchly defend the traditional ways and means, the traditional 
beliefs and values in the face of imminent change. And being 
polarised by the enormity of the perceived threat, these 
traditionalists tend to assume highly radical positions in defence of 
the status guo. 
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In tl1e nineteenth century, it was the Romantic poets c:md artists 
who, confronted with the relentless march of industrialism and the 
new productive realities, escaped to and saturated themselves in an 
al terna·ti ve spiritual world of their own making. They built a 
defence around Art by proclaiming that it (Art) could only derive 
from this spiritual inner world of tl1e artist and be given form by 
the inspired vision of the artist himself. Thus it would be an 
impossibility for a machine-made product to ever assume the status 
of Art. The practical, utilitarian mind - the whole ideology of 
the new product 'designer' - was clearly anathema to the Rom:mtic 
disposition. It is at this historical point that the current 
dichotomy of fine art and design took root. 
Goethe (1831), in lauding the virtual divinity of Mozart, also 
inferred the abject mundanity of the new productive means of the 
day: 
How can one say, Mozart has composed Don Juan! 
Cb~position! As if it w~re a piece of cake or 
biscuit, which had been stirred together 
out of eggs, flour, and sugar! It is a 
spiritual creation, in which the details, as 
well as the whole, are pervaded by one spirit, 
and by the breath of one life; so that the 
producer did not make experiments, and patch 
together, and follow his own caprice, but was 
altogether in the pov-;er of the daemonic spirit 
of his genius, and acted according to his 
orders. 
(in Beardsley, 1966, p.260) 
Beardsley (1966) furtller relates how, in more direct vein, Schlegel 
also sought to distinguish between artistic creation and mechanical 
production. According to Beardsley, Schlegel 
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... had explicitly contrastec1 the form of a 
work of art with 'mechcl.nical form' -
the former 'unfolds itself from within', 
but the latter 'is implanted to a material 
merely as an accidental addition without 
relation to its nature' . 
(p.258). 
The romantic conception held that since Art manifested itself by 
divine means and upon a higher plane, the artist hbnself therefore 
existed - and justifiably so - outside , or rather above the world 
of the ordinary affairs of 'lesser' mortals. To even conceive of a 
social role for the artist was considered a travesty of Art. 'rhe 
artist had nothing in carman with the real world and, because of 
the sublime nature of Art, it was only proper that this be so. He 
was after all (as Goethe described him) /God's anointed'; and art, 
according to Victor Hugo, 'is what God creates through the rrdnd of 
man' (in Beardsley, l966,p.262). As for the relationship between 
art and life, Oscar Wilde (1889), through one of his characters in 
a dramatic dialogue , proclaims 
So far from being the creation of its time, 
it (art) is usually in direct opposition 
to it, and the only history that it preserves 
for us is the history of its own progress .• 
In no case does it reproduce its age. To pass 
from the art of a tirre to the time itself is 
the great rrdstake that all historians corrmit • 
• . . . All bad art canes fran returning to Life 
and Nature and elevating them into ideals ... 
Life goes faster than Realism, but 
Romanticism is always in front of Life. 
(in Ellmann, 'Ed., 1982, pp.319-320) 
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Here is t11e doctrine of Art. for Art's Sake. Arnold Hauser (1962) 
points to what he regards as an irony in this doctrine: that whilst 
serving as 
the bulwark of art against the danger 
of being swallowed up by industrialized 
and rrechanized life, (the idea of) 'L 'art 
pour 1 'art' ... is, in fact, p:c1rtly 
the expression of the division of labour 
which advances hand in hand with 
industrialization. 
(p.l9) 
The Romantic movement thus represented an ironic, albeit unconscious 
manifestation of the very principles against which it pitted its 
forces. 
At the other extreme to the Rom:mtic doctrine, however, existed a 
powerful body of nineteenth century opinion which perceived and 
encouraged a positive contribution by art and the artist to industry 
and industrial society. The artist would, according to this ideal, 
work in concert with, rather than reject and work in opposition to the 
new society and its ever-evolving means of production. Hence the 
creation in the early nineteenth century of the National Art 
Training School (later to become the Royal College of Art) in London, 
established with the 
•.. object (of) the systematic training of 
teachers ... in the practice of Art and in 
the knowledge of its scientific principles, 
with a view to qualifying them as teachers ... , 
competent to develop the application of Art 
to the common uses of life and to the 
requirements of trade and manufactures. 
(The Years Art, 1880, p.92). (writer's emphasis). 
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Ruskin struggled with questions as to the role and nature of art in 
t.he face of the new industrialization, and attempted to reconcile 
the romantic neo-·theology in which his own aesthetic sensibilities 
were essentially rooted with his profound social conscience and 
keen awareness of the real world. Thus in 1870 he extolled a 
positive conception of the dichotomy and crisis in art which he so 
clearly perceived. The crisis Ruskin perceived was the same as 
that perceived by Fuller a century later. This was the crisis 
brought about by the conflict between ideologies which, 
respectively, saw the role of art as being necessarily 
'collaborationist' and necessarily 'subversive' to t~e dominant 
ideology. Ruskin attempted to resolve the issue thus: 
•.• the entire vitality of art depends 
upon its being either full of truth, 
or full of use; and that, however 
pleasant, wonderful or impressive it 
may be in itself, it must yet be of 
inferior kind, and tend to deeper 
inferiority, unless it has clearly one 
of these main objects, - either to state 
a true thing, or to adorn a serviceable one. 
(In Beardsley, 1966, p.304) 
Fran an etyrrological perspective, Ruskin's statement is completely 
valid. 'Art' - fran the latin root 'Ars', rreaning 'to make' - could 
literally be used to refer to anything which has been made . But 
to merely attribute etymological validity to Ruskin's staternent 
reconciles little. For so mutually exclusive are the two separate 
functions of art as he defines them that one may think that he is 
not referring to one form of knowledge at all, but to two quite 
81 
distinct forms. If this should, in fact, be so, then whilst 
Ruskin's use of the word 'art' to describe both forms ('use' and 
'truth') may be etymologically valid, by so employing the word in an 
all-encanpassing fashion he strips it of workable precision, for 
the concept it contains may be felt to lack the spec if ici ty 
required in this debate. 
In fact, so succinctly are the distinctions between the two forms 
identified and articulated by Ruskin that one could surmize that 
his statement serves mre to sever the ties between the two forms 
than forge a unity. It is as if Ruskin, perplexed at the 
fracturing of human operations and of social relations which had 
once functioned in organic unison, yet perceived also the 
irreversibility of the new dichotomy's momentum brought about by 
the new means of production of his day. Regarded in this light, 
his statement represents, perhaps, the final gasp of a now-dead 
order of things. 
What Ruskin and his like-minded contemporaries were perhaps most 
confronted (and affronted) by in respect of the new industrial 
advances of the day was mass-production itself. For when applied 
to the manufacture of objects, the creation of which had hitherto 
been the task of the artist-craftsrran, rnass-prcduction not only 
revolutionalised the scale of production, but in the process it 
destroyed a fundamental characteristic of art. It shattered the 
aura of the unique work. In so doing, it exposed a perhaps hidden 
ethos that the aura of the unique work was the most jealously 
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defended artistic canon of all. 
For the unique work stood for the uniqueness, the individuality of 
the artist himself . To deny the uniqueness of a work was therefore 
to deny the individual spirit and identity of the artist - to deny 
that, to quote Victor Hugo, ' .•• the poet is a priest' (in 
Beardsley, p.262). 
The organic and spiritual unity of art and nature, as conceived by 
the Romantic artists, was corrupted by the mechanical reproduction 
of things. According to their doctrine, the affinity of works of 
art with nature was not merely manifest on the superficial level 
wherein, for example, an artist might choose a therre from nature 
for his work. Indeed, as Wilde asserted, to merely render scenes 
was not to engage in Art at all. Rather the union with Nature was 
manifest in the artis-es aesthetic sensibilities and indeed in the 
very method of artistic production: that which Paul Klee was later 
to describe as 'organic creation' in art. Thus Coleridge described 
Shakespeare plays as possessing 'a vitality which grows and 
evolves itself from within' (in Beardsley, p.258). 
Mechanisation, even if its products should at times take the 
outward forms of nature (as, for example in Victorian cast-iron 
ware), nevertheless represented to the Romantics the antithesis of 
Art at the most fundamental level. For it was a logical and 
physical impossibility, on the basis of the organic creation 
conception of the artistic process, for the machine to create. 
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Hence the products of ·the machine could never attain the status of 
Art. 
And whilst the underlying laws governing organic creation were 
permanent, the outward manifestations of Nature's workings were 
infinitely varied, indeed never duplicated. Thus the concept of 
organic creation in Art reinforced another principle of 
Romanticism: that of the uniqueness of the artistic spirit embodied 
within the treasured individuality of the artist himself. 
According to Beardsley (1966), 
What now became of the highest importance 
and interest was not so much the work itself 
as the man behind it. 
(p.251) 
Together, the two principles- organic creation and the artist's 
individuality - realised and extolled the absolute uniqueness of the 
work as the supreme signification of its status as Art. It would 
therefore be impossible to create Art by any other rreans. It was this 
uniqueness - especially since it had sprung from 'within' - which gave 
the work of art its aura. Thus to remove the principle of uniqueness 
from a product would also be to destroy or deny an aura - the 
critical defining characteristic of the work of Art. This was 
precisely what mechanised reproduction accomplished. Its 
ramifications were significant not only in respect of traditional 
crafts,but in particular insofar as it affected the pictorial arts 
through the invention of the carrera. As Walter Benjamin (1970) 
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states, 
One might subsume the eliminated elernent 
(from the art object, by means of mechanical 
reproduction) in the term 'aura' and go 
on to say: that which withers in the age of 
mechanical reproduction is the aura of the 
work of art. This is a symptomatic process 
whose significance points beyond the realm 
of art. One rrrrght generalise by saying: the 
technique of reproduction detaches the 
reproduced object from the domain of tradition. 
By making many reproductions it substitutes a 
plurality of copies for a unique existence. 
(p.220) 
An additional factor, however, attends to the principle of uniqueness 
of the work of art: namely, that of ownership. The traditional 
c~ncept of ownership of works of art was radically altered by mass-
production. The reproduction of objects and images provided far 
greater access to pictures and to decorative and sculptural forms to 
all classes, in this way making artistic knowledge and the possession 
of art works more widely distributed than ever before. 
It may be seen from this that advances in mechanical reproduction had 
both a causal and a deterministic relationship with the great social 
changes of the nineteenth century. In the v;ord.s of Benjamin (1970), 
.•. in permitting the reproduction to meet the 
beholder or listener in his own particular 
situation, it reactivates the object 
reproduced. These two processes (elimination 
of the aura and greater access) lead to a 
tremendous shattering of tradition. 
(p.220) 
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Factors such as elimination of the aura of an artefact, ambivalence 
toward the capacity of the artefact to assert its maker's ~rsonality 
and the manufacture of artefacts for a vast public rather than for an 
exclusive elite are inherent principles of so-called design. Benjamin 
(1970) in the spirit of Marxist historical determinism alludes to the 
concept that deep sub-structural social changes are effected by 
changes in a society's super-structure: that is,the deeper changes 
occur out of revolutionary changes at the level of day-to-day affairs 
and social institutions - for example, those of material production. 
He states, 
During long periods of history, the mode 
of human sense perception changes with 
humanity's entire mode of material production. 
How human sense perception is organised, the 
medium in which it is accomplished, is 
determined not only by nature but by historical 
circumstances as well ...• (Thus) if changes 
in the medium of contemporary perception can 
be comprehended as decay of the aura (of the 
work of art) it is possible to show its 
social causes. 
(p.221) 
This suggests that the incursion of the designer into the domain once 
exclusively occupied by the artist or craftsman constituted an 
historical, revolutionary, super-structural re-orientation which 
affected social relations in the visual arts and art epistemology 
itself in the nineteenth century. 
The designer thus replaced the artist in giving the new art market 
what it wanted. The artist was nON frequently identified by the 
general public as a social anachronism - an opinion hardly alleviated 
86 
by the Homantics' own somewhat extravagant behaviour. Perhaps, 
therefore, design as an artistic enterprise had~ in 9eneral terms, 
similarly rendered fine art lar9ely redundant. 
But changes in society's means of production have not ceased. Perhaps 
the rate of change has even accelerated in recent years. Today, the 
computer is in the process of transforming society in perhaps more 
revolutionary ways than have all the 9reat technological advances of 
the past t-wo hundred years. 
If desi<jn is a product and an integral part of society 's dominant 
means of production at any given time (Fuller's definition of design 
as collaborationist in respect of a society's dominant ideology 
suggests that this is so), it follows that as society's dominant means 
of production would continue to evolve, so too would the nature of 
desi<jn and the activity of designing also evolve. This could mean 
that the field of design will become more and more removed from fine 
art in terms of the working mode itself of the designer in corrparison 
to that of the fine artist. 
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'TCJI't~S' AS IDEKS OF AH'I'. 
Once, the roles of artist, architect and engineer - for projects even 
on the largest scale - overlapped and indeed were often fulfilled by 
the same person. The C,othic cathedral and the Hindu temple are 
examples of sculptural buildings which work . And in the Italian 
Renaissance, single personages such as Giotto, ~tichelangelo, Ghiberti, 
Bernini, Brunelleschi and Fiero Della Francesca each spread his 
prodigious talents across such fields as art, architecture and 
engineering. Leonardo, of course, was the epi tone of Renaissance Man: 
the supreme example of the unity which existed between virtually all 
the visual arts in pre-industrial European society. 
Changes in the means of production brought about by, and which 
identified the Industrial Revolution,however, systenatically developed 
higher and higher degrees of specialisation. Thus no longer was it 
the architect who necessarily designed a bridge - let alone the 
architect-who-was-also-a-painter. It was the engineer, with his 
specialised knowledge of new materials (in particular of pre-stressed 
steel) and associated structural principles (for example, cantilever 
construction), V>Drking within a cost-efficiency ethos. which was itself 
a major dete.rminant as well as a product of the nature of production 
in the nineteenth century,who becarre the creative champion of the age. 
The American architect Louis Sullivan was later to be identified as 
the father of functional design, as much by the resonance of such 
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pronouncements as "Form follCJ'Ws function" and "'l'he line of strength 
and the line of beauty are one" as by his buildings. But the ethos of 
functional design in the modern age was surely born with the new 
engineers of the nineteenth century. 
Henry Bouch's Firth of Forth bridge (1873) (Fig. 2) stands as a 
pinnacle of achievement in nineteenth century engineering. 
Constructed almost entirely out of steel and utilizing the cantilever 
method. of construction, this bridge is seen as a climactic symbol of 
the Industrial Revolution. 
In other words, the bridge serves as a vehicle for symbolic 
communication, to use Kubler's term. Thus the Firth of Forth bridge 
would, according to the anthropological rationale, count as a work of 
art. To be sure, it would constitute a 'totem' (as defined by 
Durkheim), and by ethnographic criteria this alone would qualify the 
bridge as art. 
From another perspective, however, this identification raises 
problems. The branch of knCJ'Wledge known as aesthetics is concerned 
with the philosophy of art. Yet :m:my of the artefacts deemed to be 
works of art according to ethnographic criteria would have been 
produced by individuals with little or no affiliation with, or 
knowledge of aesthetics as episterrology. Indeed, rrerely conferring 
the status of art onto artefacts may bear no relationship whatever 
with their rrakers ' intentions. It would seem to be irrelevant, 
according to the anthropological rationale, as to whether the maker of 
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Railway Bridge, Firth of Forth, Scotland. 
Designed by Henry Bouch. Opened 1873. 
Figure 2. 
9 '·' 
an artefact subsequently designated as an art object possessed any 
knowledge of aesthetics at all. Thus the aesthetic principle of 
intentionality - "Art is the artist's intention', as Hothenstein 
(1967) put it -would seem to be of little or no account to the 
anthropologist. 
The paradox here is that whilst intentionality and knowledge of art 
and aesthetic theory on the part of the artist so conceived is 
regarded as insignificant from an anthropological point of view, those 
who would propose ethnographic criteria as the paradigm are thanselves 
proposing an· aesthetic theory. Perhaps ethnographers would claim to 
be the legitimate arbiters on the question as to what should count as 
art. 
It may appear to be an epistemological problem if the products of 
engineers and engineering should be counted as art objects, even when, 
in most cases perhaps, no consideration or knowledge of aesthetics as 
a branch of knowledge had been brought to bear in the design and 
development of engineering products. &1gineers are surely in the 
business of functional design, but the doctrine of functional design 
has been incorporated into the history of _9-rt and promoted as an 
aesthetic doctrine. Has this placed engineering within the realm of 
art? The influence of the Bauhaus is of particular significance in 
bringing about this situation. Fran its establishment by the 
architect Walter Gropius in weimar in 1919 to its closure by Hitler in 
Berlin in 1932, the Bauhaus practised and prorroted the ideal of union 
between the visual arts. Thus painters, architects, sculptors and 
product designers were inspired by the ideals of a canrnon 'soul' and a 
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corrmon pJsitive social purpJse, and were cognizant of conrnon 
underlying principles and modes which they considerc:rl unified their 
respective specialisations and overall missions. Such conm10n 
denominators (universal values) included the perceived impJrtance in 
all specialisations of colour theory, structural logic, creative 
thinking, utilisation of new materials, and the reduction of the 
visual language to its resic visual elements (shape, line, texture 
etc.). 
Such universal elements and principles were considered as relevant to 
functional design as they were to fine art, and Bauhaus pa.inting 
masters Klee, Kandinsky, Feininger, Albers, It ten and others taught 
and personally practised in their own work at the time the aesthetics 
of pure form. They also developed a curriculum and teaching 
methodologies which were to form the underlying reductionist 
philosophy and practice of Basic Design/Foundation courses in British 
and Australian art schools of the 1960 s and 1970 s and which, in 
turn, havecontinued to influence the nature of art education in 
primary and secondary schools to the present day. This is of 
pa.rticular significance to the current debate in that inherent to this 
enduring rrethodology and philosophy is the notion that design and fine 
art represent a single indivisible unity in art education. 
As previously discussed, other cultures in time and place have 
produced utilitarian objects which have also served as expressive 
images, thus indeed establishing a unity bebveen what may be described 
as a design object and a fine art object. But the Bauhaus design 
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aesthetic was the aesthetic of functional design. It was, in fact, 
the aesthetic of the machine. Under this aesthetic there exists 
little room for the extra dimension of fine art. 
The ramifications of belief in the ultimate artistic criterion of 
functional design need to be considered. It may be asked: At what 
stage, if any, do objects designed according to purely functional 
criteria cease to becorre objects of art? The rationale of functional 
design surely means that the more successfully an artefact fulfils its 
intended function, the greater is its aesthetic quality and hence the 
higher M::>uld be its standing as art. 
By this criterion, however, one could propose that a simple nut and 
bolt are art objects because they perform their intended (combined) 
task so effectively and because their design is absolutely devoid of 
anything which is superfluous to this function. Logically ,the 
functional design aesthetic would indeed qualify a nut and bolt as 
art, as it would also have to so qualify countless other manufactured 
items. How ironic this is when the intentions of the designers of 
such utilitarian articles could not, in most cases,have been further 
removed from artistic intent. 
Another approach ma.y be to investigate whether it is possible to draw 
a line between successful functional objects which count and others 
which do not count as art. Bouch 's Firth of Forth bridge is 
frequently pictured and written about in art text books despite the 
fact that it was not conceived as an art object in any conventional 
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sense at all. If, however, despite this lack of artistic intention 
Bouch's bridge J.s yet regarded as a work of art and, presUITk"lbl y, Bouch 
hlinself therefore considered an artist, then the original nut and 
bolt, along with its designer, would surely have to be similarly 
rE:o'garded. 
On this basis, the ABC TV prograrnrre 'The Inventors' could be regarded 
as an art cc:mpeti tion. For the criteria used on this programme for 
evaluating the merits of the various inventions submitted by members 
of the public are essentially the criteria of functional design. And 
this clalin may not be as far-fetched as it may at first seem. For on 
the one hand, the inventor adheres to the principles of functional 
design: to Louis Sullivan's aesthetic doctrine that 'the line of 
strength and the line of beauty are one' . As such, the ~,~;Drks of the 
inventor may therefore be seen in an aesthetic light. Does this also 
mean that they \\Duld be seen as \\Drks of art? Kubler's thesis, based 
on the ethnographic imperative that 'the history of art may be located 
in the history of things' - in other words, that such things as 
everyday tools can yet serve as vehicle3 of symbol1c communication -
surely ascribes to the business of the inventor (and henoe 'The 
Inventors' programme) the extra dlinension of artistic activity. 
There is yet another criterion by which the successful iron, tap, 
clothes-line, car-engine, umbrella or brassiere could all be justified 
as objects of art: the criterion of creativity. For firmly entrenched 
in the folk-lore as to what counts as art, what constitutes artistic 
behaviour and even who can be identified as possessing an artistic 
personality is the concept of creativity. Creativity is popularly 
conceived as a dynamic, sp:mtanE.'OUS capacity and energy especially 
evident in artists. Indeed art is regarded as the special repository 
of creativity. If creativity is also central to invention - as would 
seem to be tJ1e case - then by this criterion invention itself could 
indeed be seen as artistic activity. 
Thus the invention (the design) of objects may, by various criteria, 
be construed as art activity - and 1'The Inventors ' prograrnrn::? could 
indeed be considered an art competition. Infact, it has transpired 
that some winners of prizes on this prograrrme have subsequently been 
awarded the Duke of Edinburgh Award for OUtstanding Design and the 
Australian Design Council's Good Design Awards for their inventions. 
If, as many (for example, Cornford and Petelin) would claim, art 
curriculum should consist of the study and practice of design, then a 
school Art departJnent could quite legitimately incorporate 'The 
Inventors' prograrrrrne as one of it.s central learning resources. 
'The sceptic may well scoff at such a proposal, pointing to what may be 
considered, on the one hand, to be the trivial or banal nature of many 
inventions. However, to judge the field today denies history its 
critical selective function in sorting out those things of enduring 
cultural value fran the mass of artefacts produced. With the 
veritable explosion of ma.·terial productivity of our time, this 
sorting-out process would seem to require a more difficult (and 
ruthless) approach. However, the task would have been more complex 
due to the prevailing principle of pluralism which almost encourages 
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no selection at all. 
Notwithstanding such difficulties, it is fair to say that a sorting-
out process will cxx.1.1r. Using a hYfDthetical scenario one might 
speculate that, from the entire stock of inventions featured on 'The 
Inventors' over many years, perhaps two i tem.s only might be regarded 
as special (in Dissanayake's terms) in fifty years' time. These two 
artefacts, in fact, rnight consequently become ensconced in a museum, 
where they would thus assume even greater specialness, for they would 
now be regarded with a new aura: where, indeed, they would now assume 
a new life and new meaning. They \VOuld now have becane transformed 
into objects of symbolic corrmunication. They \VOUld have become 
totems. That is to say - in ethnographic terms - these artefacts 
\VOuld have become art . 
One need only consider the collections of utilitarian artefacts from 
different cultures which are housed in our museums and art galleries 
today for evidence to support this scenario. 
In fine art too this historical process of seler.tion has occurrei!, as 
John Berger (1970) reminds us, 
... if one studies these works (by Rembrandt, 
El Greco, Giorgi one, Vermeer, Turner, etc. ) 
in relation to the oil painting tradition 
as a whole, one discovers that they were 
e-Xceptions of a vAry spet:ial kind. 
The tradition cnnsistF>d of' many hnndr-ed~ 
of thousands of canvases and easel pictures 
distributed throughout Europe. A great 
number have not survived. Of those which 
have survived only a small fraction are 
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seriously treated todav as works of fine 
art., and nf this fraction another small 
fraction comprises the actual pictures 
repeatedly reproduced and presented as 
the work of 'the rraster' . 
(p.88) 
Thus one may be acting t<X> hastily in dismissing whole categories of 
contemporary artefacts as being far removed fran art. As John 
Rothenstein (1967) stated in response to the question 'What is art 
today?', 
... only time is the jmpeccable judge. 
(in 'Time' magazine Nov 17th 1967) 
Fran this it might be claimed that what counts as art are not simply 
certain categories of objects per se - for example, the categories of 
painting and sculpture, or pottery or film. Rather any artefact 
could be called art if, by virtue of its capacity to function as a 
vehicle of symbolic communication of and within a culture, it thus 
attained a status of specialness . 
Specialness of this kind is, as Dissanayake (1983) states, conferred 
~n an object by a perceiving subject. The relative valuing of the 
artefact resides within the sensibilities of the individual who 
confronts it. The specialness of an artefact is therefore dependent 
upon the degree of affective response which is shorrehow induced within 
the mind and senses of the cerceivino subject. 
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Where affective response of this kind is not restricted to the 
sensibilities of a single person but is a pan-cultural response, then 
the potential of art as a unifying force in culture is evident. The 
repeated acting out, or reproduction of these special artefacts will 
achieve the desired goals of social solidarity and c~1ltural identity. 
When Dewey (1934) alluded to this culturally unifying function of art 
(art conceived as aesthetic experience), he also described the 
negative social consequences when art is rerroved from the canmon life. 
He stated, 
When artistic objects are sep:rrated from both 
conditions or origin and operation in 
experience, a wall is built around them 
that renders almost opaque their general 
significance with which aesthetic theory 
deals. Art is remitted to a separate realm, 
where it is cut off from that association 
with the materials and aims of every 
other form of human effort, undergoing 
and achievement. A primary task is to 
reunite the fine arts. This task 
is to restore continuity between the 
refined and intensified forms of 
experience that are works of art and the 
everyday events, doings and sufferings 
that are universally recognised to 
constitute experience . 
(p. 3) 
This suggests that art possesses a ritualistic dimension and function. 
Indeed to Dewey, those cultural forms which did in fact involve ritual 
were, ipso facto, forms of art. One may speculate as to what rituals 
may be fulfilling the functions of art as defined by Dewey in our cmn 
culture. Perhaps these v.Duld include major sporting events, 
festivals, pageants and commemorative events. It is a conception of 
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art which admits a considerably broader range of artefacts than that 
which limits those forms which can be called art to traditional fine 
art areas. As ritualistic artefacts, such things could be described 
as totems - 'totem' meaning (to paraphrase tl1e Collins Dictionary 
definition) an object, or a representation of an object which 
symbolizes a clan or culture- 'often having ritual associations.' 
To the functionalist theory of Durkheim, totems so defined perform a 
crucial cohesive role in society. Describing Durkheim's conception of 
this role, Kottak (1979) states, 
When people worship their totem, a sacred 
emblem that symbolizes their comnDn social 
identity, they are actually worshipping 
society - the moral and social order without 
which, according to Durkheim, individual 
life would be impossible. In Durkheim 's 
argument such a moral and social order is 
too abstract to be worship_r::>ed in itself, and 
something less abstract must be substituted. 
Thus the totem. In totemic rites, people 
come together to worship their totem, which 
stands for their own social unity, and in 
so doing, they ITB.intain that unity that the 
totem symbolizes. 
(p.l93) 
Totems are those things which are somehow invested by a. culture with 
. 
significant meanings and which, as such, arouse strong affective 
response from the members of that culture. Such totems would 
therefore, according to the anthropological rationale, count as art. 
Now a society's particular totems are ideosyncratic: they are products 
of a particular culture as well as determinants of its solidarity and 
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maintenance. What ITk-:ty be attributed considerable significance - and 
thus function as a totem - in one culture may not even be known about, 
let alone valued in another. And this latter culture, in its turn, 
may well possess its own ideosyncratic totems, and so on. 
If, t~erefore, totems are culture-bound and tot6ns are what really 
constitute art, then it follows that art must similarly be an 
essentially culture-bound phenanenan. As Allison ( 1984) states, 
Art is a fact of culture: it is 
not a fact of life. 
Such a view rna.y appear to compromise the concept of art as a universal 
biological trait in humans as proposed by Winnicott and Dissanayake. 
However, referring to the culture-bound forms of art does not deny the 
universal human disposi·tion to rna.ke art. 
What, then, might constitute the totems in contemporary Australian 
society? If we could identify these, then we could surely also 
discover what counts, or what should count as art in Australian 
schools. 
In seeking out those cultural artefacts which might thus count as art, 
we IffilSt be searching for ·things which, for us, serve as 'systems of 
symbolic communication', to use Kubler's phrase. Things which possess 
the power to symbolically camnunicate sanething to and about a culture 
thus transcend their superficial functions and assume deeper symbolic 
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or totemic status. 'I'his now-transcende..nt significance of certain 
things may re more unconsciously felt than consciously known by the 
members of a culture. It is precisely recau~e they \rX:lrk relow the 
levels of consciousness, within the domain of what Jung called the 
'collective unconscious', that their symbolic comnunications are 
rendered so potent. 
In a 1922 paper entitled On the Relation of Analytic~l Psychology to 
Poetic Art, Jung describes the power of the collective unconscious. 
In the YJOrds of :£?€ardsley (1966), Jung 
... applied his theory of the 'collective 
unconscious' to literature. In a truly 
'symbolic art-work', the source of the 
irnages are not to be found in the personal 
unconscious of the author, he argued 
(that YJOuld make the v.Drd 'a symptanatic 
rather than a symbolical product'), but 
'in that sphere of unconscious mythology, 
the primordial contents of which are the 
comnon heritage of mankind' ... In the 
mythologies of all cultures, and in their 
dreams and literary creations, there appear 
these 'primordial images' or 'archetypes', 
which bel_o ... g not. to jndivi_dv::ll or 01J tnra1 llinds, 
but to the vast unconscious mind underlying 
them all. 
(p.347) 
Jung's idea fits well with Kubler's view of art reing a system of 
symbolic communication, one which arises not as much out of an 
artist's intentions nor out of acceptance of traditional forms of 
artistic representation but from the significance attached to things -
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including things not intended to be art by Il¥::rnbers of a culture. This 
conception - that what may count as art objects are various things 
originally intended to play no such role - nay appear r.x"1radoxical in 
the extreme. 
Th1rkheim (1950), however, explains that the social function of 
sanething may well change without any change occurring at the 
physiognanic level. 
There are cases where a practice or a social 
institution changes its fun(.."tion without 
thereby changing its nature ... Thus, the 
same words may serve to express new ideas. 
It is, moreover, a proposition true in 
sociology, as in biology, that the organ is 
independent of the function - in other words , 
while remaining the same it can serve different 
ends. The causes of its existence are thus 
independent of the ends it serves. 
(ppB0-81) 
Anthropological rationales provide compelling justifications for 
catJ1olic concept.ion.s of Rrt. Qu.i +:.e distinct fr::x1 the fixed abE"olntist 
view as to what counts as art, the cultural anthropologist, from a 
relativist standpoint, would fully endorse contemporary mechanically -
based and cybernetically - created image - making forms. For 
photographic, cinematic, video and computer-derived imagery may be 
seen to function in precisely the same ways in contemporary culture as 
oil painting, frescoes, stained glass windows, mosaics, drawings, and 
illuminated manuscripts worked in and for the cultures of former 
times. 
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It should be remembered that each of these tradtional forms 
represented, at the tirre of its invention and early development, a 
breakthrough in visual representation of quite revolutionary 
djme.nsions. That not one image-ma]dng mode was ever a given fact of 
life is an obvious point yet lost, it seems, on many fine art 
traditionalists. 
An historical view indicates that individual artists have always 
exploited, utilized and often extended the ·technologies available to 
them within their respective epochs for expressive representational 
ends. Even Palaeolithic man did so when he fashioned a crude chisel 
with which he could carve stone and a primitive brush with which to 
apply paint. But even more rrorrentous than the developrrent of these 
tools was the idea that such inherently inert substances like stone 
and coloured ochres could be transformed into media for the 
representation of rneaningful images. 
The unifying factor between the image~ITB.king discoveries made in the 
Palaeolithic age and those of today is that in each case image-making 
itself has derived from individuals' imaginative, specifically 
representation-intended exploitation of available technology. 
Technology to the artist has always thus constituted a potential 
vehicle for representation. Perhaps the apparent need for human 
beings to make images of thenselves and their worlds constitutes a 
prior condition to the actual modes of image-making themselves. 
Behavioural conceptions of art v.;ould appear to subscrite to this 
notion, but not so institutional views in which (consistent with 
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Wittgenstein's ideas on language as a determinant of knowledge) media 
of art are seen to be prior to its forms and hence to its meanings. 
According to the anthropologcal rationale for art, painting and 
sculpture would be conceived as quite valid image-making forms, but 
their value and meaning would be considered to pertain only to 
particular cultures. That is, painting and sculpture are not 
universally-meaningful forms. 
Yet Fuller (1982) asserts that painting and sculpture alone offer the 
promise of a new artistic reality. In making this assertion, Fuller 
also specifically denounces the claims to artistic standing of newer 
i.rrage-making forms and processes: the camera, the movie camera, the 
computer, video, neon lighting, the laser, the photo-copier and so on. 
In so doing, he denies the important historical evidence that artists, 
from palaeolithic times down to the present day, have exploited the 
technology available within their respective cultures for the making 
of images. Thus changes in the means of production have always been 
accompanied by changes in the forms of art:. An important question is: 
Have the changes in the means of prcrluction also led to changes in the 
meaning of art? Or, put another way, if art is itself a normative, 
dynamic entity, have changes in the :rreans of production also led to a 
diminution, or even an abandonment of the apparent human need and 
behaviour to make meaningful images which explore and represent the 
relationships between the individual and the world? Winnicott, Jung 
and Dissanayake would surely, in reply, answer 'no' • Winnicott and 
Jung would argue that i.rrage-making is a human instinct. It is ironic 
that it is Fuller himself who (1983) citing ~vinnicott's work, rrakes 
such a strident claim as to the biological basis of image-making. 
It may be for ideological reasons that an apparent_ jnconsistency has 
arisen in Fuller's writing. That is, his plea for painting and 
sculpture could be regarded in the light of the political context of 
his 1982 pafer: the battle for supremacy between fine art and design 
in British art schools. 
Otherwise, it rray appear that Fuller is confusing rreans and ends in 
art. For surely, it may be argued, if art is a biological 'fact' in 
hurrans, its repression would not be effected except, perhaps, somehow 
by physical force. That is, in a culture within which individuals are 
able to exercise even limited free will, biological needs (at least) 
are likely to be met. Therefore art - if it is a human behaviour -
would find its outlet within any such culture, and \AiOuld do so through 
the means of production available. Further it may be proposed that 
the most powerful media used for the production of art at any time are 
likely to be those media which possessed current :import as the most 
powerful media within a culture. 
It may well have been that in the sixteenth century, for example, the 
oil painting provided the maximum potential for the making of irrages 
and the visualisation of the hunan irragination. That individuals 
would be sufficiently inspired by the potency of the medium that they 
would be prepared to trek across Europe simply to gaze a·t a single 
painting by Raffacllo testifies to the validity of this notion. 
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In the 'age of rrechanical reprcduction' today, however, we are quite 
saturated by visual images of kinds which are not, in terms of the 
nature of their presentation to our senses, significantly dissbnilar 
to oil painting. As a consequence, the power of the medium of oil 
paint itself has dbninished: it has lost its inherent specialness as a 
medium. This is not to suggest that the aura of particular original 
works of art, which are oil pajntings, has also dbninished. Rather it 
is to suggest that oil paint itself is no longer the most powerful 
medium able to produce bnages which transcend real existence, hence 
its decline as a vehicle for the representation of bnages and cultural 
meanings and its relegation to a position outside the mainstream of 
culture. 
It is film which now constitutes the most powerful image-making 
' medium. It :is perhaps film which, in large part, is able to satisfy 
any biological need for art in humans in western society today. Dewey 
(1934) bnplored a restoration of 
.•. continuity between the refined and 
intensified forms of experience that 
are works of art and the everyday 
events, doings and sufferings that are 
universally recognised to constitute 
experience. 
(p. 3) 
However, despite his promotion of everyday experience as the source 
and content of art, Dewey may not have readily accepted the new forms 
of popular culture, as is suggested by his statement, 
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When VvDrks of fine art ss>ern anemic 
to the mass of people, aesthetic 
hunger is likely to seek out the 
cheap and vulgar. 
(1934) 
Like Fuller, Dewey proposed remedial action through art education. He 
apparently did not conceive of the possibility that art could have 
been alive and well in the fabulous rrovie-palaces of the 1930 s. 
Rather Dewey perhaps saw in them the potential death-knell of art, not 
only because the cinema rerroved the individual from direct experience. 
Like Fuller's, his was a view based on the idea that whilst its 
content must stem from everyday experience, art is anbcx:lied only in 
certain traditional forms. McLuhan (1973) would probably regard 
traditional art forms as purely norrrative. This may be gleaned fran 
his comments regarding the relative adaptability to change of two big 
corporations - IBM and GEC: 
'When IBM discovered that it was not in 
the business of making office equipment 
or business ITBchines, bnt that it was in 
the business of processing information, 
then it began to navigate with clear 
vision. The General Electric Corporation 
makes a considerable portion of its 
profits from electric light bulbs and 
lighting systems. It has not yet discovered 
that it is in the business of moving 
information. 
(p. 56) 
Art educators may, like IBM in McLuhan 's example, need to explore the 
essential functions oLart. .Like G.E.C., many may conceive that 
certain processes initially invented as means in art have, over time, 
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transcended their original purposes and have become institutionalised 
as e_nds. 
Dewey's stance is that of the liberal reformist. 'rhis is the view 
which holds that education should provide equal opportunities for all 
to savour the fruits of culture. However, it is a view which takes 
for granted that these fruits are contained only within traditional, 
institutionalised, legitimate cultural forms. 
Such a stance is, to Keddie (in Young, 1972), based on a 'cultural-
deficiency' model of people. It assumes that certain people actually 
lack culture, a proposition which Keddie describes in terms of 
ontological impossibility. 
Keddie points to the existence of a more expansive cul·tural pluralism 
than may be gleaned from consideration simply of different ethnic 
groups within a single society. Specifically, she identifies sub-
cultures which are distinguishable not only on the basis of ethnicity 
but also on the bases of social class and age. She attaches equal 
value to the respective cultures of all such groups. Under-pinning 
this equal valuing - this pluralism - is the relativist concept that 
common culture of whatever ilk is the crucial bonding agent for groups 
of human beings. Ironically, it is also the functionalist conception 
of culture. 
As culture is embodied and represented in the form of its artefacts, 
it follows that those artefacts which possessed meaning for a group 
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must, according to the relativist rationale, be considered legitimate. 
Indeed such artefacts should, according to the relativist view, be 
regarded as forms of art. Relativism clearly derives its fundamental 
ethos fran anthro);X)logy. 
The anUrro_!X)logist Arnold Rubin ( 1972) explains the difference between 
the traditional and the anUrropological (or relativist) conceptions 
as to what counts as art: 
A ... tendency of art studies, according 
to the traditional approach, involves 
a predominant concern with objects 
rather than people .•. Anthropology, 
by virtue of its primary orientation 
toward analyzing and understanding 
human behaviour and emphasizing the 
relationship of art to the broader 
cultural matrix, from which it derives, 
seems to have offered a new perspective 
and an alternative framework for 
considering the arts. 
(pp 669-670) 
Rubin ~s view is one wh_i_ch defines art prjmarily a2 hUITlC'n lJo,..l->.avicur 
rather than primarily as man-made material objects. The material 
objects which may be born of this artistic behaviour give tangible 
form to, and expression and canmunication of the behaviour. 
What are the discernible features of artistic behaviour which so 
distinguish it fran other forms of human behaviour? 
According to Dutch anUrropologist A.A. Gerbrands, art possesses seven 
key functions in culture, which can all be conceived in behavioural 
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terms. As cited by Chalmers, these functions are 
... the religious and supernatural, the 
social prestige value, the play aspect, 
the aesthetic aspect, the linguistic or 
communicative function, the technological 
aspect, andthe political function. 
(p.ll). 
According to this premise, any cultural artefact which fulfilled any 
or all of the functions listed v.x:>uld presu:rnably count as art. Thus in 
our own culture a church service and the movie 'E.T.', a Rolls-Royce 
car and John Lennon's autograph, a B.M.X. bicycle and the V.F.L. Grand 
Final, three flying plaster ducks on a wall and bizarre scenes spray-
painted on panel vans, the television programmes 'Dallas' and 'The Mike 
Walsh Show' and an anti-nuclear rally would all count as art. For all 
these manifestations - artefacts of our culture - surely fulfil one or 
more of the functions of art as defined by Gerbrands. 
And Gerbrands is in eminent cc:rnpany: Read ( 1943) rra.intained that even 
the humble ditch-digger digging a hole in the ground can be regarded 
as engaging in artistic activity. 
In the light of this the sceptic may ponder the value and significance 
of the word 'art' at all. And indeed it could be argued that the 
traditional concept of art - fashioned as it has been out of the 
unique circumstances pertaining to evolutionary phases in a particular 
culture's (the West's) ideosyncratic historical development- is 
outmoded and simply irrelevant today. 
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CHANGING CONCEPI'S OF ART AND ClJLTURE. 
If knowledge is a socially constructed reality, then art,as a separate 
form of knowledge, may be seen as a particular construct of 1-'Jestern 
Society. Since the word 'art' had to be coined at all, it must have 
been conceived that a certain category of things in western Society 
required special designation - hence this special label. 
The word 'art', derived from the Latin base 'ars' - :rr'!E3aning to "put 
together, join, fit' (Oxford Dictionary of Etymology p.52) - itself 
has a history. The word is re[X)rted to have simply :rr'!E3ant in the 
thirteenth century, 'skill or its application~ (in respect, 
presumably, of any human undertaking). By the seventeenth century, 
however, the word 'art' was used 'in relation to poetry, music, 
painting etc.' (p.52). By this ti:rr'!E3 the word's usage had become 
restricted to refer only to those specialised forms with which we 
commonly associate the word today. 
Williams (1958) also traces e1e historical evolution of the word (and 
concept) 'art' -along with four other key words ('class', 'culture', 
'industry' and 'derrDCracy' )-in his book, CUlture and Society 1780 -
1950. Far from discussing each of the five words separately and in 
isolation from each other, Williams' central thesis is that all five 
are structurally inseparable, all having been shaped in unison, as it 
were, by the same historical events. And it is the changes in western 
culture and society brought about by new technology - the new rreans of 
production of the Industrial Revolution - which Williams highlights as 
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the crucial determining factor in this evolution. 
Changes in the :rreans of production coincided with changes in social 
relationships and the nature of society itself. Such changes included 
the emergence of capitalist owners who acquired great power and wealth 
whilst able to remain physically apart from the actual sources of 
their wealth; the rapid grCMth of huge urban enclaves of factory 
workers uprooted socially from their old rural locales and alienated 
psychologically even from the products of their own work; and growth 
of a prosperous middle class of bankers, merchants, shopkeepers,office 
workers and social service personnel. 
In tune with the radical compart:rrentalisation and separation of 
functions which so characterised the new means of production, the 
wider society itself became similarly cornpartmentalised in respect of 
its social functions. Thus culture - like art and industry during 
the same period - became, according to Williams, 
a separate rather than an inseparable 
part of life, (and was) 
no longer conceived simply as a 'natural 
process' but as an entity or a goal 
external to normal social experience: 
Before this :period, it (culture) had 
meant, primarily, the 'tending of natural 
growth', and then, by analogy, a process 
of human training. But this latter use, 
which had been a culture of something, 
was changed, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, to culture as such, a 
thing in itself. 
(1952, p.l7) 
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Williams shows that Culture was no longer sorrething one was born 
with. Instead it becarre sorrething for which the individual had to 
strive. Along with the word 'cultivated', to be cultured meant to be 
refined, to demonstrate certain manners. Tb show an interest in, 
indeed to claim as one's own province those artefacts and processes 
which, being not overtly concerned with monetary, vocational or 
production ends (in this context such ends were considered crass) but 
with inherent human values,was therefore a way of displaying one's 
level of culture. Art, in this way, became the property of the 
moneyed classes. 
Just as culture, t.hen, was concerned with becoming rather than with 
being, so the particular artefacts and processes considered by the 
cultured to be embodiments and expressions of !T'annered ref inernent were 
exulted as pinnacles of hU!T'an achievement: as heights to be scaled. 
The comprehension and meaning of these pinnacles were never rnerely 
givens - as understandings common to all members of a culture - but 
were instead held as prizes for which individuals had to strive, using 
particular behaviour and knowledge as the rreans. 
The concepts of cultural advantage and its natural corollary -
cultural deprivation - were firmly established. In tracing the 
developrrent of this idea of culture, Williams (1958) refers to the 
writings of Coleridge. 
This idea of CUltivation, or Culture, was 
affirrred, by Coleridge, as a social idea, 
which should be capable of erribodyirlg true 
ideas of value. 
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... 'I'hat man was so capable, that the pursuit 
of perfection was indeed his overriding 
business in life, was of course widely 
affirmed elsewhere, especially by Christian 
writers. But for Mill it was Coleridge who 
first attempted to define, in terms of his 
changing society, the social conditions 
of man's perfection. Coleridge's emphasis 
in his social writings is on institutions. 
The promptings to perfection came indeed 
from 'the cultivated heart' - that is 
to say, from man's inward consciousness -
but, like Burke before him, Coleridge 
insisted upon man's need for institutions 
which should confirm and constitute his 
personal efforts. 
(pp 77-78) 
Institutions in this sense were therefore conceived as the 
repositories of the highest forms of knowledge and the edifices which 
determined standards within these forms. 
Institutions in this way became the bastions of culture: realisations 
of the 'social conditions (necessary) for man's perfection.~ 
::-n th::s2 ~e':TI's, the attainment of per:!:e::;tion could hardly be 
considered within the reach of the VvDrking classes, whose very 
designations as the 'lower order' or the 'cormnon folk' implicitly 
precluded them from the possibility. Indeed the word 'perfection' in 
our language and culture fits the metaphor of ascent, of the scaling 
of heights. 'Ib thus describe a certain class as an 'upper class', its 
members belonging to a 'higher order' is, to continue with Coleridge's 
conception, to attribute to that class a closer realisation of human 
perfection. The artefacts of culture so conceived 'fNOUld serve 
important signifying functions for those who possessed the culture. 
The artefacts would in this way also become identified as the 12roperty 
of the upJ?2r (the 'cul t.urc>d' ) classes. 
Art. had, therefore, become a realm removed from ordinary life. As an 
extraordinary phenomenom, art by definition could not exist at a low 
level, wherein nothing extraordinary could be found. Those objects 
and images ma.de and enjoyed in the domain of the ccmmon folk were, 
therefore, not designated as art at. all but were conceived as 
something else: as vulgar knick-knacks, handiwork, trivial 
illustration, or ma.chine-made junk. Being instead a vehicle for the 
attainment of human perfection, art was related more to metaphysics 
than with vulgar everyday affairs. The metaphysical domain of art 
could be realised both cognitively, through comprehension of the 
content of works, and spiritually, through sensory response to their 
formal qualities. 
In order to derive the proper meanings, both cognitive and sensory, 
from works of art, it was necessary - since art was the property of an 
upper ('more perfect') class - to become initiated into that class, by 
which means one could thereby become cultured . In this way art 
became institutionalised. In fact, in this way certain productive and 
image-making processes such as p3.inting, drawing and sculpture, became 
art. And these choices were not arbitrary. Ap3.rt from their 
designation being justified on the basis of their considerable 
traditions, p3.inting, drawing and sculpture also represented, by 
virtue of their particular means of production, an antithesis of the 
perceived vulgarity of mechanised production. They were conceived as 
affirmations of humanity, being concerned with 
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... the harmonious development of those 
qualities and faculties that characterise 
our humanity. (Coleridge, in 
Williams (1952), p.77.) 
Art thus stood, according to Williams, 
Against mechanism, the illnassing of 
fortunes and the proposition of utility 
as the source of value (offering) a 
different and a superior social idea. 
(p. 77) 
Williams offers an explanation of the nature and origins of the 
Romantic view of art. It is this view which, having been perpetuated, 
also constitutes the popular conception of art today. 
The traditional view of art cannot be merely dismissed as the view of 
a bygone age. It is an inevitable conception of those with residual 
reflexive conservatism who automatically react against anything new. 
Perhaps such a condition represents an ideological commitment. 
Perhaps Coleridge's arguments were not concerned with old-versus-new 
forms per se, but with the means by which any forms - long established 
or novel - were actually produced. For to Coleridge, forms counted as 
art if they involved purely man-made as opposed to mechanised means of 
production. Perhaps Fuller's view of art is also a reaction to new 
technology, as Coleridge's may- with our advantageous historical 
perspective - be more clearly so perceived. 
The opposition to mechanised forms of production was largely 
opposition to its ultimate off-shoot: mass production. A canmi tment 
to mechanised production on a huge scale, such as that which has 
characterised the deeds and utterances of capitalist - industrialists 
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of the past two hundred years, is a corrmitment which carries with it a 
whole set of concomrrUtant values, attitudes, beliefs and an 
identifiable life-style: in short it represents a culture. And 
similarly, a commitment to purely manual production - often portrayed 
today as 'alternative life-style' - can also be interpreted as the 
expression of a culture. Thus the conflict between two cultures so 
identified is not one simply concerned with subtle degrees of 
difference between what may or may not, technically, be considered 
mechanised production (for even ancient INOod-craftsmen used the 
lathe) . The argurrent is really about conflicting world-views and 
belief-systems. The picture is one of conflicting ideologies. 
In the nineteenth century, each side of this conflict maintained that 
its course alone provided the path to salvation. This is shown by the 
contradicting statements of two prominent figures of the nineteenth 
century who engaged in this debate: Prince Albert and William Morris. 
Opening the Great Exhibition in 1851, Prince Albert, for his part, 
extolled, 
Nobody who has paid any attention to the 
particular features of the present era will 
doubt for a moment that we are living in 
a period of most v-.Dnderful transition, 
which tends rapidly to the accomplishment 
of that great end to which indeed all 
history points, the realisation of the 
unity of mankind. 
(In Pevsner, 1960, p.40) 
Elsewhere in the same speech Prince Albert 2raised precisely that 
. against which Morris was so trenchant! y opposed. Prince Albert lauded 
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... the great principle of division of 
labour, which may be called the moving 
power of civilization . 
(p.40) 
Morris had other ideas. He proclaimed 1 
Art will die out of civilization, if 
the system lasts. That in itself does 
to me carry with it the condemnation of 
the whole system. 
(in Pevsner, 1960, p.23) 
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THE CRAFr ETHOS: MOI:m_r S AND TBE ARTS AND C..'PAFTS MOVEMENT'. 
Morris saw a causal unity between art, industry and society. 'ro him, 
industrialisation, of which 'the great principle of division of labour' 
was a crucial component, sounded the death-knell of art. The 
corollary to this - and it was explicity promoted by Morris - was that 
art would survive and flourish only if society based its means of 
production on individual handiwork rather than on mass machine 
production. Gocx1s should, according to tvbrris, be 
... made by the people and for the people, 
as a happiness for the maker and the user. 
(in Pevsner, p.23) 
Such goods would, by· this criterion, thereby count as art, for Morris 
saw art as ~ ... the expression by man of his pleasure in labour' 
(p.23). 
Thus art, a society's rr,eans o£ producticn a1d its cultural health were 
inextricably linked. Morris further stated, 
That talk of inspiration (in art) is 
sheer nonsense; there is no such thing: 
it is a mere matter of craftsmanship. 
(p.22) 
Art sprang not from some divine intervention but from simple hard 
work. Here he opposed not only mechanisation, but the Romantics' 
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prescription for art's salvation. According to Pevsner (1960) 
It is obvious that such a definition of 
art removes the problem from aesthetics 
into the wider field of social science. 
In .Morris's mind, 'it is not possible to 
dissociate art from morality, politics and 
religion.' 
(p.23) 
Since .Morris' art was thus firmly conceived within the context of an 
ideology, it was consciously deployed to promote ideology. Morris was 
patently aware of a sociology of art. 
The root of his concern and protest was that art in his time had been 
stripped of its true social function, namely " ... the expression by man 
of his pleasure in labour." He eulogised the ethic of labour, the 
human productive process itself as the source of aesthetic 
satisfaction and as the central condition for the realisation of works 
of art. He heaped scorn on the assumption that art could be 
deb?rminee only by virtue of t':1e contemplatior, by t':"!e r~finE'd, of 
finished products made by often-unknown others. Morris simultaneously 
attacked 'The Machine' , which he saw as his arch-enemy: 
As a condition of life, production 
by machinery is altogether an evil . 
(in Pevsner, p.25) 
In opposition to The Machine, Morris and his followers in the Arts and 
Crafts .Movement prorroted its anti thesis - 'handicraft' - which they saw 
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as the true basis of art. To Morris and his followers, handicraft 
signified a humanizing element in society. It constituted, of course, 
a distinc~ive means of production, and Morris was incisively aware 
that the means of production upon which a· society was based determined 
the nature of social relations within it. 
In thus locating handicraft (or simply 'crafts' as we now generally 
know it) squarely within the province of Art, Morris was laying the 
epistemological foundations, as well as providing the ideological 
rationale for what - despite the gap in time and space - has continued 
to count as Art even in many Australian schools today. Indeed many 
art curricula in Tasmanian schools comprise crafts alone: ceramics, 
thread and fibre, woodcraft, copper work and the like. And the 
overwhelming emphasis on craft in the work of some art teachers is 
sanctioned even by offical art syllabuses devised for purposes of 
educational certification. 
This concept of craft-as-art has continued to be supported by 
essentially the same ideological rationale as that put forward by 
Morris some one hundred years ago. It is based on a philosophy that 
engaging in craft work is asserting personal autonomy, and that it 
could, by extension, assure the mental health not only of the 
individual but of the whole society. A UNESCO publication (1972) 
echoes Morris ' sentiments in relation to the dehumanizing effects of 
mass machine production in the 1970's: 
•.• the division and rational specialization 
of labour results in making .•. work piecemeal, 
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cramping and repetitive, devoid of 
inventiveness and responsibility, and by 
breaking the bond between work and its 
product eliminates the joy there is in 
a job well done. Whereas culture traditionally 
arose from work that involved mastering 
nature, the worker in industry is bereft of 
every form of creativeness, of every means of 
shaping matter according to his fancy. 
(p.l4) 
The conception o£ virtual handicraft as the ideal nature of work 
parallels Dissanayake's description of the nature of art. By 
conceiving that the work-model inherent to art is equally applicable, 
indeed highly appropriate to virtually all fields of human 
productiveness, and to attribute to this model the capacity to endow 
aesthetic experience for the worker so e~gaged, it could be concluded 
that any work which provided a sense of joy and fulfilment in the 
making would in essence qualify as art. 
Such reasoning prompted Read's (1943) previously cited declaration 
that even a man digging a ditch could be engaged in what was 
essentially an artistic act. Indeed, the actual title of Dewey's 
work, /Art as Experience', in itself clearly states the case. Dewey 
elaborated along such lines~ 
A piece of work is finished in a way that 
is satisfactory; .•. whether the experience be 
that of eating a meal, playing a game of 
chess, carrying on a conversation, writing 
a book, or taking part in a political 
campaign, it is so rounded out that its 
close is a consummation and not a cessation. 
(p.35) 
And, 
In short, aesthetic experience cannot be 
sharply marked off from intellectual 
experience since the latter must bear an 
aesthetic stamp to be itself complete. 
The same statement holds good of a 
course of action that is dominantly 
practical. 
(p.36). 
That the meaning of work derives not only from viability of the 
products of works but, to a greater extent, from certain qualities 
felt to reside within actual processes - a sentiment expressed by 
JV:brris, Dewey and the UNESCO publication is also a concept which is 
central to the commonly-conceived nature of art today. The painter 
Paul Klee, for example, stated, 
And, 
The work of art is above all a process 
of creation, it is never experienced as 
a mere prcx:luct. 
In working, the way is the essential 
thing, ill1d becoming is "Tore ilotJcKt.:am: .. 
than being. 
(in Lynton 1975, p.52) 
According to this rationale, an activity which itself induced an 
aesthetic experience INOUld, ipso facto, seem to count as art. 
Thus not only the product as an object of contemplation but the 
process itself possesses significant social meaning: in fact; it is 
the process which, according to this view; constitutes the art. 
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The corollary to this rationale is that any process which did not so 
completely involve the individual in a direct sense and which did not 
require his or her total participation in, nor even knCM7ledge of all 
the various phases of production, constituted the antithesis of art. 
Developed countries in the contemporary tMJrld are built upon systems 
of production and hence of living itself of the most complex, 
fragmented, highly specialised and technologically - sophisticated 
kind. By the above definition of art the countless ffi:3.ss-produced 
articles produced by rrodern rreans of production could never thus count 
as objects of art. 
Morris' doctrine became a virtual theism. He. envisaged and sought to 
practise a full fla.v of aesthetic experience occurring in and out of 
even the most mundane tasks involved in day-to-day-living, which 
itself was thus conceived as a manifestation of art. 
Since art was considered to reside essentially in the making process, 
Morris believed that items for use by humans should embody and 
communicate a sense of human-ness in their actual physical characters. 
This it was felt, was important for cultural identity; it would serve 
to bond people together; it would circumvent alienation and satisfy 
deep psychological needs. 
Lewis F. Day was the author of a number of textbooks on the arts and 
crafts around the turn of the century. Among these volumes were such 
titles as Pattern Design, Nature in Ornament, Art in Needlework and 
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Qrn~~!!_t___!Y1sL_:rts _ A..J:2121:ication. These works in themselves constitute 
historical artefacts. 'J'hey contain insigh·ts into the philosophy of 
t.he Arts and Crafts movement and the ideological struggle it 
represented at the same time as they provide extremely comprehensive 
information on a vast range of art-craft forms, processes and 
techniques. 
In addition, they reveal the origins of a particular orientation and 
its underlying ideology which have rerrained prominent in art education 
today: namely, art as craft. This rray be gleaned fran a brief 
examination of Day's Ornament and Its Application (1904), in which he 
makes the following statement: 
We talk of art teaching! Artists know 
that it is not Art which can be taught, 
but only the things that go to its 
· successful pursuit - the way to use 
eyes, hand, and brains, the control 
of such artistic faculty as may be 
born in a man. What training does, 
and teaching should do is to make 
good workmen. Out of workmanliness 
art is most 1 ikd y to develop itself. 
It is the source too, of all a 
workman's satisfaction in doing, and 
in the doing of others. 
(p.l39). 
Here Day embodies much of the philosophy of the Arts and Crafts 
movement. 
His book is itself a testimony of the principles it promotes. It 
diligently covers a wide field of arts and crafts, including applique, 
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basket-work. blown qlass, bookbinding and brassheaded nail work; stone 
carving, carpet making, cloisonne enamel and leatherwork; joinery, 
woodcarving, glazing, goldsmith's work and intaglio; lace, lacquering, 
lettering, mosaic and patchwork. The list goes on. Its purpose is to 
describe the principles and techniques of ornamentation pertaining to 
this extensive catalogue of fonns. 
In providing this, Day demonstrates his own extensive knowledge of the 
many diverse crafts. At the basis of his philosophy is the principle 
that the ornamentation of objects is determined by the tools and 
methods employed in their production: what Day calls the /mechanism of 
the method' (p. 84). Ornamentation is not superimposed, but it grows 
fran within the form of the object produced. 
Implicit in this principle is the requirement that the individual 
engaged in the ornamentation of objects is also heavily steeped in 
knowledge of their actual manufacture. Indeed, it virtually behoves 
that the manufacturer and the ornamentor are one and the same person. 
Nor was this integration considered by Day to be in any way 
detrimental. Far from it; for one of the pre-eminent values of the 
Arts and Crafts movement was precisely such a union to be realized 
within the \\.Drk of a single individual. It represented, in fact, the 
movement /s ideological commitment, for it asserted that such a mode of 
work should prevail as society's dominant means of production, 
implicit in which - in turn - were ramifications as to the nature of 
social life itself (p. 72). In short, it was a value which asserted 
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Man over Machine . It reviled the principle of the division of labour 
implicit in the latter. 
Day prescribes the study of historical styles as part of the artist-
craftsperson's preparation. The book itself contains copious 
illustrations of designs from many cultures in time and place: 
Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Byzantine, .Japanese, Arabic, Etruscan, 
Persian, Italian, Spanish and German among them. Of special 
prominence, however, are examples derived from English Gothic, a 
circumstance which would be justified by Day in terms of his concern 
for ideosyncratic stylistic continuity in the arts and crafts as a way 
of cementing cultural and national identity (p.l25). The desire to 
retain national indentity in the arts and crafts may also be seen as a 
further means of undermining the goal of mass (uniform) production by 
machinery. 
This adulation of the Gothic, which was rrost notably inspired in the 
nineteenth century by Ruskin and Morris, revealed also the fundamental 
romanticism of the arts and craft rrovement at the same time as it 
promoted its ideological commitment to non-mechanized labour as the 
basis for humane social existence. Thus the traditional styles of 
ornament themselves constituted statements of ideology, since such 
styles were inextricably linked to a mode of prcrluction - making 
by hand - which itself was regarded as being essentially humanizing. 
Ornamentation produced under such ideal conditions spoke of the 
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integrity of its manufactt1re. It contained what Day called 
'character' : 
.. ornament grows out of conditions of 
work, and the character resulting tells 
of them. ' (p. 87) 
By this criterion character could hardly exist at all in machine-made 
products. Yet Day appears to be a figure at the crossroads. His 
apparent knowledge of principles and techniques demonstrates his 
thorough grounding in the arts and crafts of his time but it appears 
that he also clearly accepted the inevitability of mechanical 
production's inundation of the market of manufactured goods. Thus he 
implores, albeit resignedly, 
In design and workmanship alike we 
must go on, or give up the game. 
OUr choice happily does not lie between 
the methods of medieval workmen 
following the lines of tradition and 
those of latter-day capitalists. We 
ho.ve yet to try wh::.t se2!T's the obvious 
way out of the difficulty in which 
a sudden change of industrial conditions 
has landed us - the experiment not of 
returning to the rude or leisurely manner 
of old days, but of devoting ourselves 
to the solution of the industrial and 
artistic problem of the rroment • 
(p.l37) 
In this recurrent grappling with the issue of mechanical production's 
reconciliation with good design and workmanship, Day enters the arena 
of art-politics and, indeed, of political activity per se. He states, 
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in his concluding paragraph, 
... we come back to the very nature of design. 
If it is true, as I began by saying, U1at, 
apart from its application, there is properly 
no such thing as ornarrent ( ' .. ornament grows 
out of conditions of work.', p.87), it 
follows that, personal as may be the work 
of its designer, it is still the outcome 
of conditions, the solution of a problem, 
set by circumstances outside himself. 
(p.312) 
It is largely this theme which ascribes to the book an historical 
significance which is separate from any which derives from its more 
ostensible function (and value) as a comprehensive exposition on 
principles and techniques pertaining to a multitude of arts and crafts 
of the late nineteenth century. 
The tension of Day's position, and of the phase in art history of 
which his book is representative, is shown by the evidence of his own 
complete saturation in the values, principles and processes of the 
Arts and Crafts movement ma.king it seemingly impossible for him to 
envisage comparable values and principles of a machine aesthetic, 
which he could yet foresee as necessary. As he states, 
Manufacturers know too little about methods 
of beautiful or artistic making, even if 
they realise that there is such a thing. 
Artists know too little about the means of 
modern manufacture, which, by their aid, 
might be put to much more artistic use than 
unaided ccmmercial or mechanical instinct 
can possibly make of them. 
(p.l37) 
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Ironically, Day appears to deny mechanical manufacture the possibility 
of realising aesthetic forms through adherence to tvvo of the very 
principles which Day himself prarrotes: namely, txuth to material 
(e.g., p.lS), and the idea that good design is determined also by the 
nature of tools and the production method itself, (e.g., p.76). Thus 
he deplores what were to become, a few years later, criteria for 
beauty in design when he asserts, 
In the process of modern manufacture, 
everything gets planed down to a 
marvellous smoothness; the ideal of 
execution is mechanical preclslon; 
and design itself sinks into dull 
monotony. 
(p.l32) 
Day could here, ironically, be describing the look of modern design. 
The ethos of the Arts and Crafts movement proposed that the made-by-
hand process in itself denoted the status of art to a manufactured 
object. Ard except fer pern.ittinc; ·~rhat Day :lecril>?d :ts & f,~,.; 
legitimate 'partnerships' between 'allied processes', such as those which 
exist between mason and carver, joiner and inlayer, goldsmith and 
jeweller. (Day, 1904, p.214), the ethos of craft-as-art also proposed 
that modes of production which did not, in their totality, involve a 
single individual could not realise objects which could count as art. 
Because of the inherent detachment and alienation from the ultimate 
product of one's labour which the principle of division of labour 
contains, the individual v.Drker, according to the craft-as-art.ethos, 
could not therefore enjoy the aesthetic experience of the making 
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process, wherein lay the virtual artistic content of an object. 
Thus products which emanate from complex, labour-fragmented 
manufacturing processes could not count as art. By this criterion 
(and despite their massive proliferation) none of the myriad objects 
produced by mechanical m2ans could count as objects of art. For not 
only does the hand crafted object provide aesthetic (and therefore 
artistic) satisfaction for its maker. Know ledge of this saiTe inherent 
aestheticism - that is, an aestheticism which is, metaphorically, 
built into the object, thus becaning an actual element of the object -
is implicity transferred to the second party (client, relative etc.) 
for whose use the object may be destined. The sense of the aesthetic, 
derived merely from knowledge of an object's individualised, and 
therefore thoroughly humanised productive mode, is an important reason 
why an additional factor - namely, the uniqueness of the art object -
emerges as a crucial criterion as to what, perhaps for the majority of 
people, should count as art. 
It is at this point that the fundarrental distinction between craft and 
design may be seen. For whilst both designer and craftsperson may be 
engaged in the production of utilitarian objects (in contrast to the 
fine artist) the craft ethos in contemporary art education is derived 
from, and it largely perpetuates the nineteenth century practices and 
ideology of handicrafts. The collaborationist ethos of design, on the 
other hand, is inextricably linked with current technology and hence 
with whatever productive modes technology spawns, whether these 
involve mechanical mass production or production by 
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computer. In fact, the designer in this sense designs for the means 
of production to a large extent. 
A basic principle of craft manufacture is 'hands-on'; for many 
crafts persons, art is simply making. It is anathe.Jna, however, to the 
very means of production to which the designer is tied that he or she 
should physically manufacture the product designed. The principle of 
division of labour, of which the designer is an integral component, 
denies him or her a role of actual making. 
The rationale for basing an art curriculum on craft ac-tivities is of 
the following order. First, it is held that art is concerned with the 
visual beauty of things. Second, since the individual constantly 
encounters objects (visual things) of all kinds in daily living, his 
or her daily life would be the richer if these could, in fact, be 
objects of beauty. Third (and by extension), since art is a great 
civilizing and humanizing agent, society as a whole would be the more 
civilized and humane if all people within it were to be concerned 
with, and able to enjoy the visual beauty of everyday things. Fourth, 
school is seen to provide the potential for the wide dissemination of 
aesthetic values through inculcation of the young. Fifth, craft 
provides activities in which all children can fruitfully engage and 
achieve personally satisfying rewards. Sixth, the aesthetic values 
acquired through making will be internalised by the child and brought 
to bear in all kinds of subsequent visual experiences. Seventh, craft 
activities have therapeutic value, of significance to the individual 
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child in terms of learning a leisure-time pursuit for the future and 
also of relieving external pressures, including the pressure of 
apparently more exacting intellectual school subjects. 
The craft. rationale is, understandably, one with widespread appeal in 
education. It appeals to parents because they can identify with, and 
locate the good sense of traditional domestic products and processes. 
It appeals to accountability-minded school principals because of this 
appeal to parents and because, in the context of school-life, 
principals can see for themselves children in classrooms being busy 
and achieving concrete results. It appeals to art teachers because of 
principals' and parents' support and also because of the relatively 
relaxed, pressure-free, intellectually undemanding climate which craft 
activities can induce in otherwise volatile unstreamed classrooms. It 
appeals to children because they can relax, feel comfortable, learn 
socially-valued manual skills and produce concrete objects which are 
valued by themselves and others. 
There are compelling reasons, it would seem, for the embattled 
comprehensive secondary school to develop a programme in crafts. 
However, that such a programme should be conceived as that which 
occupies the position of Art in the school's curriculum is another 
rna.tter, however taken-for-granted this conception has been. 
It has been shown that the place in present day art curriculum of 
craft has largely stemmed fran the influence of the Arts and Crafts 
movement of the nineteenth century. This movement established the 
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rationale for its own p.::>si tion on a pa.rticular conception of art which 
it supported by a selective view of art history and a strong moral and 
social stance which grew out of contemporaneous conditions. 
The rationale for craft-as-art mainly stems from a taken-for-granted 
assumption that art is concerned with the visual beauty of things. 
Morris himself proclaimed (1896) in precisely this vein, 
As to my generalizations, I can only say, first, 
that, in order to have a living school of Art, 
the public in general must be interested in Art; 
it must be a part of their lives; something 
which they can no rrore do without than water or 
lighting. We must not be able to plead poverty 
or necessity, as we do now, as an excuse for 
ugliness or dirt. If we raise a building, whether 
it be palace, factory, or cottage, it must be 
a thing well understood that it must be sightly: 
if a railway has to be run from one place 
to another, it must be taken for granted that 
the minimum of destruction of natural beauty 
must be incurred, even if that should increase the 
expense of the line largely; disfiguring waste 
of coalpits or manufactories must be got rid of 
whatever the cost may be, and so on. And, mind 
you, all this need of real public conv61ience, 
which is the only possible foundation for Art in 
modern '::irnes 1 is ':]Uite :?<JSsible to he done; und 
it will be done, as soon as people care about it. 
(pp.2-3) 
Here is a classic extrapolation of the idea that it is the nature of 
art and hence the business of the artist to be concerned with the 
visual beauty of the world. Morris alludes to the ugliness and dirt 
of many buildings, railways, coalpits and the like and asserts that it 
is the role of the artist to bring his or her particularly refined 
sensibilities to bear in the remediation of such visual desecration. 
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Yet many of the world's (attributed) great VV'Orks of art are concerned 
with pxtraying such ugly thenes, and a good deal more present images 
of considerably greater ugliness and apparent hurran barbarity. 'I'here 
is Grunewald's 'crucifixion', 'The Last Judgement' of Hieronymous Bosch 
and images in the lower half of Michelangelo's version of the same 
subject, Goya 's 'Saturn Devouring One of His Sons', Van Gogh's painting 
of worn-out workmen's boots, Duchamp's 'Fountain' (a urinal), Picasso's 
'Guernica', the powerful images of refugees' suffering by Kathe 
Kollwitz and of the industrial wasteland of England by Stanley 
Spencer, 'campbell's Soup' by Andy Warhol and Lichtenstein's blc:>vm-up, 
comic strip-inspired 'Rat-a-tat-a-tat'. 
Examples such as these raise the question: If art is concerned witi1 
visual beauty, how can images which portray visual ugliness be 
considered art? 
A response to this question is that, irrespective of what it 
represents, a painting, drawing or piece of sculpture can be beautiful 
as a thing-in-itself. Clearly, however, the images in the particular 
examples above were intended to shock, to disturb. This indicates a 
fundamental dichotomy between what art and craft respectively stand 
for. The criteria which determine beauty in a work of art are 
different from those which define beauty in the general environment 
to which craft and design relate. 
Notwithstanding the anthropological conception, advanced by Kubler, 
that the history ()f art may be found in the history of ordinary 
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things, the issue of intentionality is an irn_[X)rtant one, given the 
context. For the context of the artist is this: he or she self-
consciously produces a piece of ~ADrk which he or she intends to be 
------
located within a specific branch of human knowledge and endeavour 
which is known and labelled as art. That is, there lS a 'world of Art' 
within which there exists a body of shared rreanings and conventions 
which, in contemporary western society, is able to function perhaps 
independently of, perhaps alongside whatever broader conceptions of 
art happen to be described by anthropologists. 
Indeed, however arbitrary this WJrld of Art may be, its existence may 
be justified by the anthropological criteria, which are founded on 
acceptance of the ideosyncratic meanings and forms of different 
cultures. 
What are the intentions of the craftsperson? Central to the craft 
ethos is the principle of making by hand. It lS the valuing of 
process itself which forms the foundation of the craft aesthetic. 
When a craft object evokes the sense of the handmade process it 
becorres 'humanized' and it is this evocation which, for rrany, provides 
the major source of aesthetic satisfaction. Thus the hand-crafted 
object even possesses a moral or spiritual dimension. If it is able 
to canrnunicate a sense of the presence of its human maker in and 
through its own form, then a traditional craft object, however humble, 
is also able to forge a link between its owner and his or her possibly 
ancient forbears. 
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The principle of conservation is integral to the craft ethos. It is 
not merely that objects should be hand-made: it is important that they 
be produced by often ancient means and even realised in forms which 
echo ancient precursors. By thus projecting object, maker and owner 
alike into a tradition, the craft object may be serving as a bonding 
agent in culture, and realising in concrete form a fusion of identity 
between a living person and a distant past. Such an object would in 
this way function as a form of symbolic communication and, as such, 
may indeed be conceived as an object of art, fitting Kubler's thesis 
that the history of art is to be found in the history of things. 
Describing 'the powerful revival of interest in the crafts which we 
have seen over the past few years', Lucie-Smith (1977) reports that, 
•.. the craftsman himself (in the 1970 s) came 
to be regarded as an ideal, even a heroic 
figure, living out in practice the values which 
most people could only half-heartedly aspire 
tOvVards ... It was the craftsman's way of life, even 
more than his product, which attracted attention. 
Craft, with its emphasis on traditional values, 
t:-ms came full circle. 
(pp.29-30) 
The contemporary revival in the crafts signifies the fact that the 
craft ethos has indeed come full circle. It is a revival of precisely 
the values and principles expounded by Morris one hundred years ago. 
Lucie-Smith's description of the perceived aesthetic value of the 
craftsman's way of life today echoes the Morris-inspired sentiments of 
Day (1904) which praised the virtues of 'workmanliness' in craft. 
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According to Day, 
... a workman ... looks for evidence 
(of workmanliness) ... and delights to 
recognise behind the work a workman 
with whom to claim fellowship. 
(1904, p.l39) 
Lucie-Smith (1977) again describes the analogous situation in respect 
of craft today in his reference to the term which has enjoyed currency 
in craft circles: so-called process art . Process art has as one of 
its basic tenets the aesthetic value which 'evidence of workrnanliness' 
is considered capable of bestovving to a craft object. He describes 
process art · as 
... a label which is used to imply that the 
main purpose of the finished V<Drk is to exist 
as a comprehensible summary of all the processes 
by which it has been brought into being ... 
(p. 30 ), 
Noting that the idea of process has been 'stealthily and perhaps even 
unconsciously extended' , Lucie-Smith observes that now 
... every aspect of the maker's life 
- eating, sleeping, even excreting -
is somehow magically encapsulated 
in the finished result. 
(1977, p.30) 
With the integral relationship of Im.lch of the contemporary craft world 
with such whole-of-life concerns as ecology, the environment and 
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comrm.mal living, t_he craft ethos today Imy l::x~ seen as a reaction to 
the anti thesis of such concerr1s: mass industria 1 isation. In other 
words, the contemporary craft movement has been spawned by virtually 
identical social conditions to those which gave birth to the Arts and 
Crafts movement in Britain a hundred years ago. The ideological 
compatibility of the two movements in thus understandable; and as 
before, the resultant influence of craft in art education is powerful 
today. 
The crafts can rest on their laurels in e1e school curriculum when 
emphasis is placed on process as a value in itself. However, 'process' 
often means simply keeping the child occupied rather than the 
cognitive and affective processes involved in a particular discipline 
being learned. That is, a child's making of a scarf with a two-colour 
dog-tooth pattern on a four-heddle table-top loom may not be valued in 
the school as much for the fact that the child VVDuld have learned a 
particular weaving process as for the fact that he or she would have 
been kept busy. 
For in many schools craft is regarded as mere busyVVDrk. Children are 
pressed into mind-numbing, repetitive production tasks which are so 
undemanding that free conversation is possible and permissible with no 
detrimental effect to the work at hand. Clearly, the prescribing of 
such activities is intended to allow children - and teacher - to 
relax. Craft activity of this kind - undertaken within that part of 
the curricuhrrn called Art - is therapeutic leisure activity. As a 
result of such programmes, however, Art in the school and art 
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education in general become easily undervalued. 
The deliberate leisurely character of such craft activity stands in 
stark contrast to the relative rigor of the intellectual demands 
imposed on pupils and teachers alike by the 'real' subjects in the 
school. It is precisely this contrast, however, which explains the 
seemingly paradoxical acceptance by schools of activities for children 
which, to any reasonably perceptive layperson, would be clearly seen 
to contravene the schools' own positions on educational standards. For 
it is the nature and the demands of the 'real' subjects which 
implicitly and indirectly justify for educators the incorporation of 
mindless repetitive busywork - in other words, craft - in school 
curriculum. In short, craft so conceived can offer a welcome break. 
As such, craft is seen to possess no intrinsic educational vaiue, let 
alone cultural value, but is acceptable only inasmuch as it might 
contribute to the child's readiness for 'real' learning by providing 
light relief. 
Furthermore, craft so conceived represents to the primary classroom 
teacher, struggling to keep abreast of methods and knowledge in a wide 
range of subject fields, an easy solution to what, for some, is the 
constant problem of'what to do in Art'. 
Even art specialist teachers in secondary schools,however, often 
resort to the most banal craft activities, particularly for 
troublesane classes. Such moves usually find ready support from 
school Principals whose chief preoccupation is with control. Hence a 
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pressure, however subtle, is often imposed upon the school Art 
department to base its curriculum on craft, since craft conceived as 
repetitive mnual acitivity is seen to provide a way of keeping 
children busy, and thus under reasonable control. 
Lip service only is paid any educational rationale for this expedient. 
However, insofar as activity may be so inte1~reted as to mean 
process , and process , in turn, may be represented as creativity , 
the expedient is, nonetheless, justified and widely accepted on 
educational grounds. 
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DIS'l'INGUISHING BEJI'WEEN AHT AND CRAFT'. 
Yet to what extent could craft, properly so-called, involve 
creativity? Is it not in the very nature of craft to carry on 
tradition rather than to break new ground; to make, by tline-worn 
processes, products which,being desired or ordered by would-be 
clients, are thus predicted in advance? 
According to Collingwood (1960), such characteristics distinguish 
craft from art • He describes a craft object as something in which 
The result to be obtained is preconceived or 
thought out before being arrived at. The 
craftsman knows what he wants to make before 
he makes it. 
(pp. 15-16) 
'Art proper' on the other hand, is defined by crucial characteristics 
which it does not share with craft. These, in the view of 
Collingwood, are /expression' and ~imagination'. (Chapters vi and viii.) 
If 'art proper' differs so fundamentally fran craft, the question 
arises as to what business has craft to be included at all in a school 
subject called Art , let alone dominate its curriculum offerings? 
Clearly Collingwood's view is in stark constrast to that of William 
Morris. It would also be contested by the contemporary advocates of 
the crafts revival • In a section headed 'craft Activities are 
Creative Activities,' Mattil (1971) writes, 
All Children possess a creative instinc~. 
Sound education provides the climate for 
the fullest development of this instinct. 
In crafts, each project must allow the child 
to think originally and to learn to work 
independently. 
(p.ll) 
Here Mattil claims that working in crafts can mean working creatively. 
In this way, crafts are compatible with the broader educational 
principle of creativity. In fact, he implies that crafts could indeed 
count as Art in the school curriculum. He states ( 1971), 
Today's artist/craftsman has largely adopted 
a position which is compatible with today's 
art education. Dedicated to the idea of personal 
freedom and in the midst of great varieties of old 
and new materials, he has turned crafts into a 
great creative adventure of the human spirit. ~ot 
trapped by tradition, he has chosen to be 
inventive, risk-taking and free to make mistakes. 
(p.l) 
Mattil appears anxious to shed the mantle of old-fashioned repetitive 
handiwork associated with craft production and to dismiss the idea 
that the crafts belong to a bygone age. His book itself, however, 
appears to be strongly characteristic of its own time. To be capable 
of positively responding to the call for relevance in respect of the 
curriculum content of one's discipline was not an insignificant 
attribute in the education scene of the late'sixties and early 
1seventies, when Mattil's book was published. Mattil reconciles craft 
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with the broad educational objective of cre-C'Iti vi ty, but in other ways 
he also reflects the dominant ethos wiu1in both education and society 
in general in the 'sixt.ies. His statement contains certain key words 
and phrases, the connotations of which may be seen to contain 
particular potency for the age of Vietnam and campus unrest. Examples 
are phrases such as 'personal freedom', 'great varieties of old and new 
materials', 'a great creative adventure of the human spirit', 'not 
trapped by tradition' and 'risk-taking and (being) free to ma.ke 
mistakes.' 
Such phrases - familiar in their time - may be also seen in a context 
relevant to this discourse. They also implicity promote the primacy 
of process over product. The disdain in the'sixties for a product-
oriented society and an education system in which, it was perceived, 
even people were regarded as products constituted an ideological 
position which permeated all facets of social life. 
The contextual similarity of the recent craft revival and that of the 
Arts and Crafts movement of a hundred years ago is pointed out by 
Lucie-Smith (1977), who claims that, in the culture of the 1970 s, 
The crafts •.• could be thought of as being 
something which represented a practical 
form of resistance to the ills of 
industrialism and the evils of catering 
for the tastes and indeed the follies 
of the mass. 
(p.29) 
As in the age of Morris the fundamental principle pertaining to the 
crafts movement of tooay is the principle of making-by-hand. The very 
assertion of craft is ln itself a form of reaction and rebellion 
toward radically industrial means of production emergent in society at 
large. 
Surely, it could be argued, if crafts are not, ipso facto, non-
creative but possess, as Mattil asserts, great potential as creative 
activities which,as such, are 'compatible with today's art education' 
and that furthermore craft acitivity involves making by hand, then 
surely craft could well count as Art in school curriculum. 
To Collingwood, the essential distinction between craft and art 
resides in the proposition that whereas in craft properly so-called 
both means and end are predetermined, craft being thus in large part 
predictable and non-exploratory by nature, art properly so-called is 
experimental , boundary-breaking activity within which outcomes cannot 
be predicted in advance. Again it rray be seen that the criterion of 
creativity is fundamental for determining what counts as art. 
Brook (1980), has elaborated Collingwood's proposition, claiming that 
the defining characteristic of art properly so-called' is that it is 
experimental . By adhering to this characteristic of experimentation 
as the crucial criterion, Brook claims that much of what is accepted 
as Art should, in fact, be regarded as craft. Here he reiterates 
Collingwood. By this criterion, perhaps most of the celebrated 
artefacts in the history of Art, from Egyptian sculpture to Byzantine 
mosaics, from Florentine painting of the fifteenth century to hard-
edge painting of the 1960's, vvuuld have to be re-cast as craft 
objects. For it is not difficult to perceive that the makers of such 
artefacts have employed established techniques and rredia in 
representing prescribed subject matter in conventional ways. This, 
after all, describes the nature of style, and it is the history of 
style which largely constitutes the history of Art. 
M:l.rtland (1974) also subscribes to the view that much of what has 
conventionally been labelled Art should instead be properly seen as 
craft. He draws the distinction between discovery and invention in 
order to explain this phenom2nom, stating 
Discovery is that which makes an addition 
to man's knowledge or nature whereas invention 
is that which establishes a new operational 
principle which serves some previously 
acknowledged objective. Thus we could say 
that discovery, along with art, points out 
or creates what men have not seen yet and 
invention, along with craft, ingeniously turns 
known facts to an unexpected advantage. 
(p.234) 
~artland illustrates this concept with Robert Browning's poetic 
criticism of the art of Andrea del Sarto and Roger Fry's explicit 
criticism of Breughel. In both instances, according to M:l.rtland, each 
artist has been seen by his particular critic essentially as a 
craftsman, since 
Before (each artist) began his 'action' 
he knew the end for which he vvurked and 
he had no need or room for the contribution 
of 'the thing wrought' other than 
bringing it into being. 
(1974, p.234) 
Thus Martland explains how, in particular circumstances, 
conventionally so--called works of art - paintings, sculptures, 
drawings etc. - would rnore properly be seen and described as craft 
objects. In so doing, he may be accounting for the bulk of 
conventionally so-called works of art, for works which one could claim 
were truly original, devoid of derivation of some order, are surely 
rare commodities. Nevertheless Martland states, 
In so far as certain activities serve the 
past, in so far as they draw men's attention, 
even their authors' cw.n attention, to 
preconceived plans or ends, they are crafts. 
They are prejudged. They themselves crystallise 
prejudices into sterotypes. In effect they 
transform the empirical to the a priori. Canned 
reaction replaces open responses ... If {a work) 
pleases, it pleases not ~ object but ~ that 
which it helps us to recognise i.e. the quality 
of the scene, memory or incident it illustrates. 
(1974, pp. 234-235) 
In common with Collingwood and Brook, and along with his own cited 
examples of Browning and Fry, Martland has implicitly built his case 
upon the taken-for-granted notion that originality constitutes the 
essential defining characteristic of art. In this line he states, 
Though (artists) begin with what they have 
gained fran their particular hour and 
fran their particular place, they quickly 
move on to bring into focus, to manifest, 
a new understanding, a new relationship. 
(1974, p.236) 
By this conception, only a small proportion of the vast productive 
output of all kinds by humans would count as art. Art would indeed be 
the preserve of the gifted, initiated few. 
The irony of this conception of art 'properly so-called' lS that the 
same word- 'art' - which is used to signify the rarefied nature of 
achievement and experience, itself once described so broad a domain of 
human productiveness. 
With regard to art in schools, it is obvious that to apply the 
criteria of Martland and company,precious little could be expected to 
constitute art 'properly so-called' . Should the subject, therefore, be 
called Craft ? For according to their criteria it is craft which 
would more accurately describe the nature of activity even in the so-
called fine art fields such as painting and sculpture. 
Such an exclusive notion of art is in complete contrast to the 
anthropological conception as advanced, for example, by Kubler and 
Dissanayake. For them,virtually any artefact, whether prescribed in 
advance as art or not would yet count as art if it was conferred by 
its awn culture with specialness In the anthropological conception, 
art is determined by the capacity of an artefact to somehow function 
as symbolic canmunication within a culture: as a virtual totem in the 
Durkheimian sense. 
The anthropological conception of art ex[.X)Ses the ethos of creativity 
and the celebration and definition of art as creative process to be 
merely a normative order peculiar to Western culture - and perhaps to 
contemr:x)ra£Y_ Western culture at that. 
If art 'properly so-called' can exist only under such tight conditions 
as those laid down by Ma.rtland and company, the_n art properly so-
called must be seen to have enjoyed only the briefest of histories. 
And if art represents such a supr~ne order of things, as they imply, 
does this mean that human evolution itself has advanced by some 
dramatic stride only in the past few hundred years, and that this 
great step forward has occurred only in ~\estern Society? For it has 
only been during this period and within this culture that the pre-
eminent defining principle of art as creative process has become 
reified. 
In other cultures, the rraking of forms and images has, historically, 
been powerfully determined by the very antithesis of this principle. 
That is, the nature of forms and objects has been determined by 
precedent and tradition, by the need to present the familiar rather 
than to over-ride it. For the common raison d'etre of Egyptian 
sculpture and Australian Aboriginal rock paintings, of Czech icons and 
North American Indian totem poles, of the smiling Buddha and Sepik 
River statuary was the need of a culture to embody and communicate its 
shared meanings. In such cultures, art has served to keep alive myths 
and traditions, to give tangible form to spiritual worlds, to 
perpetuate triumphs and to assert and preserve the fundamental order 
by which such cultures have been governed. 
Seen against this perspective, the view of Ma.rtland and company rray 
even be considered trite. 
For what emerges from an anthropological perspective on a culture's 
irrBges and forms is that the critical factor which will determine 
significance are the embedded meanings of the images and forms: what 
they embody and corrrrnunicate as cultural symbols. As such, the 
principles of originality and creativity may constitute the antithesis 
of art; for the realisation of such principles may, by thus tending to 
obscure meanings and invent new ones, serve only to mystify meanings 
and alienate rather than corrrrnunicate meanings and reinforce a 
culture's identity. 
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THE PIUMACY OF PRCX::ESS IN ART EDUCATION. 
The handicraft tradition places an enphasis on .rrBking and doing , on 
'hands-on' activity: on process itself. 
However, this belief in the prinBcy of process over product has 
stemmed also fran the influence of other factors, the origins of 
which, like the Arts and Crafts rroverrent, .rrBY also be located in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There were the growing 
disciplines of psychology and psycho-analysis and the ascending 
philosophy of democractic liberalism. All drew attention to the 
significance of human experience - the process of living - for 
determining the nature (the quality) of an individual's and, by 
extension, a society's life. All had profound effects upon theory and 
practice in both education and art- the twin pillars of art education. 
Progressive education, with its emphasis on the concept of child-
centred learning and the quality of the educational experience itself, 
was being developed at the same time as artists were also asserting 
the pre-eminence of such values as creativity and self-expression in 
art. To them, the intensity of personal experience was considered the 
necessary precondition for the realisation of insights and, ultinBtely, 
work of quality. A .rrBjor concern was that individuality and personal 
freedom should always prevail over mass conformity and crass 
materialism - symbols of industrial man. 
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In this vein, Wheeler (1936) wrote, in respect, however, of education, 
There is no human being, however insignificant, 
whose function it is to be a mere cog in the 
industrial machine. 
There is no individual, however insignificant, 
whose whole business in life is to acquire 
information. On this account, the rna.jority of 
modern thinkers are not satisfied with narrow 
utilitarian views of education as a preparation 
for complete living.· 
(p.23). 
In a further statement, Wheeler draws attention to the importance in 
education of attending to process. TO do so she suggests would be 
facilitate the evolution- the 'becoming' - of the hurna.n individual: 
The recognition of the creativeness of each 
living individual, the realization of the 
deep-set social impulses within the human being, 
and the belief in rna.n 's fundamental urge to 
be in harmony with the process of creative 
evolution can only lead to one view of 
education, namely, that it is, or should be, 
a means of further hurna.n evolution and of the 
emergence of higher values than those so far 
achieved in h1..lll1Cl.n history. 
(1936, pp. 27-28) 
Significantly, Wheeler here links the perceived value of the 
educational process to the factor of creativity. She states that in 
education nothing less than human evolution itself is involved, and 
that its fruitful realisation comes from recognising, harnessing and 
developing 'the creativeness of each living individual.' From a 
philosophical point of view, this educational theory directed 
attention to child developrrent. It was a theory strongly supported, 
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indeed strongly influenced by developments in educational psychology 
in the early decades of this century which provided copious data on 
the phenomenom of the developing child, culminating in the vvork of 
Piaget. 
With the dominant educational theory of the day pranoting the twin 
values of process and creativity, a door was opened for art to enter 
(or re-enter) the school curriculum, under a new banner which loudly 
proclaimed those same key concepts, now linked as one in the term 
'creative process.' Thus in the mid-thirties, Hobart High School, 
under the behest of its headmaster H. V. Biggins, introduced this new 
conception of the role of art in education into Tasmanian Schools. 
The most influential individual to establish this relationship between 
the then-current values in art and education was Viktor Lowenfeld, 
most notably through his book, Creative and Mental Growth (1943). In 
this work, Lowenfeld asserted the value of art activity for the 
development of the overall creativity and the sound general mental 
disposition in the child. As well, however, he attached to the 
developmental stages - which approximated the Piagetian stages of 
cognitive development - various artistic behaviours, imagery forms and 
media preferences related to children. Central to his thesis was that 
the child grew from within. As such, it was considered not only 
unnecessary but positively harmful for an outsider - including the 
teacher - to interfere in the child's creative process, in particular 
when the child was naking art. 
In art, a similar orientation toward process was stongly evident. The 
difference between process and product was conceived by the Italian 
Futurists as being little less than the difference between life and 
death. In the first Futurist Manifesto of 190~ Marinetti described 
museums - the repository par excellence of art products - as 
'cemetEries .. , public dormitories .. , absurb abattoirs' (in Appollonio, 
1973, p.22). He announced instead the Futurists' intention 'to exalt 
agressive action, a feverish insomnia, the racer's stride, the mortal 
leap .. ' (Ibid, p.21) and encapsulated the idea of the primacy of 
process over product in his famous staterrent, 'A roaring car .•. is more 
beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace ' (ibid). 
The German Expressionist August Macke also described the significance 
of the artistic process, stating that all great paintings (within 
which category he included paintings from so-called primitive 
cultures) 
... are the expressions of (artists') inner 
lives; they an.! che fon,lS o£ tljesc artists' 
interior VV'Orld in the medium of painting. 
(circa 1911-1912, in Lankheit, ed., 1974. p,87) 
Macke alluded to the significance of process also in the art of 
children, demonstrating a knowledge and perception of principles, 
beliefs and values beginning to be more widely advanced in education. 
He stated, 
To create forms rreans: to live. Are 
not children more creative in drawing 
directly from the secret of their sensations? 
... Thunder, flower, any force expresses 
itself as form. So does man. He, too, lS 
driven by something to find \\Drds for 
conceptions to find clearness in obscurity, 
consciousness in the unconscious. This lS 
his life, his creation. 
As man changes, so do his forms change. 
(in Lankheit, p.85) 
M3.cke perceived that which Lowenfeld ( 1943) was to later e:x:p:Jund as 
the developmental stages in children's art. 
M3.cke the artist is seen to be akin also to ])E:wey the 
philosopher/educationist. This is apparent in respective statements 
made by the two. First, Macke wrote (c.l912), 
The joys, the sorrows of man, of nations, lie 
behind the inscriptions, paintings, temples, 
cathedrals, and masks, behind the musical 
compositions, stage spectacles, and dances. 
If they are not there, if form becanes empty and 
groundless then there is no art. 
(in Lankheit, p.89) 
The title of Dewey's book, Art as Experience (1934), itself suggests 
the significance of process in art. In it, Dewey states, 
In order to understand the meaning of 
artistic products, we have to forget 
them for a time, to turn aside fran them 
and have recourse to the ordinary forces 
and conditions of experience that we do 
not usually regard as aesthetic •.• In 
order to understand the aesthetic in its 
ultimate and approved forms, one must begin 
with it in the raw; in the events and scenes 
that hold the attentive eye and ear of man, 
arousing his interest and affording him 
enjoyment as he looks and listens. 
(pp. 4-5) 
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However, Dewey himself did not go so far as to dismiss the art product 
as being of no significance, and nor did Macke or the Futurists. 
The same could not be said for many of the zealous disciples of 
progressive education. The notion that process alone 1s all that 
counts in art and art education - in fact, in respect of education in 
all the arts - is a notion which is alive and well in many educational 
quarters today, not least in the so-called Related Arts rrovem::mt. 
Emphasis on the pre-eminence of process over product in art education 
may be traced also to three major influences from educational 
psychology which have manifested themselves in significant ways. 
First, there is the notion that art activity possesses particular 
therapeutic value and is therefore a contributor to the general mental 
health of the child. This notion derives from interpretations,most 
notably, of the V\Drk of Freud and Jung. Second, the art-making process 
is seen as a cognitive activity and thus an indicator of intelligence 
in children. Burt's Mental Scholastic Tests (1921) and Goodenough's 
Measurement of Intelligence by Drawings ( c .192 6 ) have been imp:::>rtant 
influences here. Third, there is the panacea of creativity as an 
educational value in itself, in relation to which art is regarded as 
a special repository and a way of giving the elusive phenomena of 
creativity actual concrete form. If art objects may be conceived as 
creations -as prcx:1ucts of creative thinking-then the artistic process 
must constitute a virtually pure embodiment of the creative process 
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itself. As Lovvenfeld and Brittain state, 
Art activity cannot 1::e imposed but must 
come as a spirit from within. This is not 
always an easy process, but the development 
of creative abilities is essential in our 
society, and the youngster's drawing reflects 
his creative growth, both in the drawing itself 
and in the process of making the art form . 
. . . Art can bring ... a dimension that is 
concerned with the psychological processes 
that occur and are experienced and developed 
in the youngster as he is involved in 
learning . 
... Through an understanding of the way a youngster 
draws and the methods he uses to portray his 
environment, we can gain insight into his behaviour 
and develop an appreciation of the complex and 
varied ways in which children grow and develop. 
1972, 41-43) 
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COMMITMENr TO PROCESS AND THE PROBLEM OF CON'I'ENr 
IN ART CUlUUCULUM. 
At an earlier point in this discourse, the notion of Archer (1978) 
that all human'making'operations could be listed under design was 
discussed. 
Archer's reductionist rationale is based on his own particular 
interpretation of the nature of process involved in human making, or 
form-giving operations: specifically, that all such activities involve 
the same creative process. Archer states that he could provethat all 
such operations logically constituted design by citing etymological 
definitions - if he had tirre! t\btwithstanding the futility of 
providing (or, as in Archer's case, not providing) etymological 
'evidence' to explain current meanings of words, to expand Archer's 
point by referring to etymological foundations may nevertheless be 
helpful in the present context. For to do so may partly explain the 
current confusion over what should count as Art in schools. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (1966), the 
VV'Ord 'design' derives from the latin 'designare' , meaning to 'mark out, 
point out, delineate, depict, contrive.' It is not difficult to 
conceive from this definition that virtually all deliberate form-
making operations would involve designing. Archer may be seen to be 
quite correct, therefore, in his globa.l definition of design. For all 
those processes defined - marking out, pointing out, delineating, 
depicting, contriving - do, in fact, describe the processes pertaining 
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to fine art and craft as well as to so-called design ln its narrower, 
discipline-based sense. 
The problem of an(often persuasiv~ argument such as Archer's is 
revealed when it is applied to the school setting. For the global, 
all-embracing definition of design based on etymological 'evidence' and 
simplistic reductionist logic is characteristically advanced as the 
rationale for incorporating all the visual arts under the label (and 
in the department) of Design in schools. The problem is that once 
accomplished, the curriculum orientation of such a department may be 
shed of any global conception and be based instead on the philosophy, 
content, and methodologies of design in the specific, normative sense 
of the word - that is, as it refers to the contemporary world of 
design and the particular vocation of the designer. An art teacher 
with a fine art background reports that, in such a department, 
'students produce oil paintings to design briefs'. 
The situation described has emanated from belief in the primacy of 
process in art, from the claim that all human form-making processes 
are fundamentally one and the same, and from the consequent idea that 
design, fine art, craft (and any other visual forms for that matter) 
could all justifiably count as Art in education. 
However, does the obvious fact that all concrete forms are brought 
into existence by some kind of process mean that all form-creating 
processes are identical? Specifically, can it be claimed that fine 
art, craft and design do, in fact, all involve one and the same 
process? 
Robinson (1973) believes so. He distinguishes between the polarities 
of fine art and design, describing the former as being concerned with 
the expression of ideas, the latter with problem-solving. However, he 
presents the notion that these polarities actually exist at the two 
extreme ends of a single continuum, within the middle range of which 
distinctions between the t'V\Q become blurred. 
The implicit justification for this concept of locating both fine art 
and design on a single continuum is that each involves a common 
fundamental activity: the creative process. Thus Robinson asserts, 
Fundamental to my argument is the belief 
that, although differences exist between 
the work of the designer and artist, there is 
significant common ground in their modes of 
thinking in that they are both initially 
concerned with creative thinking . 
.... in creative thinking, reason and 
intuition are mutually interdependent, 
and •.. originality and innovation, flexibility, 
fluency and direrge'1t: thinki:1g (he cites 
Guilford elsewhere) can occur in any 
discipline. Whether they are concerned with 
problem-solving or expression is completely 
irrelevant. 
(in Aylward,Ed., 1973, p.97). 
Aylward (1973) is of the same persuasion. He presents a rationale for 
the use of the title 'Design' to encompass a range of existing school 
subjects, including Art, which is rerrarkably Archeresque in its 
sweeping nature and in the taken-for-granted truths which it asserts 
as the very basis of the rationale. 
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Aylward see~ingly takes for granted t~at all his readers would agree 
with him that educational change is a good thing in itself, that the 
pertinent school subjects in particular need to be reformed and that 
inter-disciplinary studies constitute a desirable model for 
curriculum. Thus he states, 
It is only too true that changes of title 
do not in themselves produce change. Yet, 
at worst, they do represent an attempt to 
look anew at ways of organising work in a 
better way. Particularly if one is concerned 
with setting up interdisciplinary studies, 
a new narre for the "WOrk is essential . If 
teachers of art, handicraft and home economics 
are to be encouraged to co-operate in developing 
more valuable experiences for their pupils, the 
old titles must go. 
D2sign has not been used as a subject title in 
secondary education, but a broad interpre-tation 
of its meaning is so relevant to the work done 
in all practical subjects that most teachers are 
willing to accept it. 
(1973, p.l4). 
In cormnon with Archer and Robinson, Aylward bases his argument of the 
essential unity between all productive endeavour involved in the 
creation of visual form on the view that each involves the same 
process. He describes, for example, common intellectual qualities 
which are brought to bear in respect of each as including 
••. the ability to analyse a problem and 
synthesize a solution, and the knowledge 
of materials and processes by which the 
solution is produced. 
(1973, p.l5) 
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He also identifies common sensuous qualities: 
... the ability to be aware of the needs of 
others, to use materials and processes in ways 
appropriate to their nature, and to evolve an 
elegant solution rather than one that is merely 
crudely functional. 
(1973, p.lS) 
The unfettered adulation of the creative process has been largely 
responsible for the current confusion as to what should count as art 
in education. Ironically, this pre-occupation with creative process 
has, by circuitous means, led to the demise of fine art in art 
education, in terms of both fine art's identity (what it is) and its 
status (its perceived cultural value). 
Nowhere has this been more fully demonstrated than by the phenanencm 
of so-called Basic Design courses in Art education. Fuller (1982) 
identifies Basic Design programmes in art schools as one of the chief 
des":royers c1f fine cut in tl:".e l::tst quarter of a centw-:y (p. 7). He 
claims that, 
•.• instead of providing an alternative to 
academicism, 'basic design' is itself a new 
academicism (and that) ••• from the beginning, it 
exerted a restrictive and finally 'collaborationist 
influence. 
(p. 8) 
With its belief in the primacy of process over product, Basic Design 
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may be seen as an heir to a familiar tradition in art and education of 
this century. However, the fact that R:-:tsic Design courses aspired to 
fully facilitating the creative process did not, of course, mean that 
this objective was automatically achieved. 
On the contrary, according to Fuller (1982), 
•.. despite claiming to be concerned with 
individual creative development, 'basic 
design' type teaching just institutionalised 
the retardation of such development .•• 
(p. 9) 
Hailed as a 'New Art for a New Age' , Basic Design was pioneered by 
Victor Pasmore and Richard Hamilton at Newcastle University in the 
U.K. in the late 1950 s. Influence spread rapidly, and the basic 
curriculum model - along with its underlying philosophy - has remained 
a powerful influence in British and Australian art education at all 
levels ever since. It remains to be seen, however, whether Basic 
Design, or Foundation Studies as it is ofte..n called, can withstand the 
radical re-assessment to which it is currently being subjected. 
Basic Design owes a good deal to the Bauhaus in its conception of an 
essential unity existing between all forms realised by the creative 
process • It is little wonder that the teachings of Bauhaus ITI:"lsters -
for example, of Itten in the sphere of colour - have been incorporated 
in the typical Basic Design curriculum. 
The strategy for devising a Basic Design curriculum is a reductionist 
one. This reductionist methodology has also been a significant 
contributor to the demise of fine art. For it is based on the Bauhaus 
notion that fine art, craftpdesign, architecture or dressmaking all 
involve the manipulation of the same visual elements of pure shape, 
pure colour, pure p;Jint, pure texture, pure line and so on. This, 
however, tends to deny the iconographic significance of works of art 
- and it is its concern with iconography which distinguishes fine art 
from other productive modes. 
The Basic Design approach tends to lead students and artists more and 
more away from representational imagery. Abstraction reigned supreme 
during the'sixties when Basic Design programmes were riding the crest 
of a wave. Painting and sculpture were the better the further they 
ranged from representation. The pa.inting was a pa.inting, so the logic 
went: it was a picture of nothing. It was pursued as an aesthetic 
form in its own right, as pure shape, pure colour, pure texture. 
The production of paintings and sculptures involved, to a high degree, 
the cognitive mode of problem-solving. Thus a student might be set 
the problem of representing space on a flat surface with colour alone 
or of achieving the effect of rhythm purely with cut-out cardboard 
shapes. Being scornful toward iconography and being concerned with 
manipulating pure visual elements into aesthetically pleasing products 
through problem-solving approaches, pa.inting and sculpture had thus 
become completely infiltrated by the ethos and the aesthetic 
principles of design - except for one crucial factor inherent to 
design: that of utility. 
Fine art was thus vulnerable. It was presenting the public with 
objects which differed little, in appearance and apparent meanings, 
from such utilitarian contemporary artefacts as kitchen utensils, 
furniture and office products. The problem was, however, that the 
fine art objects were, unlike such other artefacts, literally useless. 
The problan was exacerbated because the relative cost of the fine art 
objects was unfortunately outrageous to a public which saw in them 
nothing more than well-designed features of interior design, if not 
pure status symbols. 
By virtue of this interpretation of an identical creative process 
involved in all the visual arts, seduced by the paradigm of 
integration and by visions of what art should be in the New Age, 
artists and art educators stripped art of its own essential character, 
its autonomy and specialness. 
It is the uniqueness of art as a special way of hurran knowing, 
feeling, responding and communicating which Fuller, for one, wishes to 
restore. Adrronishing Basic Design for t11e crisis it has created in 
respect of art in education and, by extension, in society as a whole, 
he asserts the potential of painting and sculpture - fine art - to 
create an aesthetically healthy society. He conceives painting and 
sculpture as perrni tting 
••• the creation of a new and definite 
reality within the existing one, an 
illusory, re-constituted v.x:>rld within 
which the aesthetic dimension could 
survive, ma.ture, and truly develop. 
(1982,p.9) 
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ASPEC''l'S OF ART AS A UNIQUE FORM OF KNOWLECGE :COVIPAIUSONS WITH 
LANGUAGE. 
Hirst (1974) claims that art is a unique form of knowledge, 'stating 
truths that cannot be canmunicated in any other way. ' (p.l53). He 
conceives of art as an autonomous symbolic system within which 
meanings reside which are inseparable, and which cannot be precisely 
translated from the symbolic system itself. As such, artistic 
meanings are meanings which are peculiar to art. 
Hirst draws a parallel between art and language, suggesting that 
studies in the field of language have shed light on the nature of 
knowledge in art. In this connection, he refers to Wittgenstein's 
studies of meaning and concept of language-games. 
It is not simply that a symbolic system - in this case art -
represents concepts already formed prior to their representation in 
terms of that symbolic system. Rather, the act of representing in 
terms of a symbolic system itself determines the precise nature of 
those concepts which emerge or become formed during the act. 
Field (1970) provides an example of this in relation to art education: 
When young children draw, aspects of their 
view of their world are being confirmed 
or modified in accordance with changing 
experience. In this recurrent process it is 
not merely that the child's drawing reflects 
his concepts: it plays a part in their formation. 
(p. 8) 
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Hobert Hughes (1963) also describes how precise meaning is l:::ound by, 
and is unique to the particular symbolic system in which a concept or 
image is embedded. In this case, Hughes explains how even meaning 
within the visual arts cannot be transferred from one form of 
representation to another and remain quite the same. Heferring to one 
of his own drawings (of a scarecrow), Hughes states, 
The 'same' image as this scarecrow, 
in paint, is a different image altogether. 
One's medium is not a passive vehicle 
for making a form or an idea lmown. It 
helps determine the form, and it modifies 
the idea. 
(in Lynn, 1963, p.35) 
Thus meaning is inherently bound up in the symbolic system which 
represents it. To Hirst (1974), there exists no evidence- nor can it 
exist - to show that meanings reside anywhere else but within the 
symbolic systems used to organise human experience. As Wittgenstein 
has stated, 'The meaning is the use'; and elsewhere, 
All we have are the achievements of the 
process (of thought) in symbolic 
occurrences. 
(in Hirst, 1974, p.71) 
Theories based on the notion that generalisations of reality -
concepts - are inseparable from the syrnl:::olic system which represent 
them awe much to the work of Vygotsky. In his pioneering work of the 
1930 s, Vygotsky was concerned with the relationship between thought 
and language. He maintained that the very nature of verbal thought 
was based upon V\Ord meaning: 'Thought is not merely expressed in 
words; it canes into existence through them.' (1966, p.l25). He 
opposed the 'association theory' advanced by the 'old schools of 
psychology', for whom 
The word was seen as the external 
concommitant of thought, its attire 
only, having no influence on its inner 
life. 
(1966, p.l22) 
Vygotsky quotes the poet Mandelstam to make his point: 
, •. 'I have forgotten the Vibrd I intended to say, 
and my thought, uneml.x::>died, returns to the 
realm of shadows.' 
(in Vygotsky, 1966, p.ll9) 
Vygotsky conceived that if thought and hence meaning were inseparable 
fran language, then just as language has demonstrably evolved so must 
thought and meaning, albeit more surrogately, also have changed: 
It is not merely the content of a word 
that changes, but the way in which reality 
is generalised and reflected in a word. 
(1966, pp.l21-l22) 
Vygotsky's conception of the essentially dynamic universe of thought 
and language extended to the more localised dialectical relationship 
between thought and 'INOrd. Such a dialectic, repeated over and over, 
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rnay be identified as the basic mechanism for the broader evolution of 
language and hence thought. Thus Vygotsky explains, 
The relation of thought to word is not 
a thing but a process, a continual movement 
back and forth from thought to word and 
from word to thought. 
(p.l25) 
Britton (1972) applies the principle of dialectic to a somewhat more 
general domain, one that admits artistic, as well as verbal 
representation. He states, 
·ance we see man as creating a representation 
of his world so that he may operate in it, 
another order of activity is also open to him: 
he may operate directly upon the representation 
itself. 
(p.l2l) 
The dialectic interaction between thought and wo~d as described by 
Vygotsky is here extended by Britton to apply to the relationship 
which exists between the individual and symbolic representation in 
general. 
The dialectic principle is uppermost in marxist theories of art. The 
dialectic process is concerned witl1 progressive penetration of a 
concept, with that concept becaning modified by virtue of its being 
represented in some form. The consequer1t externalised representation 
of the concept ...: its symbolic form - thus becomes the medium for the 
dialectic process. The purpose of this penetration - this dialectic -
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is to facilitate knowing. 'l'hus a particular characteristic of rneaning 
is that, by being represented, it is also ever-unfolding. This 
dynamic dialectic process of concept/representation/new concept/new 
representation - a process which presumably may go on indefinitely -
is a cognitive process. 
'I'his would mean that cognition itself is bound up in the symbol 
systems used for the representation of experience. Such systems do 
not simply represent existing concepts, existing knowledge. By 
deploying a particular symbolic system, the individual will1 as Field 
has pointed out, discover a concept in elaborated form. He or she 
will arrive at knowledge by means of the symbol system used, but the 
particular nature of that knowledge will itself be exclusive to that 
system. 
What are the implications of this for art? Essentially three 
propositions are being advanced. The first is that art is like 
language, in that it is a symbolic system utilized for the 
organisation and representation of experience. The second proposition 
is that, as such, the structure , function and nature of artistic 
representation parallel those pertaining to language, and Yv'Ork in this 
latter field has illuminated our knowledge of artistic knowing. The 
third proposition, however, by claiming that the particular nature of 
concepts or meanings is peculiar to the particular symbolic system 
used for its representation, thereby implicitly distinguishes between 
artistic and linguistic meanings and suggests that the nature of 
knowledge in art is unique. 
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If artistic representation, by m2ans of the dynamic dialectic meaning-
revealing process, is able to provide for greater knowing and if, at 
the same time, the particular nature of that knowledge is exclusive to 
artistic representation itself, it would seem that a case could be put 
for artistic knowledge to become significantly manifest in school 
curriculum, concerned as curriculum is with the overall cognitive 
development of the child. 
Hirst builds his conception of curriculum comprising various unique 
forms of knowledge - or different ways of knowing - on such a 
rationale. He includes artistic knowing as one such unique way. 
If it is accepted that all human symbolic systems constitute ways of 
organising and cormnunicating experience, of apprehending the temporal 
and spiritual world, then it would seem to follow that the elements of 
those systems which carried these experiential meanings would have to 
actually refer in some way to t~e content itself of experience in 
order for meanings to be made known. Symbols must possess referents 
in order to be symbols. It is in the nature of the res recti ve form of 
their referents that art and language fundamentally differ. 
In a drawing, particular lines may refer to a cat, for example. That 
is, a line may stand for, or is an abstraction, a symbol of a visual 
phenornenom (a cat) which exists in the 'external' world .. The ability 
to project the meaning of 'cat' into the line would der;end upon one's 
knowledge of the nature and function of the syml:::x)lic system itself (in 
this case drawing) as well as, r;erhaps, a rudimentary knowledge of 
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four-footed furry animals. 
The same may be said to be true if language were to be used t.o 
represent the same subject matter: that is, a cat. In order to 
understand the meaning of the word 'cat', one mus~again, possess 
knowledge of the symbolic system itself which has been used (in this 
case the English language) . As well, however, a c.unsiderably m:::>re 
elaborate, in fact, specific knew ledge of cats would be necessary for 
the word 'cat' to have any meaning. 
In differentiating between language and art, Hirst claims (1974) that 
'the noises and marks' themselves of words are distinguishable fran 
their meanings, but that in artistic images, on the other hand, 
' .•. meaning is not separable fran those noises and marks' (p.l56). 
By this argument, an artistic image does more than simply refer to or 
signify a concept. In the very representation of a concept, the 
artistic image also presents character and meaning which are embedded 
within, and are inseparable from the form of representation itself. A 
work of art depicts not only knowledge about a subject, as do words: 
it also canmunicates knowledge of a subject. 
Thus the artists who participated in the early French and English 
expeditions of discovery to Terra Australis would, through their 
pictorial representations of hitherto unknown creatures, be able to 
provide knowledge of how these creatures looked to people unaware of 
the existence of such creatures at home. In contrast, words alone-
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such as 'kangaroo', 'koala', 'platypus' - would comnunicate only 
knowledge about the existence of such creatures; and even elaborated 
verbal descriptions of them would still rely on a string of conceptual 
associations between words and their referents. 'rhe 'noises and 
marks' of descriptive words would still not of themselves communicate 
the nature of their referents without a whole complex of abstract 
concepts existing in the minds of an audience. 
To Hirst, therefore, works of art do not, in the strict sense, 
constitute a language. For unlike words, visual images are not 
'statements about' but are instead 'expressions of' (1974, p.l57). He 
quotes Louis Arnaud Reid's statement, 
The perceptuum does not 'symbolise' or 
'mean' something else which is, aesthetically 
and in aesthetic experience, distinct from itself: 
aesthetic meaning is embcx:lied. 
(in Hirst, 1974, p.l57) 
In this sense, art rray be conceived in the ten1S proposed by 
Wittgenstein with regard to language: that art, like language, is a 
form of life. That is, artistic experience and artistic meaning 
cannot exist outside an artistic context, or outside artistic 
statements themselves. 
Here the emphasis is placed upon the integral relationship which 
exists between art and artistic meanings. This is to direct attention 
to artistic products, or outcomes. Wollheim (1978) applies this 
principle of the inseparability of form and meaning in art also to the 
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artistic process, and to what may be considered the initial step in 
this process: the artistic impulse itself. He points to 
'l'he error ... of thinking that there is 
an artistic impulse that can be 
identified independently of the institutions 
of art. It does not follow that there is no 
such thing as artistic impulse. On the 
contrary, there is, where this means the 
impulse to produce something as a work of 
art: ... where this means the attitude of seeing 
something as a work of art. 
(p.l23) 
According to this view, an artist's perception of the world would 
often tend to be in terms pertinent to art - that is, in terms of 
artistic products. Gornbrich (1977) suggests that an artist's 
perception is more than simply affected, but is determined by his 
knowledge of the institutions of art, of artistic precedents, or 
products. 
This Gombrich encapsulates in his statement, 
The artist does not paint what he sees; 
he sees what he r:aints. 
(1977, p.284) 
The conclusions, from a psychological perspective, by M.D. Vernon 
(1971) verify this conception of the integral relationship between 
one's knowledge of a representational form and what is actually 
perceived in one's world. She states, 
We have frequently noted that the object 
perceived in a complex field, and the clarity 
and accuracy with which they are perceived, 
appear to be related to the observer's 
'interest' in perceiving the~. 'Interest' 
usually possesses the implication that there is 
some strong and persistent motive in the observer 
which has impelled him to observe, investigate, 
and acquire knowledge about some set of objects 
or ideas in the world around him. Thus when we 
say that an observer perceives something because 
he is interested in such things, we imply both that 
he is knowledgeable about them, and also that he is 
eager to perceive and learn more about them. 
(p.l80) 
ranger (1953) maintains that each of the so-called expressive art 
forms is structured upon, and grows out of the dominance of a 
particular human sense. Thus art, to Ianger, is unique in its over-
riding emphasis on the sense of vision. 
Perhaps, therefore, a case could be put that education in art should 
principally involve the education of vision. Ait e)ucatlon may tl1us 
be concerned with educating people how ·to 'see' and in ways which may 
lead to their developing capacity to understand and represent meanings 
in what they see. In short, art education vvould be principally 
concerned, as Eisner (1977) asserts, with the education of perception. 
The linguists, aestheticians and psychologists cited in this section 
all point to a relationship existing between knowledge, impulse and 
expression: in other vvords, between cognition, perception and 
representation. The absolute interdependence of cognition and 
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perception constitutes the central thesis and is summed up in the 
title of Arnheim's (1969) book, Vi_§_ual Thinking. 
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CONCLUSION: WHAT MIGifr COUNr AS ART IN SCHOOLS. 
If perception - seeing - is so dependent upon cognition - knowing 
the~ art educators who accept that they are primarily in the business 
of educating perception are thus provided wit~ what amounts to a 
philosophical framework for determining the content of art curricula. 
In essence, this is a framework of knowledge. Methodologically, this 
would imply that the ·teacher should ensure that knowledge is acquired, 
not that such acquistion be left to chance. 'I'his in turn would 
involve the teacher in specifying what may be considered appropriate 
knowledge and in imparting it. With regard to the latter, the teacher 
would need to devise appropriate ways for the knowledge to be 
imparted. Essentially, however, the over-arching focus of art 
curriculum would be on developing visual perception, on the capacity 
to 'see' - to be capable of p2netrating, representing and deriving 
meaning from the world principally through the S61Se of vision. 
Eisner (1977) asserts an active, determining role for the art teacher 
in this regard .. He states, 
What I think some people fail to realize 
is that the ability to perceive is a learned 
ability. We are not born with sight; we 
acquire it through experience, through 
trial and error. To see something is to have 
constructed intellectually a perceptual 
realisation . 
... Art teachers have an enormous contribution 
to make to the growing child by helping him 
to keep his visual exploration going. 
(pp.l-2) 
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'l'he notion of the educability of vision to which Eisner alludes is 
powerfully reinforced by anthropological studies. McFee (1980) cites 
a study by Turnbull on the visual perception of pygmies, in which a 
group of pygmies was taken out of the forest for the first time and 
into a plain. Elephants, though familiar to the pygmies, were 
perceived as insects when seen from a distance of about a mile. With 
their prior environmental knowledge having been gained always at 
relatively short focal distances in their dense jungle habitat, these 
pygmies simply never knew - and hence could not perceive - that things 
drastically reduce in apparent size as they become more distant. 
(McFee, 1980, pp.48-49) 
In another study, Forge (In !'1ayer, 1970) describes how the Abelan 
community in the Sepik District of Papua - New Guinea were incapable 
of perceiving the content of pictures - even of photographs of 
themselves. These people possessed no prior knowledge of the 
convention itself of pictorial representation (pp. 269-291). Again, 
the capacity to perceive was seen to depend upon the possession of 
knowledge. 
Perception and cognition are inter-dependent. Arnheim (1969) 
:maintains that it is not merely that knowing facilitates seeing, but 
that the deeper perception which the knowledge affords in turn effects 
deeper, or more comprehensive knowledge, and so on. The relationship 
between perception and cognition is a spiral one. It is a virtual 
dialectic, a closely similar :manifestation to that described by 
Vygotsky in relation to thought and language. 
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How might the education of visual ~rception benefit representation 
in, and appreciation of art? It would be consistent with the above 
conclusions to claim that when a work of art is confronted, it is 
apprehended by the individual by means of that individual's complex 
~rceptual apparatus, which in turn is built upon the individual's 
prior visual knowledge. The more expansive an individual's knowledge 
of words the more precise, subtle or sophisticated would be his or her 
ability to identify concepts and ~rceive meanings in verbal 
statements. Similarly, the more expansive an individual's knowledge 
of visual form, the more precise, subtle or sophisticated may be his 
or her ability to identify concepts and perceive meanings in visual 
statements. 
How does one develop one's vocabulary of words? Surely this would 
occur through engaging in the use of words, which would be to engage 
also in the world which words both comprise and describe. The same, 
perhaps, holds true for art. Through practising art, and thereby 
entering into the world of forms out of which an expanding visual 
vocabulary , which includes technical knowledge, is constructed, it may 
be possible to develop a progressively greater capacity to both 
perceive and represent meaning in visual forms. 
The study of art, therefore, essentially involves the study of visual 
forms, and since visual forms are there to see, as it were, in the 
visual world, it is the visual world which should, therefore, 
constitute the principal focus of study. 
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Klee insisted upon the necessity for the artist to continue to study 
and represent visual forms from the real world, particularly natural 
forms. However, Klee regarded such studies as means, not ends. He 
regarded such studies as essential, nevertheless, for they served to 
supply what he called the creative unconscious of the artist with an 
ever-expanding vocabulary of forms out of which ·the artist's own 
world of rreaning could re created. He stated (in Lynton, 1961), 
Nature, if we love her, will ultimately 
lead us into liberty. Of course the 
painter must study nature. You know it! 
J.:X) it. It is rrore sensible than poetising 
or borrowing from the primitives. Follow 
the natural paths of creation, the genesis 
and functions of forms. That is the best 
school. Through nature you will perhaps 
achieve your own configurations and one 
day, re nature yourself, creating like nature. 
(p.66) 
Advising art educators, Klee implored them, 
When the demand arises, lead your pupils 
to nature, into nature. Let them experience 
how a bud forms,how a tree grows, how a 
butterfly opens its wings, so that they may 
become as rich, a.3 wilful a~; natw:e. 
Contemplation is revelation; contemplation 
is insight into God 's v;orkshop. There, in 
the lap of nature, lies the secret of creation. 
(in Lynton, pp 73-74) 
Here Klee describes the cognitive process of abstraction in art. He 
does not suggest that it is the end of art to faithfully represent, to 
create illusions of a particular bud, tree or butterfly. Rather, he 
explains the significance of developing knowledge of principles of 
visual forms, which, once these are known and internalised may be 
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~reatively employed by the artist in the configuration of new images 
evoking (like dreams) new, albeit often suoconsciously related 
meanings. 
Rodgers (1970) describes this internalisation of general principles in 
the structure and character of visual forms as canprehension of the 
'logic of form' of a particular subject. Though his concern is with 
'sculptural thinking' as opposed to pictorial representation, Rodgers 
prescribes the same course as Klee. That is, tl1e sculptor should, 
according to Rodgers, begin with and continue to produce analytical 
studies of subject-matter, particularly of natural forms. By such 
means, the particular logic of a natural object 's form will become 
known and internalised. 
After time- again in common with Klee's notion- the artist will 
become cognizant of various logical general principles in the nature 
of visual form. With this knowledge, according to Rodgers, a sculptor 
is able to operate at a level of phenomenoma - apprehending which he 
describes as 'advanced thinking in three-dimensions' . Advanced 
thinking in 3-D is distinct fran 'ordinary thinking in 3-D' by which he 
describes the level involved simply in the everyday practical 
negotiation of one's environment. 
With this internalised knowledge of the logic of forms acquired 
tl1rough the study of actual forms, the sculptor is thereby able to 
represent, in terms of his or her own visual forms, new meanings. The 
meaning of an image may be comnunicated when an audience, however 
unconsciously, 'read' the image through their own usually tacit 
ordinary knowledge of the universal principles of form which the 
sculptor has manipulated and which are alluded to in the work. Again 
it may be seen that perception is dependent upon knowledge. 
As Forge (1970) and McFee (1980) show, however, the requisite 
knowledge amounts to more than knowledge of, and hence a capacity to 
perceive artists' subject-matter as it is known and experienced in the 
physical world (that is, knowledge of an image's referent). The 
perception of artistic images also requires knowledge of artistic 
imagery itself. That is, artists ' meanings are represented in terms 
of the symbolic system which is art in precisely the same way that an 
individual's verbal representation of experience is expressed in 
language. 
It is obvious that, notwithstanding the significance of expressional 
accanpaniments to language, an understanding of the meanings expressed 
by an individual speaking a rerticular language require on the p:~rt. of 
an audience that they too be cognizant of that same language. The 
same holds true for art. 
Here a task for art education is clearly implied. Tha·t is, as well as 
acquiring knowledge of artistic principles through the practice of 
art, it would seem that a study of the history of art would provide a 
way of discovering the vast domain which constitutes the art language. 
1£52 
However, a great many overtly utilitarian artefacts of contempxary 
culture which do not pllr]X)rt to be art objects at all have yet 
intentionally been produced so as to play a role in culture which 
anthropologists identify as the role of art. They are forms which, 
like conventional art images, rely on the perception of meaning 
deriving from and imparted by the canbination of visual elements of 
the artefacts themselves. An example is the automobile. 
The design of cars has not involved purely functional or other 
practical criteria such as aerodynamics, structural integrity, safety, 
fuel efficiency and price. Cars have been designed in certain ways 
for other reasons, and these reasons essentially revolve round the 
concept of image. 
Every car projects an image; but the image embodied in the car is the 
image not of the car itself but rather the image of its owner. In 
this way the car serves as a totem, embodying meanings which extend 
far deeper than those concerned purely with utility. Cars may project 
meanings about the owner's status, social class, age, personality, 
values and sex. They are affirma.tions of identity. Since they would 
thus constitute, in Kubler's terms,a system of symbolic communication 
they would also, by this criterion, also count as art. 
Artefacts of this order may superficially be considered as objects of 
design, but their cultural meanings are essentially artistic meanings. 
As such, the study of such artefacts in terms of their import as 
visual forms in culture would constitute a legitimate curriculum 
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enterprise in art education. Art ~~ucation is therefore concerned, 
as part of the education of vision, also with the study of semiotics. 
Clearly, a high school art class could not be expected to actually 
make a real car; but this inability would not of itself diminish the 
potential of a semiotic orientation in the study of automobiles in 
culture for that class. Indeed, the actual manufacture of a car would 
be irrelevant and counter-productive in an art curriculum which 
adopted a semiotic approach. 
At the same time, however, to involve children in drawing, 
photographing, filming or making ceramic forms, junk sculpture or 
collages which would represent tl1eir ideas about the embedded meanings 
which they perceived in cars, of the symbolic meaning of the car in 
contemporary culture, would be entirely compatible with the semiotic 
approach. To reoresent the car is to engage in art; to make a car is 
to engage in design and craft. 
Making, then, is important to art, but it is not simply any kind of 
making which is important. The making proper to art is that which 
serves the purpose of representing. 
Nor is the making alone the appropriate mode of learning in art. For 
when artistic meaning is conferred onto objects which have yet been 
produced outside the institutions of art - that is , with no artistic 
intent having been brought to bear in their making - the mode 
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by which these objects have been apprehended a~ rreaningful art fonns 
is usually (perhaps fundamentally) verbal. 
As Field (1970) claims, talking about art is of equal importance to 
practising art. In talking about art, one may well be describing 
artistic processes, but a semiotic approach often ignores 
consideration of process. Its concern is with the symbolic meaning of 
products - with the import of visual forms - often irrespective of the 
processes which have brought these products into being. 
While there exist certain processes, such as oil painting and bronze 
sculpture, involving the manipulation of materials which are peculiar 
to art, such processes of the.rn.selves do not define art. For art 
objects may be intended but they may also be attributed. In respect 
of the latter, another kind of representational process is involved: 
the verbal. 
And just as realising artistic meaning in an intended art object 
through the manipulation of, say, oil paint may constitute a creative 
process, so realizing through discourse artistic meaning in artefacts 
not so intended may similarly constitute a creative process. 
The problem with the panacaea of Art-as-Creative-Process lay not with 
the view that the fostering of creativity is important in education. 
To foster creativity is important. The problem with the panacaea is 
that its followers have conceived of creativity in such extremely 
narrow terms: specifically, that the making of art is the supreme 
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creative act. And further, they believe that, as such, to engage and 
support the child (unfettered) in art-making is the primary task of 
art educators. 
Witkin (1974) describes as distinctive of art that it is concerned 
with the 'iconic' rather than the 'discursive' rrode of representation. 
It is true that if art is about the import of visual form, its focus 
should be upon iconic meanings. However, the deliberate production of 
iconic meanings requires the ability to comprehend iconic meanings. 
This applies even at the earliest stages of infancy when the child 
first perceives iconic meanings. 
Iconic meanings can be infinitely more subtly suggestible, rrore 
complex, than those perceived by the small infant. Yet even the small 
infant's apprehension of iconic meaning involves description: in this 
case, simply naming. With respect to the considerably rrore elaborated 
iconic meanings encountered by the adolescent, a proportionately more 
elaborated capacity for verbal description is demanded. And just as 
the simple naming of an image can constitute a major creative act on 
the part of a small infant, so can an elaborated description by an 
adolescent. 
In each case, the individual concerned must possess the capacity for 
engaging in, and realising such meanings. In art education, 
therefore, it would seem that learning about the nature of description 
in art constitutes an important curriculum domain. 
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Thus the iconic and the discursive should not be regarded as mutually 
exclusive in art education, but mutually dependent. For it is largely 
by means of discourse that the nature of iconic rreaning is 
comprehended. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the particular iconic meanings 
in an individual's work of art can be precisely translated into verbal 
discourse: earlier discussion has attempted to show that this is not 
possible. For the particular meanings arrived at in a work of art are 
unique to that form, as is the particular sensory mode - the visual -
by which experience is encountered also unique. 
Villat verbal discourse is able to realise however, is knowledge of 
iconology itself - the very way of knowing within which the individual 
producing art is engaged. 
It is not, therefore, the study of fine art alone, of design or 
craft so-called - or even integrated activities involving all three -
which should count as Art in the school curriculum. 
What counts as Art is not that which simply fits appropriate 
categories, but rather human-made visual fonns of any kind which 
possess intended, unintended, irrrnediate or latent iconic significance: 
that is, fonns which represent meanings for an individual, a group or 
an entire culture. 
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